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LOAN CONTROLS IN THE CARIBBEAN

Out of the adjustments of debts which the economic crisis is bringing about, new standards are arising as to the conditions under which obligations may be assumed and as to the respective rights of debtors and creditors. Mortgage legislation of wide variety is being adopted by many state legislatures, "blue sky laws", formerly a field of experiment only in our states, have now their counterpart in the "Securities Act of 1933" adopted by congress. Even to international loans where the maxim of *caveat emptor* has heretofore had widest application, new rules are now to apply through the activities of the Corporation of Foreign Security Holders which it is contemplated to set up under the "Corporation of Foreign Bondholders Act" of May 27, 1933.

The new attempts to regulate the sort of investments into which the savings of the people will be allowed to flow, whether they involve ventures in domestic or foreign finance, are intended primarily to protect the purchaser against putting his money into enterprises about which the information offered him is inadequate or misleading. Securities issued by the United States, or by a state or political division of a state, are by a general clause exempted from the provisions of the law. But securities issued by foreign governments and their subdivisions are specifically included in the regulations. Before bonds can be floated on their behalf on the United States market detailed statements must be filed showing, among other things, their general debt position, default record, revenues,

proposed purpose and amount of the issue, proposed price of issue to the public, and commissions paid.

To defend the rights of holders of foreign securities, and especially the holders of such securities in default, there was to be created by the terms of the law as passed, a corporation made up of six officially appointed directors. The functions of this body were to be broadly comparable to those of the Council of Foreign Bondholders incorporated in Great Britain as long ago as August, 1873. It is to be noted, however, that the directors of the American corporation were to be appointed by an official body—the Federal Trade Commission—while the British controlling group of twenty-one—the Council—is nominated partly by independent outside bodies and partly by the council itself. This portion of the law has not been acted upon and perhaps will remain inoperative. There has been created, however, a less formal committee without official standing which will seek to carry out the intent of the act.

The new "Corporation of Foreign Security Holders", if it be later created, or the less formal committee to be created, may have brought before it many adjustments of foreign security issues which the world crisis has made inevitable. It is not to be expected that it will promptly reach solutions of the problems raised by the numerous defaults. At best, advance in such matters is slow and obviously it may not be in the interest of creditor or debtor to push for a settlement when the economic resources of the latter are at their lowest ebb.

Among the adjustments which must be made, some of the most interesting will be those involving the Caribbean republics. They are, first of all, among the economically weakest of the world's sovereignties. They are monoculture areas in which public income rests on a narrow basis and is subject to fluctuations more violent than in better developed regions. Secondly, the fortunes of their loan services are to a high degree

bound up with the success of the local governments in establishing political stability. Thirdly, their international interests, economic and political, are so closely connected with those of the United States that their bond issues have peculiar significance for the northern neighbor. Finally, there has already come to exist in the Caribbean, partly as a result of the circumstances already mentioned, a variant system of loan controls, some of which are clearly political, others only faintly so. These have attempted to protect the rights of bondholders, and less explicitly, perhaps, the credit position of the borrowers.

Now the object of the "Corporation of Foreign Bondholders Act, 1933", or of the alternative committee, like that of the loan controls already in existence in the Caribbean, is primarily protection of the rights of the bondholders. But in carrying out the duty to "conserve and protect the rights and interests of holders of foreign securities issued, sold, or owned in the United States" the corporation will be drawn into consideration of measures which will improve or impair the general economic position of the borrower. Are not these factors which determine the degree to which the rights of the bondholders may be conserved? Further protection of these rights carries with it the duty of passing judgment as to whether new loans should be made to petitioning governments. Such loans, also, may affect the credit position and the security upon which holders of previous issues rely. In short, interest in the rights of the bondholders implies an interest in all branches of the public finance of the borrowing country. That such is the case has been abundantly proven in the experience of the Caribbean loan controls already in existence. It can hardly cease to be the case in any which may succeed or supplement them.

If this be true, it is of more than passing interest to study the experience which is already available in Caribbean countries to see to what degree the agreements in force have pro-

tected the interests of the lenders and to what degree loan controls have benefited the borrowers through stabilizing the conditions of local public finance. Such a review will show the circumstances to which any new control must adjust itself and some of the financial problems which must be faced in this part of the world in which the United States has so large a stake in political, commercial, and investment lines. It will also raise questions as to whether the new controls proposed are to be independent of those previously established, or supplement or supplant them.

One is struck from the first by the fact that the controls run through a wide variety. They affect, in one form or another, every one of the independent areas except Venezuela, which, after its extraordinary adventures into international finance and politics in the opening years of the century has, through dictatorship and oil royalties, put itself as to public debts in a unique position among the nations of the world. It has no foreign obligations.

In no two of the other republics are the controls of the same sort. They fall into two general classes—those in which the United States by treaty has taken over certain rights and responsibilities and others in which the obligations of this government are less formal or non-existent. But within each of these groups wide variety exists.

In what we may call the "treaty group" fall the earlier less explicit controls in Cuba and Panama and the more detailed measures adopted in the Dominican Republic and Haiti. The treaties with Cuba and Panama include the first experiments by the United States to assure a degree of stability in Caribbean public finance. Both agreements were signed in 1903—the Cuban on May 22, the Panamanian on November 18—and proclaimed the following year—the Panamanian on February 26, before that with Cuba—July 2. The terms of the engagements do not indicate that what is essential for an effective control of foreign borrowing was foreseen.

The clauses in the Cuban treaty which have a bearing on foreign loans stipulated that it would not enter into any treaty which would impair or tend to impair its independence, nor "assume or contract any public debt to pay the interest upon which, and to make reasonable sinking fund provision for the ultimate discharge of which" the ordinary revenues after current government expenses would be inadequate.¹ The hastily drawn Panamanian treaty contained no statement as to any right of control by the United States over local finances except such as might be implied by the first article, "The United States guarantees and will maintain the independence of the Republic of Panama".²

Neither treaty explicitly stated that the United States should be consulted as to any proposed loan nor contemplated the discharge of any functions through which payment of loan services from specified national incomes was to be made. The Cuban agreement by using the indefinite phrase "public debt" left it open whether these words meant only foreign loans or those which might be called "internal" and floating debts, which by compromising domestic finance might make practically inevitable the creation of internal or foreign bond issues of more formal sorts.

It seems that the clauses in both these treaties either did not visualize the financial problems which would arise or sought to postpone any definite statement upon them until they made their appearance. At any rate the actual influence which the United States has come to exercise at times in the finances of both countries has been much greater than the words of the treaties forecast.

In their actual working, until recently, both of the controls established have made creditable showing, in part, at least, owing to the close political association of the countries with

¹ William M. Malloy, *Treaties, Conventions, International Acts, Protocols and Agreements between the United States and other Powers, 1776-1909*, 2 vols. (Washington, 1910), I. 363-364.

² Malloy, II. 1349.

the United States. On other than purely financial lines, Cuba maintained its debt services without difficulty during the World War due to sugar prosperity and through the hard times following—though this was possible only by a narrow margin during part of the Zayas administration. In later years, also, the Machado government, in spite of steadily falling revenues, fulfilled the debt service.

On the other hand, it is clear that the floating of issues, in form not foreign bonds, such as were involved in the Carretera Central undertaking, shows that the loan control is not an effective one. The external debt on May 31, 1933, was \$159,179,700 and the internal bonds and floating debt about \$53,000,000. Roughly half of the debt was due to the road venture.

Some measure to consolidate all the national debt of some \$200,000,000 now seems to have become necessary as well as arrangements which will make less burdensome the total bond service, including both interest and amortization. Such steps will give temporary relief but they will not, of course, in themselves guarantee that situations such as now confront the republic and its creditors will not again arise.

Panama started like Cuba without any foreign obligations. It had also the \$10,000,000 payment from the United States and the assurance of an annuity of \$250,000. A part of the former amount—some \$6,000,000—was shortly after the founding of the republic invested in the United States.

External loans have not been avoided. Debts have been contracted chiefly for roads, railways, and port improvements, and on August 31, 1928, were reported to total, all branches included, \$19,010,706.^a

Panama, like Cuba, succeeded in keeping up its debt services during the world war, but early in 1933 three-fourths of its external debt went into default.

Two loan controls, those with the Dominican Republic, originally of 1907, and Haiti, of 1915, have been established

^a *Commerce Yearbook*, II. (1932), 463.

which involve more extended control of local finance by the United States, though in these areas the responsibilities do not run indefinitely as to time but are limited to the life of stated bond issues. But for the unwillingness of the United States Senate to assume the responsibilities involved, one with Nicaragua would have come into existence in the period between negotiation of the other two. These agreements show in their texts clauses derived from the earlier experiments and new ones reaching out toward standards which experience had shown were essential if effective stabilization of finance were to be attempted.

The Dominican agreement of February 8, 1907, provided that the president of the United States should appoint a general receiver of Dominican customs and assistants who should collect all the customs until the bonds issued by the government under a plan already worked out with the bondholders should be paid—the payments to be on a minimum schedule but to be raised if the Dominican government so directed or if the national income rose above a stated amount. Both governments were to support the new officers and, until the Dominican Republic had “paid the whole amount of the bonds of the debt, its public debt” was not to be increased except by agreement with the United States and only thus could the import duties be modified.⁴

This was a much more far-reaching control than those which had preceded. It gave an official appointed by the United States government continuing functions in one branch of the activity of a foreign government—the collection of customs, the chief source of funds for the local treasury. It expressly stipulated that the consent of the United States was essential for increase of the public debt and for change of customs. No such provisions were found in the Cuban and Panamanian treaties. On one point, the direct appointment of the general receiver by the president of the United States, the agreement

went farther than any other loan control arrangement entered into by the United States in the Caribbean.

But for effective control even this agreement was weak at a vital point. The phraseology used was not clear as to the meaning of the "public debt" which could not be increased until the "bonds of the debt" had been paid off. Did the phrase forbid increase in the total public debt through internal borrowings—unless the United States consented—or was it only the total of foreign debt which could not be increased? Further, what was the meaning of the phrase in relation to floating debts to which the government might become obligated through expenses incurred in putting down disturbances of the peace? Was the consent of the United States necessary, for example, if borrowings were considered essential for putting down a revolution? If so, did the treaty by implication mean that it should not only affect foreign debts but that the two governments should coöperate to see that the internal finances, including the planning of revenues and expenditures, should be so managed as to prevent such borrowings or at least to minimize the chances that they might become unavoidable? Differences of opinion on such points became a practical issue and helped bring on the long intervention of 1916-1924.

The agreement signed December 27, 1924, reflecting that of 1907 and providing for the refunding of the remaining balance of the first loan and of the borrowings which had occurred in the intervention, included clauses liberalizing the conditions under which the money borrowed was to be repaid, but left the appointment of the general receiver as it had been and repeated the clauses as to the "public debt" which thus, except for a provision for arbitration of differences of opinion still, as before, might prove ground for contest.⁵

The Haitian Treaty of September 16, 1915, the most far-reaching of any of the formal agreements, reflects the phraseology of the previously established control arrangements and

⁵ Text in Sumner Welles, *Naboth's Vineyard*, 2 vols. (New York, 1928), II. 1018-1024.

seeks to avoid the difficulties which had recently arisen under the Dominican agreement. Haiti agreed not to allow "any foreign power" to obtain control over any of its territory, nor enter with such power into any contract which would "impair or tend to impair" its independence.⁶ Neither shall it "contract any debt or assume any financial obligation unless the ordinary revenues of the republic available for that purpose, after defraying the expenses of the government, shall be adequate to pay the interest and provide a sinking fund for the final discharge of such debt". These clauses hark back to the Cuban treaty of 1903. A general receiver, with assistants, is to have the support of both governments in collecting all the customs. Haiti "shall not increase its public debt except by previous agreement with the President of the United States", nor except thus reduce the customs duties. These are paraphrases of clauses in the Dominican agreements.⁷

But it had now become evident from the experience in the Dominican Republic that effective regulation of the customs alone would not assure stability in the public debt, internal or external, and steps were taken to control other income and expenditures as well—thus to secure a hold upon both ends of the purse strings. A customs receiver was set up on the Dominican model and a financial adviser was to be appointed, whose functions in connection with taxes, other than customs and with expenditures, made him the guiding influence in all Haitian public finance. These offices in practice came to be held by the same man.

With the conditions under which this far-reaching control was established we are not here concerned. That it went far beyond the earlier loan controls is evident. Other provisions

⁶ Text of the treaty in Arthur C. Millsbaugh, *Haiti Under American Control, 1915-1930* (Boston, 1931), pp. 211-215. See Articles VIII and XI of the Haitian Treaty and Articles I and II of the treaty of 1903 with Cuba.

⁷ Article III of the Dominican agreement of 1907 and Articles VIII and IX of the Haitian treaty. The latter provides that the agreement for increase shall be with the president of the United States, the former that it shall be with "the United States".

of the agreement led out into many of the primary functions of the local government and established powers, the exercise of which, if successful, would materially contribute to the stability of the loan services and strengthen the general financial position of the government. Another change was in the manner of appointment of the financial control officers. In the Dominican treaty they were appointed by the president of the United States. In the Haitian by the president of Haiti "upon nomination by the President of the United States".

There can be no doubt that both of these treaties have had a stabilizing influence on the finances of the countries in which they operate. The Dominican debt, assumed after scaling of the claims had come to be about \$20,000,000 at the time of the treaty of 1907. The total has varied subsequently with repayments and new bond issues. At one time in 1920 it had fallen to \$9,322,000. Increased by later loans it had again fallen on December 31, 1932, to \$16,498,500.

In recent years, however, owing to the world crisis and the effects of the hurricane of 1930, the regular service of the foreign debt has not been maintained. All revenues declined rapidly after 1930 and the Dominican Government informed the Department of State that it found it necessary in order to maintain the primary functions of government to adopt emergency legislation, violative of the loan contracts and the treaty, temporarily diverting payment of certain customs income to the national treasury and postponing payment of amortization charges.⁸ Interest payment on all issues was continued. It was hoped that the emergency legislation would cease to operate at the end of 1933.

The control in Haiti has given uniformly satisfactory results in the service of the foreign loans but this is not only owing to the terms of the loan control. During most of the period since 1915 the financial position of the country was

⁸ This action was taken by the Foreign Debt Emergency Law of October 23, 1931. The suspended amortization payments amounted to \$1,851,666 per annum. The interest charges stood at \$918,000 per annum.

strengthened by the fact that coffee, the chief national export, sold at satisfactory prices. Especially after 1922 local order was effectively maintained. The extensive control established over the collection and also the expenditure of public income enabled the country to make the most of the revenues which became available. It was, indeed, enabled to finance public improvements from current revenues in contrast to making loans to pay for them as was done in the Dominican Republic. Finally, in more prosperous years an emergency fund was created to be held to meet deficits in lean years which might be ahead—an arrangement which has proved of value in the current crisis.

When the control was set up the public debt was of indeterminate amount. A large number of claims were outstanding and the floating debt was heavy and increasing. Payments on both the internal and external debts were in arrears.⁹ On September 30, 1915, the total debt was reported as \$153,861,068 gourdes. During the years following, owing to domestic disturbance and the fall of trade during the European war, the total rose to reach the high point of 177,247,900 gourdes in 1918.

Thereafter, the course of the public debt total has tended downward to reach a gross of 72,625,870 gourdes at the end of the fiscal year 1931-1932.¹⁰ It is with justifiable pride that in the midst of a world economic crisis the fiscal officers can report that Haiti continues to meet every obligation.

However satisfactory the loan control has been to the bondholders and as a general stabilizer of public finance, it continues unacceptable to those who look upon the limitation on local control of the purse strings as a shadow on the national sovereignty and an indefensible hindrance to the spending of public funds as the local authorities may freely decide. The

⁹ Haiti, *Annual Report of the Financial Adviser-General Receiver for the Fiscal Year October, 1929-September, 1930*, (Port-au-Prince, n. d.) p. 95. The par value of the gourde is twenty cents, United States currency.

¹⁰ Haiti, *Annual Report . . . October, 1931-September, 1932*, p. 46.

unratified agreement of August 5, 1931,¹¹ and the accord signed August 7, 1933, look toward decrease of the control over both income and expenditures. What effect such a change may have on the efficiency of the control, on public credit, and on the loan services, it will be interesting to note.

In the four controls described the United States government is explicitly or implicitly involved. All the others which have come to exist in the Caribbean are "unofficial". That in Nicaragua is a curious arrangement arising after the negotiations in 1910-1911 looking toward the creation of a customs control similar to that already operating in the Dominican Republic except that the agent was to be chosen from a list of names "presented" by the fiscal agent of the proposed loan, "approved" by the president of the United States and "appointed" by the "government of Nicaragua".¹² The treaty was "defeated" in the committee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate on May 9, 1912. Meanwhile, however, agreements had been negotiated with the creditors of Nicaragua and with American bankers who were to advance emergency funds, on the assumption that the treaty would be adopted and the customs collector was presented, approved and "appointed". The approval was accompanied by a reservation that it did not indicate intention to give any "protection" other than would be accorded "to any legitimate American enterprise abroad".¹³

Nevertheless, the customs collectorship on this narrow basis went into operation on December 6, 1911, and has continued to operate to the present day uninterruptedly, the functions of its officers being from time to time greatly enlarged—especially since 1918 when the "control" undertook collection

¹¹ "Executive Agreement Series", No. 22, *Haitianisation* (Washington, 1931), Article VI.

¹² Text in *The United States and Nicaragua* (Washington, 1932), p. 128. The appointment thus was made by the local government as in the later Haitian agreement. In the Dominican agreement the appointment was by the United States.

¹³ *For. Rel.*, 1912, p. 1080.

of most of the revenues for the service on bonds representing the internal debt.

In the years following, Nicaraguan national finance has gone through an extraordinary series of ups and downs in which at times it has seemed to some observers that the country was in danger of being "absorbed" by American financial interests. The loans by them, however, have never been large in amount, and the mortgages on national assets have in the long run been discharged. The chief foreign obligation is a British one, the external debt of 1909 totaling £1,250,000. Of this issue there were bonds in circulation on February 1, 1933, representing £487,780. The Guaranteed Customs Bonds of 1918, the only other outstanding issue, had been reduced from \$3,744,150 to \$1,117,750.¹⁴ Amortization payments by 1932 were five years ahead of schedule on the former loan and seventeen years ahead on the latter, and there were no outstanding obligations to American bankers.¹⁵

Nicaragua, however, like the Dominican Republic, has suffered misfortunes plus such sharp decline in national revenues that in current years it has had to ask its creditors to agree to modify the loan contract as to amortization payments. Payments were kept up during 1931 and the bonded debt reduced by more than C\$370,000.¹⁶ Then, owing to the world crisis, the earthquake which destroyed the capital on March 31, 1931, and the withdrawal of United States marines, whose expenditures had favorably affected the financial condition of the country, the situation became more difficult. Reduction of the bonded indebtedness fell to C\$82,000; interest thereon was

¹⁴ Nicaragua, *Report of the Collector-General of Customs and High Commission for 1932* (Managua, 1933), pp. 92, 93, and 107.

¹⁵ Statement of Irving A. Lindberg, Collector General of Customs, February 21, 1932, in *New York Times*, February 21, II. 8:5, 1932.

¹⁶ *Nicaragua Memoria del Recaudador-General de Aduanas y Alta Comision por 1931* (Managua, 1932), p. 3. The cordoba at par has a value equal to the United States dollar.

paid but amortization proceeded only at a reduced rate.¹⁷ The bondholders, owing to the good record which had been made, agreed to the temporary modification of the sinking fund payments. Nicaraguan bonds, indeed, were "quoted higher than any other known Latin American issues".¹⁸

The record made, like that in Haiti, is not owing only to the loan control. United States forces have been in the republic during the greater part of the period since the customs collectorship was established. They were an influence strengthening the position both by their presence and by the expenditures made in the country. In addition, the creation of the High Commission, with functions touching other sources of revenue besides customs and with *de facto* influence on budget operations generally, has helped to make the record better than it might otherwise have been.

There remain for briefer consideration the other controls not resting on treaties but on specific loan contracts which either (1) set up agencies representing the lenders, operating continuously in the borrowing country or elsewhere to protect their rights, or (2) contemplate the setting up of such agencies when and during such periods as default may occur, or (3) merely pledge the honor of the borrowing country to devote the proceeds of certain revenues to pay interest and amortization charges on stated loans.

In the first class fall Salvador and Honduras. In both cases, while no formal connection with the lenders' governments exists, the agreements have involved degrees of co-operation with them.

The Salvadorean control illustrates both the coöperation which can be established with unofficial outside agencies and

¹⁷ Nicaragua, *Report of the Collector-General of Customs and High Commission for 1932*, p. 3, as of February 28, 1933. A similar operation had occurred as to the bonds of 1909 in 1917. Full service was resumed in January, 1920, and arrears paid off in August, *Fifty-eighth Annual Report of the Council of the Corporation of Foreign Bondholders . . . for the Year 1931* (London, n. d.), pp. 305-306.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 8.

the weakness attending them. An arrangement consummated in 1923 aimed to stabilize handling of all the debts of the republic, internal and external. Three issues of securities totaling about \$21,500,000 were made claims on 70 per cent of the customs income, and if this were not sufficient, on the total customs revenue. A fiscal agent, representing the lenders, created a service in the republic directly to supervise the customs in coöperation with local officials. In case debt service should fall into arrears, the customs administration was to be turned over to a collector general appointed by Salvador from two persons selected by the fiscal agent with the concurrence of the secretary of state of the United States. An exchange of notes carried the assurance that the governments would coöperate to see that the contract was carried out and disagreements as to its meaning were to be arbitrated by the United States judiciary, the decision of which was to be "final and conclusive".¹⁹

In the first years following its making the arrangement worked smoothly. The pledged revenues proved much greater in yield than was required by the debt service. The loan contract, however, since 1931 has not been observed. The fall in the price of coffee—on which government income greatly depends—has put the people and government in a less favorable position, though the pledged income has continued in excess of the demands of the bond service.

More important as an influence in breaking the contract has been the overthrow of the established government by the Martínez group at the end of 1931. This new government, until recently unrecognized by the United States, took over the customs administration in January, 1932, and on February 27 by executive decree suspended customs collection under the loan contract. The government is now in default on all of

¹⁹ Texts of the agreements in *Diario Oficial*, San Salvador, Viernes, 21 de Julio de 1922, Núm. 163.

its \$12,663,000 of outstanding foreign debt.²⁰ The steps which may be taken later to secure observance of the agreement will be an interesting demonstration of the efficacy of loan control independent of treaties.

An exceptional and almost curious arrangement for loan control is that obtaining in Honduras, in more than one respect the weakest of all the Central American republics. After more than a century of floundering in international finance in which the republic was subject to some of the worst abuses in foreign borrowings found in the history of the world, debts which with arrears were estimated as high as \$154,000,000 were adjusted by an agreement of 1926, to about \$6,000,000 to be paid without interest in sixty semi-annual half yearly instalments.²¹ In the negotiations agents of Great Britain were influential. The funds for these payments were to be collected through an issue of stamps handled by a designated New York bank. These stamps could be bought only through that agency and were to be affixed to all consular invoices of goods to be imported into Honduras to the amount of three per cent of the value of the invoice. The bank on its part was to make the debt payments, drawing on other consular revenues if necessary and turning any surplus balances back to Honduras.²²

This is an exceptional sort of loan service and one which it does not seem likely will have many counterparts. It is interesting to note, however, that up to the present the income from the consular stamps has been sufficient to allow the regular service of the debt and to provide in addition substantial amounts placed at the unrestricted disposal of Honduras.

The Costa Rican unofficial loan control is in the detail of

²⁰ American Council of Foreign Bondholders, Letter 28, May 18, 1933. The total is variously reported. The outstanding principal of the loan of 1922 was officially given as \$17,132,000 on June 30, 1933.

²¹ Text in *Fifty-third Annual Report of the Council of the Corporation of Foreign Bondholders for the Year 1926* (London, 1927), pp. 246-249.

²² In 1928, a new loan of \$1,500,000 by the Marine Bank and Trust Company of New Orleans was guaranteed by the customs receipts of Tela, Puerto Cortes, and Puerto Castilla. The service on this loan is being regularly maintained.

arrangements for payments the most elaborate found in the Caribbean countries. Some of its provisions seem to have furnished prototypes for clauses in the Salvadorean contracts though there is no continuing supervision of customs operations provided for normal years.

The oldest loan now unextinguished was made in 1911 and its service was made a preferential charge on the customs. At the end of each half year five-sixths of the amount for the next half-year's service was to be kept in hand by the government. Failure to do so would thus act as a warning signal to the creditors that the financial position of the government was becoming weak. The proportionate amount of the debt service was to be paid to a designated agent monthly and if default occurred the creditors could appoint an agency to collect the customs revenue. Another loan control of 1916 contained similar provisions applying to income from the alcohol and liquor monopoly plus the customs. It required weekly payments. One of 1926 required daily payments. In case of default a special collections agency can be appointed to collect the specified revenues subject to the rights of the holders of previous issues. In case of dispute appeal may be made by either party to judicial officers of the United States whose decision is "final and binding upon all parties. . . ."²³

The amounts involved in this loan control, as indeed in all those in Central America, is relatively small. The control has shown weaknesses in the years of the world crisis and owing to sharp falling off in public income, Costa Rican debt payments have now fallen into arrears in spite of the guarantees.

In 1932, with a budgeted debt service of 9,144,000 colones,²⁴ the national revenue was estimated at 26,407,000 colones. The government felt it could no longer meet its obligations and in August announced that payments on the greater part of its

²³ The text of the contract is found in *La República de Costa Rica and Central Union Trust Company of New York as Trustee . . . Trust Agreement, dated November 1, 1926* (n. p., n. d.).

²⁴ The par value of the colon is twenty-five cents, United States currency.

debt service through 1935 would be made to only about one-tenth of the amount called for in the contract. By May, 1933, Costa Rica was in default on 89 per cent of its \$9,800,000 debt.²⁵ Control of the customs has not been taken by the bondholders.

Guatemala, like the other countries of Central America, has avoided loan contracts in which financial engagements have been undertaken by treaty, though help has been sought from foreign advisers and for a time a foreigner, an American, was employed in planning financial reforms and a recasting of the customs service. Control of public revenues through loan contracts hypothecating certain of them to various creditors, has, however, had many examples and at present affects a very large part of the national income. The customs income, the coffee export tax, the tax on sugar, consular invoices taxes, the liquor tax, profits from railways, electric plants and banks, and the match monopoly all have been pledged in security for loans.

Guatemala escaped the temptations of the recent easy money period less than the other states of Central America. The high current prices for coffee and resultant increase of public income gave at home and abroad a wrong idea of the economic strength of the republic and dimmed the visualization of the fact that prosperous years are quite as good a time to pay off debts as to embark on ambitious national economic ventures. As a consequence of temptation to the latter the Guatemalan obligations have been greatly increased. All but about \$3,500,000 of the outstanding obligations totaling about £1,540,860 plus \$5,500,000 were issued in 1927 or later.²⁶

In current years, Guatemalan revenues, like those of other governments, have suffered sharp declines. In 1928-1929 they

²⁵ The foreign debt was reported in March, 1933, as about \$7,198,000. American Council of Foreign Bondholders, March 21, 1933, Letter No. 24.

²⁶ Not including floating debt items. Several instalments on a subsidy to the International Railways of Central America are reported in arrears.

stood at 15,399,000 quetzales²⁷ but the budget for 1932-1933 estimated them at only 7,980,000. Budgeted expenditures were sharply reduced but early in 1932 amortization payments on the part of public debt were suspended through an informal agreement with the bankers. The budget for 1933-1934 continued to carry an item for payment of interest.²⁸

Colombia, the largest and by far the most populous of the Caribbean republics, had before the remarkable economic advance especially in foreign trade which has occurred in the twentieth century, only moderate foreign borrowings, though, even so, the service thereon was not without interruptions. Only relatively small amounts of the loans made in Europe before 1922 are still outstanding.²⁹ They are with one exception secured on railway properties, or percentages of the entire customs revenue with recourse, if the resources prove insufficient, to the general revenues or portions of the customs revenue of certain ports. A loan in 1922 issued in New York, and extinguished in 1927, gave a lien on customs revenue from two Atlantic ports but was otherwise only a direct external obligation of the republic.

Later, national borrowings dropped specific revenue pledges. American loans of the easy money period are now far the greater part of the foreign debt of the republic, the total of which is much increased if obligations of the Agricultural Mortgage Bank and of the local governmental units, in some cases guaranteed by the national government, be included.

The later rapid increase of foreign obligations was based upon the greater political stability at which the republic seemed to have arrived, the economic activity within the national borders, and the favorable conditions for obtaining loans in the later twenties. Of all the Caribbean countries,

²⁷ The par value of the quetzal is one dollar United States currency.

²⁸ *The South American Journal*, April 29, 1933, stated that interest payments were being maintained.

²⁹ No sterling loans were made to subordinate governmental units in Colombia.

Colombia seemed to be profiting most by the "new era" and fell most heavily under its spell. Its borrowings—at least those directly by the central government—tended to be made without the specific guarantees that were still being demanded of weaker units.

Under the conditions which have developed in more recent years it seems clear that both Colombia and those who loaned that country money were too optimistic as to the future. It is also to be said, however, that the efforts which the republic has made to sustain its credit, though they have not enabled it to meet the terms of the loan contracts, have been commendable and the conditions it has had to face would probably have made it impossible to meet all obligations even if the practice of insisting on more specific pledges of revenue had been continued.

The total debts of Colombia, which reached \$193,732,700 on December 31, 1931, when sinking fund operations were suspended, is now doubtless, if arrears and short term obligations be included, well above \$200,000,000. Departmental and municipal issues defaulted between December 1, 1931, and January 1, 1933. The agricultural mortgage bank issues followed in May, 1933, when sixty per cent of the national debt was reported in arrears. The first default on interest on a national issue came on July 1, 1933.

From this highly varied experience of the Caribbean countries with loan contracts we may draw a number of conclusions. Most of them are only rephrasings of statements applying to all loans, public or private.

1. Foreign borrowings of Caribbean countries should be kept at a lower level than may be permissible in countries industrially better developed. Their public revenues are highly irregular. They cannot rightly rely on domestic or foreign credit to meet the exigencies of periods of budget deficits to as great an extent as can countries economically "stronger." The often made statement that public loans are "safe" if their

services do not take more than say twenty-five per cent of the normal revenue is not justified in the case of the weaker nations.

2. All loan controls are unwelcome. All countries prefer to borrow on their unsecured credit. Weaker countries cannot always do so at reasonable rates and will often prefer to give "guarantees" rather than forego the advantages believed to lie in borrowing. Occasionally they find themselves unable to avoid borrowing, whatever their prejudice against doing so.

3. The borrower wishes to retain as much as possible its freedom of action. It will specifically pledge as little as it can. It will resist giving guarantees, especially if the agency to which the pledge is given is a foreign government. Only less strongly will it object to giving foreign groups of individuals the right to take over functions of the government—such as the collection of taxes. The pledge of certain revenues to the service of a loan stands next in line but best of all, it will feel, is no specific pledge.

The lender's interest runs in reverse order. He wishes to secure the greatest guarantee possible. Best of all is a specific loan control which his government will support as in the current controls in Haiti, the Dominican Republic and, in effect, Nicaragua. Next best are such arrangements as those in Cuba. Less desirable are the unofficial specific controls such as those in Salvador and Costa Rica. Least satisfactory are "guarantees" only pledging certain revenues in general terms.

4. Cases may arise in which the best of controls will fail. Bondholders' rights stand second to those of the local population in public order and other essential functions of government. The modifications agreed to in the controls in the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, and Guatemala are cases in point. Where the dividing line between the rights of the bondholders and the rights of the local population lies must always be a matter on which opinion must be divided.

Facts of these sorts all loan controls must face. They limit

the freedom of action of those in charge of bondholders' interests at present in the Caribbean countries and they will demand no less the study of those who administer the Corporation of Foreign Security Holders or the substitute. Those who supervise the making of new issues to the Caribbean states or the adjustments of old ones will have no easy task when they undertake to protect the interest of their clients and to avoid the abuses both investors and borrowers have heretofore suffered. If they succeed they may develop a better understanding of rights and duties under loan contracts and more general fulfillment of their terms. If they fail international borrowings will continue to contribute to friction and misunderstanding.

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AMERICAN BUSINESS AND THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR

The student who seeks from the standard historians an explanation of why the United States embarked upon the war with Spain and the resulting career of territorial expansion and imperialism can hardly fail to meet with two contradictory opinions. James Ford Rhodes, whose close relations with Mark Hanna enabled him to speak with much authority of the attitude of American business men, has stated in no uncertain terms that "the financial and business interests of the country were opposed to the war".¹ According to this thesis, the war resulted from a combination of humanitarian sympathy for Cuba and popular excitement skillfully engineered by the sensational press, and the annexations which followed were accepted as unsought responsibilities thrust upon the nation by the exigencies of the war. On the other hand, Professor H. U. Faulkner, in his excellent *American Economic History*, contends that the expansion of American industrial and financial power had created a readiness for "financial imperialism", which "provided the great cause for the war".² These two opinions seem irreconcilable. How could the war be caused primarily by the desire of American industry and finance for imperial expansion, and at the same time be opposed by "the financial and business interests of the country"?

Two separate but related questions here call for examination. First, can we accept Rhodes's generalization that American business was opposed to a course which would lead to war with Spain? Second, did American business and finance display an interest in acquiring colonies either before war was

¹ James Ford Rhodes, *The McKinley and Roosevelt Administrations* (New York, 1922), p. 55.

² H. U. Faulkner, *American Economic History* (New York and London, 1924), pp. 624-625.

declared or in the months between the declaration and the peace treaty? Evidence bearing upon these two questions has been sought in a large number of financial and trade periodicals which supposedly spoke the minds of their clientele, in proceedings of chambers of commerce and boards of trade, and in the *Miscellaneous Files* in the department of state, containing letters and petitions from business men and organizations.³ While conclusions drawn from such data are subject to the dangers which beset all studies of public opinion, there seems, on each question, a sufficient preponderance of evidence to warrant a fairly confident answer.

That business sentiment, especially in the east, was strongly anti-war at the close of 1897 and in the opening months of 1898, is hardly open to doubt. Wall Street stocks turned downward whenever the day's news seemed to presage war and climbed again with information favorable to peace.⁴ Bulls and bears on the market were those who anticipated, respectively, a peaceable and a warlike solution of the Cuban question.⁵ The "jingo", in congress or the press, was an object of intense dislike to the editors of business and financial journals,⁶ who sought to counteract his influence by anti-war editorials in their columns.⁷ Boards of trade and chamber of

³ This study was made possible by a grant from the Social Science Research Council.

⁴ Cf. *Wall Street Journal*, December 3 and 31, 1897; January 25, April 21, 1898; *Railway World* (Philadelphia, weekly), XLII. 105, 217 (January 29, February 26, 1898).

⁵ *Wall Street Journal*, December 31, 1897; February 17, 1898.

⁶ *Ibid.*, November 18, December 3, 1897; *Railway World*, *loc. cit.*; *Banker and Tradesman* (Boston, weekly), XXVI. 78 (February 23, 1898); *American Banker* (New York, weekly), LXIII. 528 (March 30, 1898); *Journal of Commerce and Commercial Bulletin* (New York), November 27, 1897; *Commercial and Financial Chronicle* (New York), LXV. 597 (October 2, 1897).

⁷ *Journal of Commerce and Commercial Bulletin*, February 28, 1898; *Commercial and Financial Chronicle*, April 2, 1898; *Boston Journal of Commerce*, LII. 40 (April 16, 1898); *Drugs, Oils and Paints* (Philadelphia, monthly), XIII. 401 (April, 1898); *Railway World*, XLII. 241-242 (March 5, 1898); *Banker and Tradesman*, *loc. cit.*; *Daily Commercial News and Shipping List* (San Francisco), March 25, 1898.

commerce added their pleas for the maintenance of peace to those of the business newspapers and magazines.⁸ So marked, indeed, was the anti-war solidarity of the financial interests and their spokesmen that the jingoes fell to charging Wall Street with want of patriotism. Wall Street, declared the *Sacramento Evening Bee* (March 11, 1898), was "the colossal and aggregate Benedict Arnold of the Union, and the syndicated Judas Iscariot of humanity". Senator Thurston, of Nebraska, charged that opposition to war was found only among the "money-changers", bringing from the editor of *The American Banker* the reply that "there is not an intelligent, self-respecting and civilized American citizen anywhere who would not prefer to have the existing crisis culminate in peaceful negotiations".⁹

This anti-war attitude on the part of several leading financial journals continued up to the very beginning of hostilities. The *New York Journal of Commerce and Commercial Bulletin* declared on February 28 that the only possible excuses for war would be (1) a finding by the naval board investigating the *Maine* disaster that the ship had been destroyed by an official act of the Spanish Government; or (2) a refusal by Spain to make reparation if the board should hold that that country had failed to exercise due diligence in safeguarding the vessel. Either of these events it held to be almost inconceivable. The *Commercial and Financial Chronicle* expressed the belief on March 12 that the opposition of the financial in-

⁸ Chamber of Commerce of the State of New York, *Fortieth Annual Report, 1897-98* (New York, 1898), p. 127; Boston Chamber of Commerce, *Thirteenth Annual Report, 1898* (Boston, 1899), pp. 115-116; Baltimore Board of Trade, *Report of President and Directors for Year Ending September 30, 1898* (Baltimore, 1898), p. 67; Philadelphia Board of Trade, *Sixty-Sixth Annual Report* (Philadelphia, 1899), pp. 50-51; Cleveland Chamber of Commerce, *Fiftieth Year* (Cleveland, 1898), p. 66 Indianapolis Board of Trade, *Annual Report for Year Ending June 1, 1898* (Indianapolis, 1898), p. 20. Of the resolutions printed in these reports, some spoke out strongly against war; others merely commended President McKinley's conservative course in seeking a peaceful solution of the Cuban question.

⁹ *American Banker*, loc. cit.

terests would yet prevent war; and on April 2 the same journal branded as "monstrous" the proposition to settle the Cuban and *Maine* questions by war while the slightest chance remained for a peaceful solution. And on April 16, after the House of Representatives had passed the Cuban resolutions, the *Boston Journal of Commerce* declared: "Sober second thought had but little to do with the deliberations. . . . The members were carried off their feet by the war fever that had been so persistently worked up since the *Maine* explosion. . . ." ¹⁰

The reasons for this attitude on the part of business are not far to seek. Since the panic of 1893 American business had been in the doldrums. Tendencies toward industrial revival had been checked, first by the Venezuela war scare in December, 1895, and again by the free silver menace in 1896.¹¹ But in 1897 began a real revival, and before the end of the year signs of prosperity appeared on all sides. The *New York Commercial* conducted a survey of business conditions in a wide variety of trades and industries, from which it concluded that, "After three years of waiting and of false starts, the groundswell of demand has at last begun to rise with a steadiness which leaves little doubt that an era of prosperity has appeared". January, 1898, said the same article, is "a supreme moment in the period of transition from depression to comparative prosperity".¹² This note of optimism one meets at every turn, even in such a careful and conservative sheet as the *Commercial and Financial Chronicle*. As early as July, 1897, this paper remarked: "We appear to be on the eve of a revival in business"; and in December, after remarking upon

¹⁰ *Com. & Fin. Chron.*, LXVI. 641; *Boston Jour. of Comm.*, LII. 40.

¹¹ G. H. Hull, *Industrial Depressions . . . or Iron the Barometer of Trade* (New York, 1911), pp. 161-173.

¹² *New York Commercial*, January 3, 1898. The only flaw in the picture was continued depression in the cotton goods industry. For notes on this and certain other newspapers I am indebted to the kindness of Miss Bernice I. Beladeau, who allowed me to make use of some material gathered by her in preparation of a master's thesis.

the healthy condition of the railroads and the iron industry, it concluded: "In brief, no one can study the industrial condition of today in America without a feeling of elation. . . ." ¹³ The *Wall Street Journal* found only two "blue spots" in the entire country: Boston, which suffered from the depressed demand for cotton goods, and New York, where senseless rate cutting by certain railroads caused uneasiness. "Throughout the west, southwest and on the Pacific coast business has never been better, nor the people more hopeful." ¹⁴ A potent cause for optimism was found in the striking expansion of the American export trade. A volume of exports far in excess of those of any recent year, a favorable balance of trade of \$286,000,000, and an especially notable increase in exports of manufactures of iron, steel, and copper, convinced practically every business expert that the United States was on the point of capturing the markets of the world. "There is no question," said one journal, "that the world, generally, is looking more and more to the United States as the source of its supply for very many of the staple commodities of life." ¹⁵ Especially elated were spokesmen of the iron and steel industry. Cheaper materials and improved methods were enabling the American producer to undersell his British competitor in Europe and in the British possessions, ¹⁶ and Andrew Carnegie was talking of a great shipbuilding yard near New York to take advantage of these low costs. ¹⁷ The *Iron Age*, in an editorial on "The Future of Business", foretold the abolition of the business cycle by means of a better planned economy, consolidation of railroads and industries, reductions of margins of profit,

¹³ *Com. & Fin. Chron.*, LXV. 134, 1046 (July 24, December 4, 1897).

¹⁴ *Wall Street Journal*, December 23, 1897.

¹⁵ *Banker and Tradesman*, XXVI. 297 (April 20, 1898). Cf. *American Banker*, LXIII. 178 (February 2, 1898); *Age of Steel* (St. Louis, weekly), LXXXIII. No. 1, p. 57 (January 1, 1898); *Rand-McNally Bankers' Monthly* (Chicago), XV. 19 (January 1898); *Statistical Abstract of the U. S.*, 1931, p. 488.

¹⁶ *The Iron Age*, December 9, 1897, p. 22; *Banker and Tradesman*, *loc. cit.*; *Railway World*, XLI. 837 (August 21, 1897).

¹⁷ *Daily Commercial News and Shipping List* (San Francisco), March 7, 1898.

higher wages and lower prices to consumers—in other words a “new deal” resembling that attempted in 1933.¹⁸

To this fair prospect of a great business revival the threat of war was like a specter at the feast. A foreign complication, thought the *Commercial and Financial Chronicle*, in October, 1897, would quickly mar “the trade prosperity which all are enjoying”. Six months later (April 2, 1898), after a discussion of the effect of war rumors on the stock exchange, it declared: “. . . Every influence has been, and even now is, tending strongly towards a term of decided prosperity, and that the Cuban disturbance, and it alone, has arrested the movement and checked enterprise”.¹⁹ The *Banker and Tradesman* saw in the Cuban complication the threat of “a material setback to the prosperous conditions which had just set in after five years of panic and depression”. The same journal summarized a calculation made by the Boston *Transcript* showing that in February, 1898, the wave of prosperity had carried the average price of twenty-five leading stocks to within 5 1-2 points of the high for the preceding ten years and 30 points above the low of 1896, and that the Cuban trouble had, in a little over two months, caused a loss of over ten points, or more than one-third of the recent gain.²⁰ “War would impede the march of prosperity and put the country back many years”, said the *New Jersey Trade Review*.²¹ The *Railway Age* was of the opinion that the country was coming out of a depression and needed peace to complete its recovery. “From a commercial and mercenary standpoint,” it remarked, “it seems peculiarly bitter that this war should have come when the country had already suffered so much and so needed rest and peace.”²²

¹⁸ *The Iron Age* (New York, weekly) December 23, 1897, pp. 19-20.

¹⁹ *Com. & Fin. Chron.*, LXV. 597-599, LXVI. 636.

²⁰ *Banker and Tradesman*, XXVI. 328 (April 27, 1898). Cf. *ibid.*, XXVI. 130 (March 9, 1898).

²¹ *New Jersey Trade Review* (Newark, semi-monthly), March 1, 1898.

²² *Railway Age* (Chicago), XXV. 215, 253 (April 1, 1898).

The idea that war could bring any substantial benefits to business was generally scouted. It would endanger our currency stability, interrupt our trade, and threaten our coasts and our commerce, thought the *Commercial and Financial Chronicle*. It would "incalculably increase the loss to business interests", said the *Banker's Magazine*; while the *United States Investor* held that war was "never beneficial from a material standpoint, that is, in the long run".²³ The *Railroad Gazette* predicted that war would result in "interruption of business enterprise of every kind, stopping new projects and diminution of the output of existing businesses and contraction of trade everywhere". Railroads would lose more than they would gain. Even arms manufacturers were not all agreed that war would be profitable.²⁴ Journals speaking for the iron and steel industry also argued that war would injure business. It "would injure the iron and steel makers ten times as much as they would be benefited by the prevailing spurt in the manufacture of small arms, projectiles and steel plates for war ships", in the opinion of one of these.²⁵ The *American Wool and Cotton Reporter* of New York and the *Northwestern Miller* of Minneapolis agreed that war was never materially beneficial in the long run, while trade journals in Atlanta, Chattanooga, and Portland, Oregon, saw as fruit of the approaching conflict only destruction, debt, and depressed industry.²⁶

²³ *Com. & Fin. Chron.*, LXVI. 308 (February 12, 1898); *Banker's Magazine*, LVI. 358 (March 1898); *U. S. Investor* (Boston, weekly) IX. 529 (April 9, 1898).

²⁴ *Railroad Gazette* (New York, weekly) XXX. 236 (April 1, 1898). As to the position of arms and ammunition manufacturers, it is interesting to find a representative of a New York firm engaged in that trade writing to the secretary of the interior in March, 1898, in behalf of a peaceful settlement in Cuba (M. Hartley to C. N. Bliss, March 16, 17, 1898, in *Miscellaneous Letters* (Dept. of State), March, 1898, II).

²⁵ *Iron and Steel* (Chicago, weekly), LXXII. No. 15, p. 10 (April 9, 1898). Cf. *The Iron Age*, March 17, 1898, p. 21; *The Age of Steel*, LXXXIII. No. 10 (March 5, 1898).

²⁶ *American Wool and Cotton Reporter* (New York, weekly), XII. 439 (April 7, 1898); *Weekly Northwestern Miller* (Minneapolis), XL. 667 (April 29, 1898);

Many conservative interests feared war for the specific reason that it might derange the currency and even revive the free-silver agitation, which had seemed happily dead. The subsidence of that agitation and the prospect of currency reform were among the hopeful factors at the close of 1897.²⁷ It had been not uncommonly charged that the "jingo"es" were animated in part by the expectation that war would lead to inflation in paper or silver. The *New York Journal of Commerce*, in an editorial on "The Breeding Grounds of Jingoism", had called attention to the fact that the jingo"es" were generally silverites, including in their number "the financiers who desire to force bankruptcy on the country as a means of breaking down the gold standard", and had quoted with approval an editorial from another paper charging that Senator Morgan's championship of the Cuban insurgents was part of "his wild scheming in the interest of the silver standard".²⁸ The *Commercial and Financial Chronicle* endorsed this view, declaring that many of the Cuban agitators "are only interested in the establishment of a free-silver standard, a plan which they think war would advance".²⁹ Similar views were expressed by the *American Banker* of New York, the *United States Investor* of Boston, and the *Rand-McNally Bankers' Monthly* of Chicago. The last-named quoted from a speech of Secretary of the Treasury Gage, delivered in Chicago in February, 1898, in which he had declared that "it would be scarcely possible for this nation to engage in war in its present condition . . . without a suspension of specie payments and a resort "Disio", *A Monthly Journal Devoted to Southern Industrial Interests* (Atlanta), XIV. No. 5, pp. 21-23 (May, 1898); *The Tradesman* (Chattanooga, semi-monthly), XXXIX. 60 (May 1, 1898); Portland (Ore.) *Board of Trade Journal* (monthly), XI. 6 (May, 1898).

²⁷ *Wall Street Journal*, November 18 and December 31, 1897.

²⁸ *New York Journal of Commerce and Commercial Bulletin*, May 21 and June 5, 1897.

²⁹ *Com. & Fin. Chron.*, LXIV. 974, LXVI. 308 (May 22, 1897 and February 12, 1898). Cf. John D. Hicks, *The Populist Revolt* (Minneapolis, 1931), p. 390: "The voting of bond issues to aid in financing the war drew fire from the Populists, who would have preferred issues of treasury notes, . . ."

to further issues of Government notes". A war of any duration, in the opinion of the *United States Investor*, would certainly derange the currency and reduce business to a gambling basis.³⁰

Something of a freak among New York financial journals was the *Financial Record*, which, in November, 1897, denounced "the cowardice of our Administration in refusing the phenomenally brave Cubans the commonest rights of belligerency" as "a disgrace to the United States", and argued that war with Spain, far from depressing securities or injuring business, "would vastly increase the net earning power of every security sold on our market today".³¹ The mystery of this jingo attitude is explained when we discover that this journal had been a warm advocate of the free coinage of silver, thus becoming clearly the exception that proves the rule.

Business opinion in the west, especially in the Mississippi Valley, appears to have been less opposed to war and less apprehensive of its results than that of the Atlantic coast. The Kansas City Board of Trade, at the beginning of 1897, had urged recognition of Cuban independence.³² The Cincinnati Chamber of Commerce, at a meeting on March 29, 1898, adopted "amidst much enthusiasm" resolutions condemning Spain for cruelties to the Cubans and the destruction of the *Maine* and calling for a "firm and vigorous policy which will have for its purpose—peacefully if we can, but with force if we must—the redress of past wrongs, and the complete

³⁰ *American Banker*, LXII. 912-913; LXIII. 394 (May 26, 1897; March 9, 1898); *United States Investor*, IX. 368 (March 12, 1898); *Rand-McNally Bankers' Monthly*, XV. 294 (April, 1898). T. S. Woolsey, in his *America's Foreign Policy* (New York, 1898), pp. 13-14, remarked that currency reform would be impeded by any unusual complication, such as war, and added: "This, perhaps, will suggest a certain subtle connection between Jingoism and the fiat money advocates."

³¹ *The Financial Record, An Investors' Manual* (New York, weekly, published by Alex. C. Lassen and Co.), November 4, 17, 1897.

³² The proposal of the Kansas City Board of Trade was forwarded, with a request for endorsement, to the Philadelphia Board of Trade, which rejected it.—*Sixty-Fourth Annual Report of Philadelphia Board of Trade* (Philadelphia, 1897), p. 15.

and unqualified independence of Cuba''.³³ The Chicago *Economist* denied that war would seriously hurt business or endanger the gold standard and asserted that the liberation of Cuba, by peace or war, would mean another star of glory for the United States and would produce "results of the highest value to mankind".³⁴ The *Rand-McNally Bankers' Monthly*, of the same city, while opposing war, called attention to the fact that while the war scare had demoralized the stock market, "general business activity apparently received an impetus".³⁵ Similarly the *Age of Steel* (St. Louis), while much preferring peace, "when not secured at the price of national honor", comforted its readers with the thought that although foreign trade might suffer, home trade and industries would be stimulated by war.³⁶ A St. Louis bank president, Mr. Lackland, believed that war would "cause a boom in many lines of business in this country . . . and give employment to a large number of persons who are now out of work".³⁷ The *Chattanooga Tradesman* stated on March 1, 1898, that a "small prospect" of war had already stimulated the iron trade in certain lines and had benefited the railroads by hurrying forward shipments of grain and other commodities in anticipation of war prices.³⁸ The *Mining and Scientific Press*, of San Francisco, while holding that, in general, war "lets loose havoc and waste, and entails destructive expense", conceded that "to nearly everything related to the mining industry the war will be a stimulus".³⁹

³³ *Fiftieth Annual Report of the Cincinnati Chamber of Commerce and Merchant's Exchange* (Cincinnati, 1899), p. 49.

³⁴ *The Economist. A Weekly Financial, Commercial and Real-Estate Newspaper* (Chicago), XIX. 233, 322 (February 26 and March 19, 1898).

³⁵ *Rand-McNally Bankers' Monthly*, XV. 199-201 (March 1898).

³⁶ *Age of Steel*, LXXXIII. Nos. 10, 11 (March 5, 12, 1898).

³⁷ *St. Louis Republic*, March 3, 1898.

³⁸ *The Tradesman*, XXXIX. March 1, 1898, p. 58. The same paper, however, in its May issue, denied that any permanent good to business could result from war. *Supra*, note 26.

³⁹ *Mining and Scientific Press* (San Francisco, weekly), LXXVI. 390 (April 9, 1898). In the issue of April 23, it remarked that war between the two chief

Even in New York, business men saw some rays of light piercing the war clouds. Stock market operators, according to the *Wall Street Journal*, just after the *Maine* explosion, "did not look for any great break in the market, because actual war with Spain would be a very small affair compared with the Venezuela complication with Great Britain". Their expectation was for a drop in stocks at the beginning of hostilities, followed by a resumption of the recent advance. In fact, the first shock might well be followed by a boom.⁴⁰ "The nation looks for peace," declared *Dun's Review*, March 5, "but knows that its sources of prosperity are quite beyond the reach of any attack that is possible". *Bradstreet's* contrasted the jumpiness of Wall Street over war news with "the calm way in which general business interests have regarded the current foreign complications"; and *Dun's Review* of March 12 stated that no industry or branch of business showed any restriction, while some had been rapidly gaining, that railroads were increasing their profits while speculators sold their stocks, and that there was a growing demand for the products of all the great industries.⁴¹

Despite such expressions as these, there seems little reason to question the belief that an overwhelming preponderance of the vocal business interests of the country strongly desired peace. By the middle of March, however, many organs of business opinion were admitting that a war with Spain might bring no serious disaster, and there was a growing conviction that such a war was inevitable. In the senate on March 17, Senator Redfield Proctor of Vermont described, from his own observation, the terrible sufferings of the Cuban "reconcentrados". Proctor was no sensationalist, and his speech copper-producing countries would occasion a boom in that metal (*ibid.*, LXXVI. 438).

⁴⁰ *Wall Street Journal*, February 17 and 24, 1898.

⁴¹ *Dun's Review*, *A Weekly Review of Business and Finance* (New York), March 5 and 12, 1898. *Bradstreet's*, *A Journal of Trade, Finance, and Public Economy* (New York, weekly), XXVI. 161 (March 12, 1898). Similar views were expressed by the *Dry Goods Economist* (New York, weekly), April 9, 1898.

ried great weight. The *Wall Street Journal* described its effect among the denizens of the Street. "Senator Proctor's speech," it said, "converted a great many people in Wall Street, who have heretofore taken the ground that the United States had no business to interfere in a revolution on Spanish soil. These men had been among the most prominent in deploring the whole Cuban matter, but there was no question about the accuracy of Senator Proctor's statements and as many of them expressed it, they made the blood boil".⁴² The *American Banker*, hitherto a firm opponent of intervention, remarked on March 23 that Proctor's speech showed an intolerable state of things, in view of which it could not understand "how any one with a grain of human sympathy within him can dispute the propriety of a policy of intervention, so only that this outraged people might be set free!" It still hoped, however, for a peaceful solution, declaring that the United States ought to urge the Cubans to accept the Spanish offer of autonomy.⁴³ That this growing conviction that something must be done about Cuba was by no means equivalent to a desire for war, was clearly revealed a few days later. Rumors circulated to the effect that Spain was willing to sell Cuba and that J. P. Morgan's return from a trip abroad was connected with plans to finance the purchase. "There is much satisfaction expressed in Wall Street", said the *Wall Street Journal*, "at the prospects of having Cuba free, because it is believed that this will take one of the most disturbing factors out of the situation. . . . Even if \$200,000,000 is the indemnity demanded it is a sum which the United States could well afford to pay to get rid of the trouble." Even \$250,000,000, it was thought, would be insignificant in comparison with the probable cost of a war.⁴⁴

It remains to examine the attitude of certain American business men and corporations having an immediate stake in

⁴² *Wall Street Journal*, March 19, 1898.

⁴³ *American Banker*, LXIII, 489.

⁴⁴ *Wall Street Journal*, March 31 and April 1, 1898.

Cuba, or otherwise liable to be directly affected by American intervention. Much American capital, as is well known, was invested in the Cuban sugar industry. Upon this industry the civil war fell with peculiarly devastating effect, not only cutting off profits on capital so invested, but also crippling a valuable carrying trade between Cuba and the United States. Naturally enough, some firms suffering under these conditions desired to see the United States intervene to end the war, though such intervention might lead to war between the United States and Spain. In May, 1897, a memorial on the subject bearing over three hundred signatures was presented to John Sherman, Secretary of State. The signers described themselves as "citizens of the United States, doing business as bankers, merchants, manufacturers, steamship owners and agents in the cities of Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Savannah, Charleston, Jacksonville, New Orleans, and other places, and also other citizens of the United States, who have been for many years engaged in the export and import trade with the Island of Cuba". They called attention to the serious losses to which their businesses had been subjected by the hostilities in Cuba and expressed the hope that, in order to prevent further loss, to reëstablish American commerce, and also to secure "the blessings of peace for one and a half millions of residents of the Island of Cuba now enduring unspeakable distress and suffering", the United States Government might take steps to bring about an honorable reconciliation between the parties to the conflict.⁴⁵

Another memorial, signed by many of the same subscribers, was presented to President McKinley on February 9, 1898, by a committee of New York business men. It asserted that the Cuban war, which had now continued for three entire years, had caused an average loss of \$100,000,000 a year, or a

⁴⁵ *Miscellaneous Letters* (Dept. of State), May, 1897, II. The memorial is covered by a letter from Geo. R. Mosle (of Mosle Bros., 16 Exchange Place, New York) to Hon. John Sherman, May 17, 1897. The list of signers is headed by Lawrence Turnure & Co.; August Belmont & Co. appear near the top.

total loss of \$300,000,000 in the import and export trade between Cuba and the United States, to which were to be added heavy sums irretrievably lost by the destruction of American properties, or properties supported by American capital in the Island itself, such as sugar factories, railways, tobacco plantations, mines and other industrial enterprises; the loss of the United States in trade and capital by means of this war being probably far greater and more serious than that of all the other parties concerned, not excepting Spain herself.

The sugar crop of 1897-1898, continued the memorial, appeared for the most part lost like its two predecessors, and unless peace could be established before May or June of the current year, the crop of 1898-1899, with all the business dependent upon it, would likewise be lost, since the rainy season of summer and fall would be required "to prepare for next winter's crop, by repairing damaged fields, machinery, lines of railways, &c.". In view of the importance to the United States of the Cuban trade and of American participation "in the ownership or management of Cuban sugar factories, railways and other enterprises", the petitioners hoped that the president would deem the situation "of sufficient importance as to warrant prompt and efficient measures by our Government, with the sole object of restoring peace . . . and with it restoring to us a most valuable commercial field".⁴⁶

How much weight such pressure from special interests had with the administration there is no way of knowing. But it is to be noted that the pressure from parties directly interested was not all on one side. Mr. E. F. Atkins, an American citizen who divided his time between Boston and his sugar plantation of Soledad near Cienfuegos, Cuba, which he had developed at a cost of \$1,400,000, had been able, through pro-

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, February, 1898, I. The memorial was signed by seventy persons or firms from New York and nearby cities; forty from Philadelphia; and sixty-four from Mobile. It was presented to the president on the morning of February 9, 1898, by George E. Mosle, Wm. Moore Carson, and George Turnure, and thereafter, at the president's suggestion, sent to Assistant Secretary Wm. R. Day. See accompanying letter from the committee to Mr. Day.

tection received from the Spanish Government and through a corps of guards organized and paid by himself, to continue operations throughout the period of the insurrection. He was frequently in Washington, where he had influential friends, during both the Cleveland and McKinley administrations and worked consistently against the adoption of any measures likely to provoke war.⁴⁷ Unlike some of the sugar plantations, American-owned iron mines in Cuba continued to do active business despite the insurrection. Three American iron and manganese enterprises in the single province of Santiago claimed to have an investment of some \$6,000,000 of purely American capital, a large proportion of which was in property which could easily be destroyed. "We are fully advised as to our status in case of war," wrote the representative of one company to the assistant secretary of state, "and that this property might be subject to confiscation or destruction by the Spanish Government." War between Spain and the United States, wrote the president of another company, "will very likely mean the destruction of our valuable plant and in any event untold loss to our Company and its American stockholders".⁴⁸ An American cork company with large interests in Spain; a New York merchant with trade in the Mediterranean and Black Sea; a Mobile firm which had chartered a Spanish ship to carry a cargo of timber—these are samples of American business interests which saw in war the threat of direct damage to themselves.⁴⁹ They are hardly offset by the

⁴⁷ E. F. Atkins, *Sixty Years in Cuba* (privately printed, Cambridge, 1926), pp. 209, 212, 274, *et passim*. Atkins's attitude is illustrated by his query (p. 209) "whether the sentimental feeling of sympathy with the Cubans should outweigh the property interests amounting to some \$30,000,000 of United States citizens in Cuba".

⁴⁸ Juragua Iron Co., Ltd. (per Josiah Monroe, Sec'y and Treas.) to Day, Philadelphia, April 14, 1898. *Miscellaneous Letters* (Dept. of State), April, 1898, II. Spanish-American Iron Co. (per C. F. Rand, Pres.) to Day, New York, April 8, 1898. *Ibid.*, April, 1898, I.

⁴⁹ Armstrong Cork Co. to Secretary Sherman, March 8, 1898. *Ibid.*, March, 1898, I. John Duer to Department of State (telegram), March 28, 1898; R. H. Clarke (Mobile) to Hon. J. Wheeler, March 26, 1898. *Ibid.*, March, 1898, III.

high hopes of an enterprising gentleman of Norfolk, "representing a party of capitalists who are enthusiastic supporters of the Government", who applied to the state department for a letter of marque "to enable us to lawfully capture Spanish merchant vessels and torpedo boats", adding: "We have secured option on a fine steam vessel and on receipt of proper documents will put to sea forth with".⁵⁰

It seems safe to conclude, from the evidence available, that the only important business interests (other than the business of sensational journalism) which clamored for intervention in Cuba were certain of those directly or indirectly concerned in the Cuban sugar industry; that opposed to intervention were the influence of other parties (including at least one prominent sugar planter) whose business would suffer direct injury from war and also the overwhelming preponderance of general business opinion. After the middle of March, 1898, some conservative forces came to think intervention inevitable on humanitarian grounds, but many of the most influential business journals opposed it to the end.⁵¹

II

We can now turn to the question whether American business was imperialistic; whether, in other words, business opinion favored schemes for acquiring foreign territory to supply it with markets, fields for capital investment, or commercial and naval stations in distant parts of the world. American business men were not unaware of the struggle for colonies then raging among European nations. Did they feel that the United States ought to participate in that struggle?

We have seen above that the rising tide of prosperity was intimately connected with the increase in American exports, particularly of manufactured articles. That the future wel-

⁵⁰ C. R. Fowles to Secretary Alger, April 23, 1898. *Ibid.*, April 1898, III.

⁵¹ *Com. & Fin. Chronicle*, LXVI, 732 (April 16, 1898); *Journal of Commerce and Commercial Bulletin*, April 23, 1898; *Boston Journal of Commerce*, April 16, 1898; *U. S. Investor*, IX, 529 (April 9, 1898).

fare of American industry was dependent upon the command of foreign markets was an opinion so common as to appear almost universal. The *New York Journal of Commerce* pointed out, early in 1897, that the nation's industrial plant had been developed far beyond the needs of domestic consumption. In the wire nail industry there was said to be machinery to make four times as many nails as the American markets could consume. Rail mills, locomotive shops, and glass factories were in a similar situation. "Nature has thus destined this country for the industrial supremacy of the world", said the same paper later in the year.⁵² When the National Association of Manufacturers met in New York for its annual convention in January, 1898, "the discussion of ways and means for extending this country's trade, and more particularly its export business, was, in fact; almost the single theme of the speakers", according to *Bradstreet's*, which added the comment: "Nothing is more significant of the changed attitude toward this country's foreign trade, manifested by the American manufacturer today as compared with a few years ago, than the almost single devotion which he pays to the subject of possible export-trade extension."⁵³

But if business men believed, prior to the opening of the war with Spain, that foreign markets were to be secured through the acquisition of colonies, they were strangely silent about it. It cannot be said that the idea had not been brought to their attention. For almost a decade intellectual and political leaders such as Mahan, Albert Shaw, Murat Halstead, and Senators Lodge, Frye, and Morgan had been urging upon

⁵² *Journal of Commerce & Commercial Bulletin*, February 24 and May 27, 1897.

⁵³ *Bradstreet's* XXVI. 66 (January 29, 1898). Cf. *American Banker*, LXII. 817 (May 12, 1897); *U. S. Investor*, IX. 400-401 (March 19, 1898); *Dry Goods Economist*, January 1, 1898; *American Wool and Cotton Reporter*, XII. 380 (March 24, 1898); *The Tradesman*, XXXIX. 52 (June 15, 1898). The National Board of Trade, at its annual meeting in Washington in December, 1897, recommended various measures for the further extension of export trade.—*Proceedings of the 28th Annual Meeting of the National Board of Trade* (Philadelphia, 1898), pp. 337-338.

the country the need of an imperialistic program in the interest of its industrial and commercial development.⁵⁴ The business world had, to all appearances, remained apathetic or frankly opposed to such a policy, which it regarded as simply one manifestation of dangerous jingoism. A large section of business opinion had, indeed, favored plans for the building of a Nicaraguan canal with governmental assistance,⁵⁵ and some spokesmen for business had favored annexation of the Hawaiian islands.⁵⁶ But beyond these relatively modest projects, few business men, apparently, wished to go.⁵⁷ Two of the most important commercial journals, the *New York Journal of Commerce* and the *Commercial and Financial Chronicle* had stoutly opposed both the canal scheme and Hawaiian annexation.⁵⁸ The former satirized the arguments of the pro-

⁵⁴ Julius W. Pratt, "The 'Large Policy' of 1898", *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, XIX. 219-242 (September, 1932); T. S. Woolsey, *America's Foreign Policy*, pp. 1-21.

⁵⁵ The National Board of Trade, a federation of local boards of trade, chambers of commerce, etc., in all parts of the country, consistently urged construction of the canal. Cf. *Proceedings* of its 28th annual meeting (Philadelphia, 1898), p. 335. Cf. also Indianapolis Board of Trade, *Annual Report* for 1898 (Indianapolis, 1898), p. 18; Philadelphia Board of Trade, *65th Annual Report* (Philadelphia, 1898), pp. 25-26; Merchant's Exchange of St. Louis, *Annual Statement of the Trade and Commerce of St. Louis for Year 1898* (St. Louis, 1899), p. 17; Chamber of Commerce of San Francisco, *48th Annual Report* (San Francisco, 1898), p. 18. The National Association of Manufacturers, at its January, 1897, meeting, took "strong ground in favor of the Nicaragua Canal" (*Journal of Commerce and Commercial Bulletin*, January 25, 1897).

⁵⁶ Cf. *Bradstreet's* XXV. 386 (June 19, 1897); *New York Commercial*, April 30, 1898; San Francisco Chamber of Commerce, *48th Annual Report*, p. 18.

⁵⁷ Exceptions to this general rule were the *Financial Record*, which was pro-war (as shown above) and which also hailed the prospect of colonial responsibilities (June 23, 1897 and March 23, 1898); and the *New York Commercial*, which thought the United States should not only annex Cuba and Porto Rico but should also buy St. Thomas from Denmark for a naval station (March 31 and April 8, 1898). The *American Banker*, in April, 1898, thought it would be good business to buy Cuba, pay for it in silver, and set it up as an American protectorate. It remarked: "A nation that borrows foreign capital, and in fact mortgages its resources to foreigners, must expect when it becomes unable to pay to be interfered with from without" (*American Banker*, LVI. 517-520).

⁵⁸ *Com. & Fin. Chron.*, LXIV. 211-213, 1205-1207 (January 30 and June 26, 1897); *Journal of Com. & Com. Bul.*, June 17 and August 14, 1897.

ponents of both schemes. "We must certainly build the canal to defend the islands, and it is quite clear that we must acquire the islands . . . in order to defend the canal." The canal was not only unnecessary, but unless fortified at each end and patrolled by two fleets, it would be a positive misfortune. Such protection—"the price of jingoism"—might

easily cost us \$25,000,000 a year, besides the lump sum that will be required for the original investment, and there is absolutely no excuse whatever in our commercial or our political interests for a single step in this long procession of expenses and of complications with foreign powers.⁵⁹

As for Hawaii and Cuba, neither was fit for self-government as a state—and the American constitution provided no machinery for governing dependencies. The Hawaiian Islands would have no military value unless the United States was to build a great navy and take an aggressive attitude in the Pacific.⁶⁰ The *Commercial and Financial Chronicle* saw in colonies only useless outposts which must be protected at great expense, and the *St. Louis Age of Steel* warned lest the expansion of the export trade might "lead to territorial greed, as in the case of older nations, the price of which in armaments and militarism offsets the gain made by the spindle and the forge".⁶¹

Colonies were not only certain to bear a fruit of danger and expense; they were valueless from the commercial point of view. Did not the colonies of Great Britain afford us one of the most valuable of our export markets?⁶² Did we not

⁵⁹ *Journal of Com. & Com. Bull.*, September 8, 1897.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, June 17 and October 21, 1897. Similarly, The *U. S. Investor* regarded Hawaiian annexation as a "menace", and the *Banker and Tradesman* thought the people of Cuba were "incapable and unfit for self-government. . . . This country does not want Cuba." *U. S. Investor*, IX. 48 (January 8, 1898); *Banker and Tradesman*, XXVI. 161 (March 16, 1898).

⁶¹ *Com. & Fin. Chron.*, LXVI. 446-448 (March 5, 1898); *Age of Steel*, LXXXIII. No. 1, p. 57 (January 1, 1898).

⁶² Baltimore Chamber of Commerce, *43rd Annual Report* (Baltimore, 1898), p. 11. Address of the president, Robert Ramsay, January 31, 1898.

trade as advantageously with Guiana, a British colony, as with independent Venezuela? "Most of our ideas of the commercial value of conquests, the commercial uses of navies and the commercial advantages of political control," said the *Journal of Commerce*, dated back to times when colonial policies were designed to monopolize colonial trade for the mother country.⁶³ The *Commercial and Financial Chronicle* believed that the current European enthusiasm for colonies was based on false premises; for although trade often followed the flag, "the trade is not always with the home markets of the colonizer. England and the United States are quite as apt to slip in with their wares under the very Custom-House pennant of the French or German dependency."⁶⁴ Outright opposition, such as this, to the idea of colonial expansion is not common in the business periodicals examined; much more common is complete silence on the subject. Positive and negative evidence together seem to warrant the conclusion that American business in general, at the opening of 1898, was either indifferent to imperialism or definitely opposed.⁶⁵

Confidence in the continued expansion of the export trade was based upon faith in the working of *laissez-faire* in a world given over largely to a system of free trade. American industry had reached a point where it could meet the world on more than even terms in both the price and the quality of its products. Given a fair chance, these products would make their own way. Government could aid them, not by acquiring colonial markets but by removing or lowering the barriers that restricted imports of raw materials and exchange commodities. To one who has in mind the subsequent tariff history of the United States, it is surprising to discover the amount of free-trade sentiment which found expression in these months of 1897-1898. The preoccupation of congress with the raising of

⁶³ *Jour. of Com. & Com. Bull.*, January 24, 1896.

⁶⁴ *Com. & Fin. Chron.*, LXV. 1147-1148 (December 18, 1897).

⁶⁵ An analysis of biographies of business men of the time points to the same conclusion. Cf. Pratt, *op. cit.*, p. 237 and note 55.

duties in the Dingley Act was disturbing to those interested in the export trade. "It is pitiful", said the *Journal of Commerce*,

to see the national legislature bending its whole force to readjusting the trammels of a system which can only obstruct, and closing its eyes to the manifest, though unconscious, struggling of industry for a freedom that will enable it to compete successfully in any market of the world.⁶⁶

The futility of expecting to increase exports while at the same time barring out imports was stressed by more than one writer for business journals,⁶⁷ and a change toward free trade in American policy was freely predicted. "We are gradually losing our fear of the bugaboo of cheap foreign labor," said the *Iron Age*, "and are slowly realizing that we hold the key of the position, since there are no indications that European manufacturers will ever displace us in the van of progress." The *American Machinist* declared that the recent growth in the export trade showed that in many lines the tariff was a dead letter, that goods which could be sold under the nose of the foreign producer no longer needed protection in the home market, and that the machinery interests would in all probability bring pressure to bear on Congress "toward action which will equalize these matters".⁶⁸ The *Chattanooga Tradesman* was convinced that the great development in the export of manufactures was certain to have upon tariff policy

⁶⁶ *Jour. of Com. & Com. Bull.*, May 27, 1897. Similar apprehension was expressed by the *American Banker*, LXII. 817 (May 12, 1897), and the *Railway World*, XLI. 572 (June 5, 1897).

⁶⁷ *American Banker*, LXII. 2328-2329 (December 1, 1897); *Dry Goods Economist*, January 15, 1898.

⁶⁸ *The Iron Age*, December 23, 1897; *American Machinist*, quoted in *Daily Com. News & Shipping List* (San Francisco), September 17, 1898. Cf. *Drugs, Oils and Paints*, XIV. p. 88 (August 1898), which argued that while protective tariffs might be useful, the proper object of such a tariff was to make itself unnecessary, and that many American industries which had hitherto been dependent upon protection had now reached a "stage where the tariff neither protects the industry nor profits the Government".

an effect "both broad and radical", and the president of the Baltimore Chamber of Commerce, speaking on the same theme to that body in December, 1897, predicted that "the day is not so far distant when free trade, in some measure, at least, will become part of our political faith".⁶⁹

In a free-trade world, colonies would be of no importance. But if countries to which American producers looked for their markets should adopt restrictive policies, then a change in the American attitude might easily occur. Two events in the late fall of 1897 gave warning that the world at large might not continue hospitable to American products. The first was an address by Count Goluchowski, Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister, to the Austro-Hungarian Delegations, in which he complained of the "destructive competition with transoceanic countries" and warned that the peoples of Europe "must fight shoulder to shoulder against the common danger, and must arm themselves for the struggle with all the means at their disposal". The twentieth century, he declared, would be "a period marked by a struggle for existence in the politico-commercial sphere", and "the European nations must close their ranks in order successfully to defend their existence".⁷⁰

In the United States, the Austrian's pronouncement was generally interpreted as aimed principally at this country. It caused widespread comment but little serious alarm. Many papers doubted the possibility of any European coöperation to exclude American products, pointing out that a stoppage of trade would injure Europe more than the United States, since we provided Europe with necessities in return for commodities most of which were either luxuries or articles that we could produce ourselves.⁷¹ Even if Europe should exclude our products, thought the *New York Commercial*, we should find

⁶⁹ *The Tradesman*, XXXIX. 52 (June 15, 1898); Baltimore Chamber of Commerce, 43rd Annual Report, p. 11.

⁷⁰ *Literary Digest*, XV. 964 (December 11, 1897).

⁷¹ *Atlanta Constitution*, *Philadelphia Ledger*, *Houston Post*, in *ibid.*, XV. 965; *New York Commercial*, January 27, 1898; *Commercial & Financial Chronicle*, LXV. 1147-1148 (December 18, 1897).

an outlet in those other markets now cherished by Europe. This opinion was shared by the *Philadelphia Ledger*, which believed that, though concerted action in Europe might cripple our markets there, our trade with South America and the far east could not "be directly disturbed through any European alliance". But the *New York Journal of Commerce*, in a thoughtful editorial, took a more serious view of the speech. In their determined quest for markets, it said, the industrial nations of Europe were following two courses: acquisition of colonies and the enactment of discriminatory tariffs. Hitherto each country had worked alone, but now there were signs of the rise of alliances or combinations in tariff policy. Since Austria-Hungary had a trade of but \$10,000,000 a year with the United States, the idea put forward by Count Goluchowski must have been initiated elsewhere, and the paper suggested that a probable source was Russia, which had reason to seek to restrict the markets for American staples in both Europe and Asia.⁷²

The suspicion voiced by the *Journal of Commerce* that behind the Austrian's speech might lie concealed a threat to the American market in the Far East seemed partially confirmed within a few days, with the coming of news of European aggressions in China. Under the color of retaliation for the death of two German missionaries, a German force, on November 14, expelled the Chinese garrison at Tsingtau, at the mouth of Kiaochow Bay, seized the forts and occupied the port. Eight days later the German Government presented its formal demands, which included a naval station on Kiaochow Bay and the grant of the sole right to build railways and open coal mines in Shantung. By early in January, 1898, China had yielded all, and a convention to that effect was signed March 6. Meanwhile, within a week after the occupation of Tsingtau, Russian warships arrived at Port Arthur, and by May, 1898, China had agreed to the cession to Russia for twenty-five years

⁷² *Jour. of Com. & Com. Bull.*, November 30, 1897.

of Port Arthur, Dalny, and other territory in the Liaotung peninsula. Compensating advantages were demanded and received by Great Britain and France, and by July 1, 1898, the partition of China had to all appearances begun.⁷³

Here were deeds more ominous than any words could be. They touched American business sentiment in a particularly sensitive spot, for though American trade with China was, in 1897, less than two per cent of its total foreign trade, exports to China in that year were almost double those of 1896, and there was a widespread belief that China was to provide an exceedingly important market for the surplus products of the United States.⁷⁴ While some papers made light of the danger to American business presented by the Chinese crisis,⁷⁵ and others professed to see positive advantage to the United States in the development of China under European direction,⁷⁶ the less optimistic saw a probability that American trade would find itself discriminated against or excluded altogether by the partitioning powers. Mr. Charles Denby, ex-Minister to China, in a note published in the *American Banker*, warned that with the seizure of territory, American commercial treaties with China "fall to the ground, and spheres of influence hostile to American commerce spring into existence".⁷⁷ Similar alarm

⁷³ H. B. Morse, *The International Relations of the Chinese Empire* (London and New York, 1910-1918), III. 105-127; J. Van A. MacMurray, *Treaties and Agreements with and concerning China, 1894-1919* (New York, 1921), I. 112-116, 119-121, 128-130, 152-153; P. Joseph, *Foreign Diplomacy in China, 1894-1900* (London, 1928), chaps. 9-14.

⁷⁴ Tyler Dennett, *Americans in Eastern Asia* (New York, 1922), 579-582; *Jour. of Com. & Com. Bull.*, May 15, 1896, February 22, December 23, 1897, January 8, 1898. Of all markets for American manufactures, said the paper on the last date, "China is incomparably the greatest".

⁷⁵ *San Francisco Bulletin*, January 4, 1898; *Financial Record*, December 29, 1897.

⁷⁶ *American Banker*, LXIII. 9 (January 5, 1898); *New York Commercial*, January 5 and 22, 1898; *Baltimore Sun*, *Kansas City Journal* in *Literary Digest*, XVI. 31-33 (January 8, 1898); *Com. & Fin. Chron.*, LXVI. 106-107 (January 15, 1898).

⁷⁷ *American Banker*, LXII. 2489 (December 29, 1897).

was voiced by numerous papers in all parts of the country,⁷⁸ by none more vehemently than the *New York Journal of Commerce*. This paper, which has been heretofore characterized as pacifist, anti-imperialist, and devoted to the development of commerce in a free-trade world, saw the foundation of its faith crumbling as a result of the threatened partition of China. Declaring that free access to the markets of China, with its 400,000,000 people, would largely solve the problem of the disposal of our surplus manufactures, the *Journal* came out not only for a stern insistence upon complete equality of rights in China, but unreservedly also for an isthmian canal, the acquisition of Hawaii, and a material increase in the navy—three measures which it had hitherto strenuously opposed.⁷⁹ Nothing could be more significant than the manner in which this paper was converted in a few weeks, justifying its change on each point by the needs of the hour in the far east.

Finding the department of state, under Secretary Sherman, quite unimpressed by the seriousness of the Chinese situation,⁸⁰ the *Journal of Commerce* itself initiated a movement to arouse the executive to a defence of American interests. At the paper's suggestion, a committee on American interests in China was organized in New York to work for concerted action by chambers of commerce in important cities. As a direct result of this propaganda, a committee of the Chamber of Commerce of the State of New York laid before

⁷⁸ New Orleans *Picayune*, in *Literary Digest*, loc. cit.; *Age of Steel*, January 8, 29, 1898; U. S. Investor, IX. 48 (January 8, 1898); Birmingham *Age-Herald*, March 25, 1898; *The Nation*, (New York), LXVI. 122-123 (February 17, 1898).

⁷⁹ *Jour. of Com. & Com. Bull.*, December 28, 1897 and January 7, 1898.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, January 5, 1898. Secretary Sherman had been interviewed by the *Philadelphia Press* and was quoted as saying that if the powers should partition China, it would not interest us materially, "as the powers would gladly seize the opportunity to trade with us. Our commercial interests would not suffer, as far as I can see, in the least—quite the contrary". Such remarks seemed to the editor of the *Journal of Commerce* to suggest "serious intellectual limitations". For confirmation of Secretary Sherman's indifference to the partitioning of China, see S. F. Bemis (ed.), *American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy* (10 vols., N. Y., 1927-1929), IX. 15, 18, 122.

that body on February 3, 1898, a report on "American Treaty Rights in China" and a memorial to the president of the United States. The report summarized the history of the acquisition of commercial rights through treaties with the Chinese Government and argued that those rights were seriously endangered by the recent aggressions of European powers. American products, it pointed out, were already virtually excluded from French Cochin China—an omen of what was to be expected elsewhere if France and other powers made good their positions on Chinese soil. "The Administration at Washington", the report continued,

seems to be supine about the present menace to those important interests of our citizens in China. . . . Under these circumstances it would seem that unless those concerned in our export trade take steps to agitate the matter and to have their interests safeguarded, nobody else will do it.

The memorial to the president, which was promptly adopted by the chamber, pictured the growing importance of American trade with China and the new dangers threatening it and respectfully urged that steps be taken

for the prompt and energetic defense of the existing treaty rights of our citizens in China, and for the preservation and protection of their important commercial interests in that Empire.⁸¹

Within a few weeks similar action was taken by the chambers of commerce or boards of trade of Philadelphia, San

⁸¹ These documents were printed in a small pamphlet entitled *Commercial Rights of the United States in China*, a copy of which is in department of state, *Miscellaneous Letters*, June, 1898, II, accompanying a letter of E. Frazar to Secretary Day, June 17, 1898. Another document there printed is a communication from about seventy mercantile and manufacturing firms and individuals in New York, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Paterson, etc., urging the New York chamber to bring the situation in China to the attention of the department of state. The original of the memorial to the president is in *Misc. Letters*, February 1898, I. The part played by the *Journal of Commerce* is related in the issue of June 18, 1898.

Francisco, Baltimore, Boston, and Seattle.⁸² Not content with this action, a group of merchants interested in the eastern trade held a meeting on March 3, at 59 Wall Street, New York, to form a permanent organization for the protection of that trade. A few days later, with the coöperation of the New York Chamber of Commerce, they took steps to organize the American China and Japan Association, to foster and safeguard the interests of citizens of the United States and others concerned in the trade with those empires and to secure and disseminate information relating thereto. The organization was not perfected until June 16. By that time the battle of Manila Bay had broadened the American outlook in the orient, and the organization followed suit, changing its title to the American Asiatic Association and including in its field of interest American trade not only in China and Japan, but also in "the Philippine Islands, and elsewhere in Asia and Oceania". Promptly upon its organization, the association put itself into communication with the department of state, offering its services for consultation or coöperation.⁸³

In the light of this widespread and intense interest in the preservation of the Chinese market, we can perhaps understand why American business, which had been, to all appearances, anti-war and anti-imperialist, was filled with sudden enthusiasm at the news of Dewey's victory at Manila Bay. Not only did the news dissipate all fears of a long and costly war and send stock prices rapidly upward;⁸⁴ still more important,

⁸² Philadelphia Board of Trade to the President, February 25, 1898; San Francisco Chamber of Commerce to same, March 8, 1898; Baltimore Chamber of Commerce to Secretary Sherman, March 17, 1898; Boston Chamber of Commerce to the President, March 30, 1898; Seattle Chamber of Commerce to same, April 14, 1898.—Dept. of State, *Misc. Letters*, February-April, 1898.

⁸³ E. Frazar to Day, June 17, 1898 (Dept. of State, *Misc. Letters*, June, 1898, II). Accompanying the letter is a printed constitution of the Association. Cf. for first steps New York *Commercial*, March 10, 1898.

⁸⁴ *Dun's Review*, May 7, 1898, said railway stocks had advanced on the average of \$2.79 per share since the news, adding: "One day's work by the officers and men at Manila has given many days' work to thousands of people at home. . . . and has placed all American industries and interests on a stronger footing

it seemed to place in American hands, all unexpectedly, the key to the trade of the orient. The attack on the Spanish fleet at Manila had been anticipated for months and well advertised by the American press.⁸⁵ Some papers had speculated upon the value of the islands as an American colony and had foreseen that a victory there might greatly alter our relation to the imbroglio in China.⁸⁶ (But for most, this thought did not occur until arrival of the news that the Spanish fleet was destroyed and Dewey safely in possession of Manila Bay. Then, at last, business men joined the jingoes in their acclaim of imperial conquests.) Senator Lodge's exclamation—"We hold the other side of the Pacific, and the value to this country is almost beyond recognition"⁸⁷—was matched by many a formerly conservative business journal. It was not the intrinsic value of the Philippines or their trade that most impressed American writers, though this angle of the subject was not overlooked.⁸⁸ Rather, their importance appeared to lie in their position as a gateway to the markets of eastern Asia.

It has been shown that the aggressions of the European powers in China had converted the *New York Journal of Com-*

for any conceivable future." Cf. *Jour. of Com. & Com. Bull.*, May 3, 1898; *Com. & Fin. Chron.*, LXVI. 874 (May 7, 1898).

⁸⁵ *New York Sun*, November 8, 1897 and March 13, 1898.

⁸⁶ The *U. S. Investor*, IX. 624 (April 30, 1898) thought that such a victory, even if we did not retain the islands, "might pave the way for future interventions on the part of the United States in the affairs of the East". The *Financial Record*, May 5, 1898 (in an editorial written before receipt of the news of the battle), thought the Philippines "would be good trading material for getting our share of what is going in Asia". Cf. *New York Commercial*, April 27, 1898; *New York Sun*, April 29, 1898.

⁸⁷ Allan Nevins, *Henry White, Thirty Years of Diplomacy* (New York, 1930), p. 136.

⁸⁸ The *New York Commercial*, May 7, 1898, declared the Philippines were "treasure islands"—"the richest islands in the world". Their development by American capital, it said (June 7), would stimulate the trade of the Pacific Coast and promote the establishment of new industries in the west. The *Daily Commercial News and Shipping List* of San Francisco also saw great possibilities of trade with the islands (May 13) and hailed the prospect of "Gold in the Philippines" (June 17). Cf. *Chattanooga Tradesman*, May 15, 1898.

merce to the belief that the United States must dig an isthmian canal, acquire Hawaii, and enlarge its navy.⁸⁹ The same paper now took the lead in insisting that the newly won vantage point in the Philippines be retained and utilized to uphold American rights in China. However disconcerting might be our possession of Manila to European plans in the far east, we must deal with it as a "factor in the protection of our interests in that part of the world". Hitherto we had

allowed Great Britain to fight our battle for an open market in China: with our flag floating within 500 miles of Hong Kong we shall be able to give that policy something more than merely moral support in the future.

There was thus "introduced a most formidable element of resistance to all that France and Russia at least seem to be working for in Asia". To return the islands to Spain or to dispose of them to England or any other power, said the same paper a few days later, "would be an act of inconceivable folly in the face of our imperative future necessities for a basis of naval and military force on the Western shores of the Pacific".⁹⁰

Endorsement of these views came rapidly from all sides. "Some broad-minded men", said the *Wall Street Journal*, May 5,

believe that the United States should retain enough interest in the Philippines to be sure of a coaling station and a naval base in Asiatic waters, under belief that the breaking up of China will make it necessary for this country to be in a position to protect, not only the existing trade with the far east, but the enormously greater trade likely to be developed in the next 25 years.

⁸⁹ Subsequently the paper had reverted at least partially to its earlier opposition to the canal and Hawaiian annexation. Issues of April 2 and June 25, 1898. But on May 31 it urged that control of the Hawaiian islands was "imperative".

⁹⁰ *Jour. of Com. & Com. Bull.*, May 3, 4, and 11, 1898. The paper held consistently to this position. August 24, 1898, it said: "We can establish ourselves as one of the Oriental powers by acquiring a really important stake in the Philippines, or we may resign ourselves to seeing the open door shut gradually in our faces." *Cf. ibid.*, February 1, 1899.

The *American Banker*, of May 11, while absolving the United States from entering the war for any selfish purpose, declared that it could not relinquish the territories which it had been forced to seize, with the result that its diplomacy would no longer be a negative quantity in European counsels, "particularly not as respects the inevitable partition of the Chinese Empire. That a war with Spain", it added, "should have transpired at precisely this time, when Europe is tending to divide a considerable section of the inhabited earth, is a coincidence which has a providential air".⁹¹ The *Banker and Tradesman* likewise discerned the hand of Providence in bestowing the Philippines upon the United States at a time when Russia, France, and Germany were threatening American trade in China, and asked whether we could rightly throw away "a possession which would be of such great advantage to us in maintaining and defending our interests in this part of the globe". It asserted later that the answer to the question of the open door in China "was given, as European nations very well know, when Dewey entered Manilla Bay and won his glorious victory".⁹² Similar views appeared in the *Age of Steel*, the *Iron Age*, the *United States Investor*, and the *Financial Record*. *Bradstreet's* thought the possession of Manila would greatly accelerate the growth of American trade in Asia and predicted that that city "might in time even rival Hong King as a distributive trade center". The *New York Commercial*, using figures supplied by the bureau of statistics in Washington, pointed out that countries closely adjacent to the Philippines contained 850,000,000 people and purchased over one billion dollars worth of goods a year, mostly articles grown or manufactured in the United States. "With the Philippines as a three-quarter way house, forming a superb trading station, the bulk of this trade should come to this

⁹¹ *American Banker*, LXIII. 785.

⁹² *Banker and Tradesman*, XXVI. 456 and 776 (June 1 and Aug. 24, 1898).

country.”⁹³ The New York Chamber of Commerce, in a report on “American Interests in China”, argued that, in face of the prospect that European spheres of influence in China might become permanent territorial acquisitions, the only course by which the United States could protect its interests appeared to be active participation in politics on the “dangerous ground of the Far East”—a participation which might be “hastened and materialized through our possible occupation of the Philippine Islands”.⁹⁴

The insistence that the Philippines be retained, for the sake of their own trade and as a gateway to Asiatic markets, was confined to no one section of the country. In the south, business men saw in possession of the islands assurance of the continued growth of the marketing of American cotton goods in China.⁹⁵ The Pacific Coast, very naturally displayed a lively interest. In Dewey’s victory, the *Mining and Scientific Press* saw an earnest that the coast cities would be transformed from the back door to the front door of civilization. “The guns that destroyed the Spanish fleet in Manila Bay thundered a warning to the nations of our approaching commercial supremacy in the Orient.” The *Commercial Bulletin of Southern California* believed acquisition of the Philippines would greatly hasten the growth of trans-Pacific trade and asserted it was with this expectation that “Pacific Coast people so generally favor territorial expansion”. The *Daily Commercial News and Shipping List*, of San Francisco, thought the coast people would make determined efforts for the retention of the Philippines.⁹⁶ The Chamber of Commerce of Seat-

⁹³ *Age of Steel*, May 21, 1898; *Iron Age*, June 23, 1898; *U. S. Investor*, IX. 953, 1017 (July 2 and 16, 1898); *Financial Record*, June 15, 1898; *Bradstreet's*, XXVI. 356 (June 4, 1898); *N. Y. Commercial*, June 1, 1898.

⁹⁴ *Jour. of Com. & Com. Bull.*, June 17, 1898.

⁹⁵ *The Tradesman*, June 15, September 1, 1898; “*Dixie*,” XIV. No. 6, p. 27 (June, 1898). Cf. New Orleans *Picayune*, quoted in *New York Jour. of Com. & Com. Bull.*, May 18, 1898.

⁹⁶ *Mining and Scientific Press*, LXXVI. 534 and 643 (May 21 and June 18, 1898); *Com. Bull. of Sou. Cal.* (Los Angeles, weekly), June 17, December 23, 1898; *Daily Com. News & Shipping List*, August 10, 1898.

tle and the Chamber of Commerce, Merchants' Association, and Manufacturers' and Producers' Association of San Francisco petitioned the president to retain not only the Philippines, but the Caroline and Ladrone Islands, "and all other lands which are now, or may hereafter be acquired in the present war with Spain", in the interests of humanity and the Oriental trade of the United States.⁹⁷ Even James J. Hill, who had been a strong opponent of the war, stated to a newspaper reporter that if it rested with him, he would retain the Philippines. "If you go back in the commercial history of the world," he was reported as saying, "you will find that the people who controlled the trade of the Orient have been the people who held the purse strings of nations."⁹⁸

It must not be inferred that business opinion was unanimous in favor of retaining the Philippines. There was an undercurrent of opposition or indifference. The *New York Journal of Commerce*, just before the signing of the peace protocol, deplored the fact that timid people were shrinking from imperialism and that "the business men of the country are maintaining a deathlike silence".⁹⁹ The *Commercial and Financial Chronicle* was cautious, pointing out that Spain's distant possessions had proved its most vulnerable point—a fact from which the United States might learn a lesson—and hoping that the United States might yet find a way to avoid such a dangerous responsibility. The *Baltimore Journal of Commerce* was, in July, strongly opposed to annexation, and two months later held that no one yet knew whether "our posi-

⁹⁷ *Seattle Post-Intelligencer*, August 8, 1898, Chamber of Commerce of San Francisco, *49th Annual Report* (San Francisco, 1899), pp. 23-24. The quotation is from resolutions adopted July 29, 1898, by the San Francisco Chamber of Commerce in conjunction with the other bodies named above. On the other hand, the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce, at its meeting on August 4, 1898, voted strongly against annexing the Philippines. *Daily Com. News & Shipping List*, August 6, 1898.

⁹⁸ *Seattle Post-Intelligencer*, June 1, 1898. Cf. J. G. Pyle, *Life of James J. Hill* (2 vols., Garden City, New York, 1917), II, 77.

⁹⁹ *Jour. of Com. & Com. Bull.*, August 11, 1898.

tion as wetnurse to Cuba, proprietors of Porto Rico and pantata to the Philippines is likely to bring us profit or loss''. The *Iron Age*, which early in the summer had been strongly for expansion, was by September harboring qualms as to the real value of colonies to the business man.¹⁰⁰ Everett Frazar, president of the American Asiatic Association, was personally a warm supporter of annexation, but the association held upon its table for months without action a resolution on the subject.¹⁰¹ The *San Francisco Call*, representing the California Hawaiian sugar interests of the Spreckels family, was strongly opposed to annexation, arguing not only that Anglo Saxons had no aptitude for tropical colonization, but also frankly warning California sugar-beet growers of the danger of competition from Philippine cane-sugar.¹⁰²

There is no way of measuring accurately the strength of business opinion for and against the retention of the Philippines. Judging opinion as best we could from the available expressions of it, (it seemed safe to conclude that American business in the winter of 1897-1898 was opposed to war and either opposed to colonial expansion or oblivious to the existence of the problem. From similar evidence it seems equally safe to conclude that after the battle of Manila Bay American business became definitely imperialistic—that is, if a wish to retain the Philippines is an evidence of an imperialistic atti-

¹⁰⁰ *Com. & Fin. Chron.*, LXVI. 876-878 and 922-924 (May 7 and 14, 1898); *Baltimore Journal of Commerce*, July 16 and September 10, 1898; *Iron Age*, September 29 and November 24, 1898. By August, the *Chronicle* had come to regard annexation as inevitable (LXVII. 401, August 27, 1898).

¹⁰¹ Everett Frazar to Pres. McKinley, November 11, 1898 (Dept. of State, *Misc. Letters*, November, 1898, I). Other business men wrote McKinley opposing annexation of the Philippines. T. G. Bush, president of the Mobile and Birmingham Railroad Co., thought all we needed was a coaling and naval station in the Philippines. Wharton Barker, of Philadelphia, thought trade could best be built up by reciprocity with the Americas, not by expansion in the far east. Bush to McKinley, July 30, 1898. *Ibid.*, July, 1898, III. Barker to McKinley, August 25, 1898.—*Misc. Letters sent to the Pres. & the Secretary of State*, Paris, Peace Commission, 1898.

¹⁰² *San Francisco Call*, September 10 and 17 and December 15, 1898.

tude. It seems certain, too, from the prominence given to the Chinese situation in nearly every discussion of the value of the islands, that the conversion of business opinion was accomplished by the combination of a European threat against the freedom of the American market in China, present and prospective, with the dramatic *coup* of the American fleet in a fine harbor so near the Chinese coast. In one paper, the *New York Journal of Commerce*, there appears with beautiful clarity the shift of position induced by the action of the European Powers in China. In November, 1897, against all schemes of colonial or naval expansion; in December, for a canal, Hawaiian annexation, and a big navy; in May and thereafter, for retention of the entire Philippine archipelago and aggressive assertion of American rights in China—the *Journal* reveals a process of thought which perhaps occurred less clearly and consciously in the minds of many business men.

Having concluded that the Philippines were wholesome and digestible, business was disposed to treat itself to more of the same diet. The venture in the Philippines strengthened immeasurably the demand for the annexation of Hawaii. "The battle of Manila Bay", said the *Journal of Commerce* May 31, "makes it imperative that we should establish permanent arrangements which will make the [Hawaiian] islands a half-way house on the road to the Philippines." When the joint resolution for annexation passed congress and received the president's signature on July 7, it was hailed not only as good in itself and in relation to the Philippines, but as the first actual step on the path of imperialism. The resolution, thought *Bradstreet's*, "gave a new direction to the impulse toward expansion, which is seldom missing among the characteristics of great nations".¹⁰⁸ But there were other Pacific islands that beckoned. "Bridge the Pacific!" cried the *Philadelphia Press*.

¹⁰⁸ *Bradstreet's*, XXVI. 450 (July 16, 1898). Cf. *Financial Record*, July 13, 1898, and *Com. & Fin. Chron.*, LXVII. 96 (July 16, 1898), which thought that "whether wisely done or not, the annexation of Hawaii has settled the general principle."

"With the Philippines go the Carolines, a Spanish possession, Samoa and the Hawaiian Islands complete the chain."¹⁰⁴ The war in the Pacific, the prospect of new possessions there, and the voyage of the *Oregon* also gave new force to the demand for an isthmian canal.¹⁰⁵ In the Caribbean, business interests not only insisted that the United States needed Porto Rico for its strategic and commercial value,¹⁰⁶ but suggested that it might prove impossible to adhere to the Teller Amendment, which had pledged the United States not to annex Cuba. The *Journal of Commerce*, voicing skepticism as to the capacity of the Cubans for orderly government, declared: "The Teller amendment . . . must be interpreted in a sense somewhat different from that which its author intended it to bear." The American flag must float over Cuba until law and order were assured.¹⁰⁷ American covetousness in the Caribbean was not

¹⁰⁴ Quoted in *New York Commercial*, May 13, 1898. Propaganda for annexation of the Carolines arose from religious rather than business sources. Spain had expelled American missionaries from the islands and closed their schools. Cf. *Toledo Blade*, quoted in *New York Commercial*, April 27, 1898; also a memorial to the American peace commission from the Board of the Hawaiian Evangelical Association, September 12, 1898 (Dept. of State, *Misc. Letters*, September, 1898, I). Dr. Edward Van Dyke Robinson was active in the same cause. See copy of letter from him to Captain Bradford, September 27, 1898, in *Misc. Letters sent to Members of the Peace Commission, 1898* (MSS., Dept. of State), and another letter to Congressman R. R. Hitt of Illinois, December 20, 1898, in Dept. of State, *Misc. Letters*, December, 1898, III.

¹⁰⁵ Cf. resolutions of San Francisco Chamber of Commerce, May 4, 1898, in *Daily Commercial News and Shipping List*, May 6, 1898.

¹⁰⁶ The *Journal of Commerce* (May 11, 1898) thought either Porto Rico or Cuba was necessary for reasons similar to those dictating the retention of the Philippines. "We want no acquisitions other than those needful for strategic purposes, but whatever territory of that nature falls into our hands must never be parted with." Letters from business men to the department of state urged the annexation of Porto Rico as a "garden spot," capable of contributing greatly to American commerce. J. H. Hamlin & Son, Portland, Me., to McKinley, May 11, 1898. Dept. of State, *Misc. Letters*, May, 1898, II. T. G. Bush, Anniston, Ala., to McKinley, July 30, 1898. *Ibid.*, July, 1898, III.

¹⁰⁷ *Jour. of Com. & Com. Bull.*, May 24, 1898. Similarly, the *American Banker* (LXIII, 986, June 8, 1898) thought conditions in Cuba might force the United States to abandon its pledge as to the independence of the island; and the *Banker and Tradesman* (XXVI. 688, July 27, 1898) believed it might

limited to the Spanish islands. As early as March 31, 1898, the New York *Commercial* had advocated the purchase of St. Thomas, in the Danish West Indies, for a naval base.¹⁰⁸ In May, it saw signs that the British West Indies might be interested in coming under the American flag and urged that the Bahamas, Jamaica, and Bermuda be not lost sight of during the war. The *Journal of Commerce*, endorsing the same idea, remarked:

Our people are now in an expansive mood and there is a deep and strong American sentiment that would rejoice to see the British flag, as well as the Spanish flag, out of the West Indies.¹⁰⁹

Merchants and manufacturers now saw in colonies a partial solution of the disposal of the surplus of American products. European countries, prejudiced against our goods, said the New York *Commercial* (evidently recalling Count Goluchowski's speech), had acquired colonial markets while we had none; but the acquisition of the Spanish islands would supply the lack; their development by American capital would stimulate the demand for the products of our fields and factories. We should regulate their customs in a manner to favor our own industries and shipping and discourage those of other coun-

be necessary to "take absolute possession of the island, and put down the insurgents". Similar views were expressed by T. G. Bush (above, note 106), and by the *Wall St. Journal*, May 5, 1898.

¹⁰⁸ The same paper on April 14 stated that negotiations for purchase of St. Thomas had been suspended, presumably because of opposition of a St. Thomas newspaper.

¹⁰⁹ New York *Commercial*, May 12, 1898; *Jour. of Com. & Com. Bull.*, August 25, 1898. Senator Lodge suggested that the United States receive from Spain the entire Philippine group, retain Luzon, and trade the remainder to England "in exchange for the Bahamas and Jamaica and the Danish Islands, which I think we should be entitled to ask her to buy and turn over to us" (Lodge to Secretary Day, August 11, 1898 in Dept. of State, *Misc. Letters*, August, 1898, II). Lodge's labors in behalf of the acquisition of the Danish West Indies are treated in C. C. Tansill, *The Purchase of the Danish West Indies* (Baltimore, 1932), pp. 208-216.

tries.¹¹⁰ This procedure was condemned by the *Journal of Commerce*, the *Commercial and Financial Chronicle*, and other journals and organizations, which insisted that after urging the "open door" in China we must adhere to the same principle in our new possessions.¹¹¹ But whether the door was to be open or closed to the rest of the world, an active and lucrative trade with the new possessions was widely anticipated. "One way of opening a market is to conquer it . . ." said the *Railway World* in August. "Already our enterprising merchants are beginning to organize to take possession of the markets which our army and navy have opened to them." The *Chicago Inter-Ocean*, in a series of interviews with merchants and manufacturers in several cities, found them

very generally waking up to the opportunities which the war has brought at a moment when the immense increase of our manufacturing capacity has rendered foreign outlets absolutely necessary to us.

The bureau of statistics reported large numbers of inquiries from all parts of the country, but chiefly from the great producing and business centers, as to the imports of Cuba and Porto Rico.¹¹² Not only the trade prospects but also the opportunities for American capital and skill to develop

¹¹⁰ New York Commercial, May 9, June 8 and August 4, 1898.

¹¹¹ *Jour. of Com. & Com. Bull.*, May 31 and July 13, 1898 and January 6 and February 1, 1899; *Com. & Fin. Chron.*, LXVI. 922-924, LXVII. 290, 401, 1082-3 (May 14, August 13 and 27, and November 26, 1898; *U. S. Investor*, IX. 1704-1705 (November 26, 1898); *Rand-McNally Bankers' Monthly*, XVI. 464 (December 1898). The American Asiatic Association, in a set of resolutions adopted January 5, 1899, called for the application of the "open door" policy in the Philippines (American Asiatic Association to Secretary Hay, January 7, 1899 in Dept. of State, *Misc. Letters*, January, 1899, I).

¹¹² *Railway World*, XLII. 861 (August 6, 1898); *Chicago Inter-Ocean* quoted in *Portland Morning Oregonian*, September 14, 1898; *Rand-McNally Bankers' Monthly*, XVI. 199 (September 1898), for bureau of statistics. Similar enthusiasm for the markets offered by the new possessions is found in *The American Exporter* (New York, monthly), XLIII. No. 1, p. 10 (December, 1898), and *ibid.*, No. 2, p. 10 (January, 1899), and in the *Financial Record*, December 21, 1898.

the resources of the islands excited enthusiasm. A national bank of Hawaii was organized immediately after passage of the annexation resolution. Similar plans were afoot for Porto Rico and Cuba, and enterprising Americans were studying financial conditions in the Philippines. "Railroad building may be expected to boom in all the islands which may fall under the influence of the United States", said *Rand-McNally Bankers' Monthly*. Cane sugar and tobacco growing would receive an impetus. "The forests may also be made to yield handsome returns, . . . and in fact every industry, so long under the blighting rule of Spain, will be exploited and made to show the advantages accruing from better government and wider enterprise."¹¹³

American business had yielded reluctantly to the necessity of a war with Spain, forced upon the United States by the distressing situation in Cuba. (It had not foreseen, or if it foresaw had feared, the colonial responsibilities to which such a war might lead. But when Dewey's dramatic victory on the first of May offered a far eastern base from which the threatened markets in China might be defended, it had gladly accepted the result, and long before the close of the wonderful year 1898, it was building high hopes upon the supposed opportunities for trade and exploitation in a string of dependencies stretching from the Philippines to Porto Rico. As the year expired, spokesmen of the business and financial interests of the country were hailing the "incalculable expansion of the influence of the United States among other nations",¹¹⁴ or declaring philosophically that the year had "witnessed a complete change in the temper and aspirations of the American people. . . . Our commercial horizon has been broadened," said one of them,

¹¹³ *Bankers Magazine*, LVII. 171-173 (August 1898); *Rand-McNally Bankers' Monthly*, XVI. 107-108 (August 1898); cf. also *The Tradesman*, November 15, 1898, pp. 60-61.

¹¹⁴ *Dun's Review*, December 31, 1898.

our ideas of the work which is before us have been greatly magnified, and we have begun to be slightly conscious of the field of development into which this nation is evidently destined to enter.¹¹⁵

In no section of American opinion had the year wrought a greater transformation than in that of the business men.

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¹¹⁵ *Banker and Tradesman*, XXVI. 1186 (December 28, 1898).

THE DIPLOMATIC SERVICE OF JOHN M. FORBES AT BUENOS AIRES

"Forbes was an extraordinarily able man whose services to his country are now almost forgotten."¹ Thus does a reputable American scholar characterise John M. Forbes who from 1820 to 1831 was a diplomatic agent of the United States government at Buenos Aires. This man and this decade of service merit attention—the man because he is an admirable type of the devoted and capable public servant; the decade because it is the first in the organized relations of the United States and the most powerful Hispanic-American nation.

In the course of the chaotic decade of the Spanish-American revolutions previous to 1820 the United States government maintained no organized contact with the region of the Río de la Plata. Various individuals bearing commissions—more or less roving—from the United States appeared from time to time at Buenos Aires, entered into relations with the existing authorities, and sent occasional reports to Washington. A more ambitious effort to gain reliable information on South American conditions was made in 1817-1818 in the appointment and work of the South American Commission,² but relations with the Platine people assumed no continuity and achieved little effectiveness until after the appointment in June, 1820, of John M. Forbes to be "Agent for Commerce and Seamen in the Province of Buenos Ayres or Chile, in So. America."³

Forbes, in 1823, stated that between November, 1819,

¹ Julius L. Goebel, *The Struggle for the Falkland Islands* (New Haven, 1927), p. 439n.

² See Watt Stewart, "The South American Commission, 1817-1818," *HISPANIC AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW*, IX. 31-59.

³ Adams to Forbes, June 17. MS. Department of State, Despatches to Consuls, II. 188.

and June, 1820, he had thrice been offered and had as many times declined the appointment to the South American agency.⁴ The next proffer, however, he accepted, though "with reluctance", and on July 25, 1820, he departed from New York on the U. S. S. *Constellation* bound for his new—and his last—post.⁵ His destination was reached on October 24.⁶

Forbes, who was to have a career of almost eleven years at Buenos Aires, was one of the most able and most successful of all the diplomatic agents of the United States at that place. Unlike his roaming predecessors he had had a diplomatic experience of several years previous to this appointment. In the years 1802 to 1817 he had been United States consul or consul general in various North European countries: consul at Hamburg⁷ and Copenhagen,⁸ consul general at Denmark, Prussia, and Mecklenburg.⁹

It was fortunate indeed that Forbes at this time should have been sent to Buenos Aires. From his dispatches it is evident that the people there were much under the influence of the English and were impatient of the temporizing policy being pursued at Washington. Forbes, by his very real ability in diplomacy and by his dignity and his attractive personality, won the respect of the Buenos Aireans. And with his capacity for interpreting situations and movements he was able through a long succession of clearly written and comprehensive dispatches to keep his government well acquainted with conditions at Buenos Aires and, to some extent, in neighboring states.

The new agent's instructions, drawn under date of July 5, 1820, emphasize the subjects of commerce, seamen, and pri-

⁴ Forbes to Wm. Lee, January 4, 1823. MS. Department of State, Consular Letters, Buenos Ayres, II.

⁵ Forbes to Adams, July 25, 1820. *Ibid.*, I.

⁶ Forbes to Adams, December 4, 1820. *Ibid.*

⁷ Forbes to Madison, July 6, 1802. *Ibid.*, Hamburg, I.

⁸ Forbes to Monroe, December 30, 1812, and to Secretary of State, August 6, 1817. *Ibid.*, Copenhagen, II.

⁹ Forbes to Monroe, June 9, 1820. *Ibid.*, Buenos Ayres, I.

vateering. He was to gain information concerning commerce. He was to protect the rights of American seamen, preventing their impressment by privateers. And he was, if possible, to cause the repeal of certain provisions of the rules of the United Provinces¹⁰ regulating privateering. He was to keep his government informed of political developments, but was to abjure partisanship, keeping at all times "a neutral position, a neutral heart, and an observing mind".¹¹

It has been noticed that Forbes's appointment was to Buenos Aires or Chile. The decision was to rest with J. B. Prevost, an American agent holding a previous commission, whom Forbes found at Buenos Aires. The question of station was determined by the Buenos Airean government which, just before Forbes's arrival, ordered Prevost from the province, giving him four days in which to depart. He had but one day remaining when Forbes arrived.¹² Though Forbes would

¹⁰ When the Platine region declared its independence from Spain in July, 1816, the style United Provinces of South America was assumed. For three years there was an ostensible union under Supreme Director Juan M. Pueyrredón, then the union practically disappeared. At the time of Forbes's arrival the government of the province of Buenos Aires, by consent of most of the others, was exercising the powers necessary to the conduct of foreign relations for the region, a situation that obtained during most of Forbes's decade. A new union was effected in 1826 and a constitution drawn for the Argentine Republic. But the union was more ostensible than real and centrifugal forces continued to operate and prevented any effective union until the era of Rosas which had its inception almost coincident with the end of Forbes's diplomatic service.

¹¹ Adams to Forbes in Wm. R. Manning, *Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States concerning the Independence of the Latin-American Nations* (New York, 1925), I. 130-133.

¹² The provincial government expelled Prevost because of its having taken offense at certain statements which he had made in communications to his government, statements that had later found their way into the press in the United States. Forbes to Adams, December 4, 1820. MS. Department of State, Consular Letters, Buenos Ayres, I. In a dispatch to Secretary Adams written from Santiago, January 6, 1821, Prevost said: "Upon receipt of the Despatch of the 10th of July last accompanying Mr. Forbes I availed myself of the choice of residence reposed in me by the President [!] and embarked forthwith on board of a merchantman bound to Valparaiso. . . . The motives for

have preferred the Chilean post, he, perforce, remained at Buenos Aires.

In his relations with the constituted authorities Forbes, as long as the government at Buenos Aires was unrecognized by the United States, took the position of an agent *authorized* by his government though not *accredited* to that at Buenos Aires. Sir Thomas Hardy, British consul, believed Prevost had been in error in failing to take such position.¹³

Argentine conditions at the time of Forbes's arrival gave slight grounds for optimism concerning the country's future. Four months after entering upon the discharge of his duties the new agent addressed this despairing wail to Secretary of State Adams:

This Country is lost both Politically and Commercially—there never was anything like education among the Natives of this Country, consequently there are no materials for forming a public opinion and without public opinion how is it possible to form a Republic? the Government will long continue a merely military despotism which will pass from the chief of one party to that of another, the people having no part or voice in it.—Commercially viewed, the resources of this Country are daily disappearing. . . . Commerce, with everything belonging to civilized life, may, and probably will relapse into utter barbarism; unless by the special grace and favour of heaven a reform in the personal habits and Political tendencies of the people should be effected and a total regeneration take place.¹⁴

Forbes found the British well entrenched at Buenos Aires, both commercially and politically. British trade in extent far exceeded that of the United States. And politically the same situation existed. During his decade of activity in that city, the American agent was instant in season and out of

my presence on this Theatre were too interesting to allow personal considerations to delay me until the return of the *Constellation* from Río." MS. Department of State, Letters of J. B. Prevost.

¹³ Forbes to Adams, December 4, 1820. MS. Department of State, Consular Letters, Buenos Ayres, I.

¹⁴ April 1, 1821. *Ibid.*

season in combating the British. This point, however, has already been adequately treated elsewhere and requires no further comment here.¹⁵

It is possible that Forbes exercised some influence on his government when it decided, in 1822, to recognize the independence of the revolting Spanish-American states. Political conditions in the province of Buenos Aires, not long after Forbes's arrival, were greatly improved through the elevation of Bernardino Rivadavia and José García to the leading offices. Forbes's dispatches describing these changes were submitted to congress in March, 1822, along with President Monroe's special message announcing his intention to recognize the new states.¹⁶

One of Forbes's tasks of somewhat more than casual interest was that of trying to secure favorable tariff treatment for flour from the United States. His activities in this connection extended over the two-year period 1824-1826. Here his efforts were productive of little result. He did succeed in securing the repeal of a flour-exclusion law, but it was replaced by a law which required such high duties on flour that the case was not much bettered.¹⁷

Failure was Forbes's lot also in his efforts to secure pay-

¹⁵ See J. Fred Rippy, *Rivalry of the United States and Great Britain over Latin America, 1808-1830* (Baltimore, 1929), pp. 9-21, 137-149, and Edwin J. Pratt, "Anglo-American Commercial and Political Rivalry on the Plata, 1820-1830," *HISPANIC AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW*, XI. 302-335. On Forbes's efforts at negotiating a commercial treaty with Argentina in 1825 see Watt Stewart, "United States-Argentine Commercial Negotiations of 1825," *ibid.*, XIII. 367-371.

¹⁶ Alberto Palomeque, *Orígenes de la Diplomacia Argentina; Misión Aguirre á Norte América* (Buenos Aires, 1905), I. 106, 107. Forbes's only connection with the Monroe Doctrine was in relation to the effort of the Argentine government to make that declaration applicable to the struggle between Argentina and Brazil in the years 1826-1828. His connection with the subject was merely incidental to his office and merits no further discussion here. See Watt Stewart, "Argentina and the Monroe Doctrine, 1824-1828," *HISPANIC AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW*, X. 26-32.

¹⁷ Professor Rippy and Mr. Pratt, in the works previously cited, treat this subject at some length.

ment of various claims which countrymen of his held against the Platine government—claims for damages on various grounds or claims for payment of financial obligations assumed by some one of the revolutionary governments. Non-success is easily explainable on the grounds of governmental instability and financial disorganization.

A new and unstable government such as that of the provinces of the Río de la Plata—now united, now disunited, threatened by grave dangers from without and menaced by dissension within—must in the very nature of things have been driven at times through promptings of the instinct of self-preservation to measures offensive to foreign governments. As a consequence that part of Forbes's time which was not devoted to efforts at furthering American commercial and financial interests was in large measure devoted to the protection of the rights and interests of his fellow-citizens in matters associated with privateering, impressment, and compulsory military service.

Privateering was a subject which demanded attention for a long period of time and caused much anxiety to the Washington authorities. Some years previous to 1820 it had become a matter of interest. As has been seen, the subject was mentioned in Forbes's instructions and it occasioned action on the part of Forbes from time to time during almost the entire period of his service at Buenos Aires.

The United Provinces, lacking naval power in their struggle with Spain, had resorted to privateering with the result that many adventurous foreigners assumed the status of privateersmen under the revolutionary governments. Hispanic-American privateers soon became numerous upon the seas. Commanders of privateers, being in most cases of unscrupulous character in the beginning, were often not over-nice about keeping their activities within the law. In 1819 and 1820 the general conduct of the boats of Buenos Aires suffered

a change decidedly for the worse.¹⁸ Privateering came to be disgraced by a buccaneering and piratical spirit for which citizens of the United States were largely responsible. Baltimore in the course of time became notorious for its failure to suppress the illegal acts of the privateers.¹⁹ It was in this connection mainly that the United States government experienced difficulty in enforcing its neutrality laws with reference to the struggle between the Spanish-Americans and the mother country.

Though the readiness of Americans to profit at the expense of Spain was one cause of the prevalence and the offensive nature of privateering, the chief cause is perhaps to be found in the very liberal regulations for the privateering service drawn by the revolutionary governments. The government at Washington attributed much of the evil of the system to two articles in the code of Buenos Aires: (1) to that article which gave the privileges of a Buenos Airean and a right to that country's flag to any foreigner who had never even been in the country, and (2) to that article which permitted the privateers to send their prizes wheresoever they pleased. These defects were pointed out in an instruction which Secretary Adams in July, 1820, addressed to Prevost in South America.²⁰ Forbes, about to set sail for Buenos Aires, was, as has been noticed, also instructed to call the attention of the Platine government to the defects of its privateering code.

No favorable opportunity for complying with this point of his instructions presented itself to Forbes until September, 1821. At that time, in reply to his remonstrance on this subject in conference with Rivadavia, minister of foreign affairs of the province of Buenos Aires, the minister stated that the evil would no longer exist, that an order recalling all priva-

¹⁸ Theodore S. Currier, *Los Corsarios del Río de la Plata* (Buenos Aires, 1929), p. 38. The writer sketches, on pp. 60-65, Forbes's activities at Buenos Aires in this connection.

¹⁹ Joseph Byrne Lockey, *Pan-Americanism; Its Beginnings* (New York, 1920), pp. 173, 174.

²⁰ July 10. Manning, *op. cit.*, I, 134-137.

teers would shortly be published. He explained his government's policy by saying that governments seated in perfect peace and security reasoned calmly on these subjects, but that his country had experienced so many difficulties in its struggle for independence that the government had been compelled to adopt the strongest measures against Spanish commerce. But, he concluded, "This is now all finished."²¹

Minister Rivadavia's word was made good when on the following October 6 the promised decree was issued.²²

Some years passed before the United States government found it necessary again to protest Buenos Airean privateering activities. The new occasion for recourse to the employment of privateers was the Argentine-Brazilian war. The operations of the privateers commissioned at this time were mainly confined to the Brazilian coast. On that coast off Santos on September 23, 1827, the American brig *Ruth* was captured by the Buenos Airean privateer *El Rayo Argentino*. When the vessel was sent to the prize court at Buenos Aires Forbes learned that it had been taken on the authority of certain secret instructions issued to privateersmen at the granting of their commissions. By those instructions the entire coast of Brazil was to be considered as in a state of blockade.²³ Forbes lost no time in protesting the taking of the *Ruth* and the illegality of certain provisions of the secret instructions.²⁴ Dispatch in judging the case of the *Ruth* was promised²⁵ and the government issued a decree modifying the secret instructions in such manner as to meet Forbes's objections to them.²⁶

After the signing of the peace treaty with Brazil priva-

²¹ Forbes to Adams, September 2, 1821. *Ibid.*, I. 581.

²² For the text of the order see Manning, *op. cit.*, I. 590, 591.

²³ Forbes to Clay, October 30, 1827. MS. Department of State, Despatches from Argentina, III.

²⁴ Forbes to Moreno, October 13 and 24, 1827. *Ibid.*

²⁵ Moreno to Forbes, October 15, 1827. *Ibid.*

²⁶ See Moreno to Forbes, October 25, 1827, and a copy of the decree of even date in *ibid.*

teers continued to operate. The U. S. S. *Erie* early in 1829 captured the Buenos Airean *Federal* on the charge of having piratically plundered the American brig *Nymph*. On learning of the incident, Forbes addressed to the minister secretary general of the provisional government of the Buenos Aires province, Dr. Díaz Velez, a strong note calling his attention to the increase of piratical abuses by privateers operating under Argentine commissions in time of peace.²⁷ Again the protest was effective. In reply the secretary general acknowledged the justice of Forbes's observations and, in order to obviate the inconvenience arising from the activities of privateers in time of peace, the government issued a decree on the subject, a copy of which was furnished the American *chargé*.²⁸ This decree, dated March 17, nullified all privateering commissions against Brazil not yet returned by their possessors as well as those issued against Spain, required individuals holding such commissions to present them to the marine department, and ordered the fitting out of war vessels to cruise in those seas frequented by the privateers in order to recover the commissions and disarm the privateers.²⁹ Considering it a matter of great importance, Forbes had some copies of the decree printed and transmitted them to United States public agents in South America and Europe.³⁰

Except for unsuccessful efforts to obtain for the owners of the brig *Ruth*, mentioned above, indemnity for the deten-

²⁷ March 10, 1829. *Ibid.*

²⁸ It was almost a year after the United States had decided to recognize the independence of the Argentine people before a minister to their government was appointed in the person of Caesar A. Rodney. (For his instructions see Manning, *op. cit.*, I. 186-192). At the same time Forbes was commissioned as secretary of legation at Buenos Aires (*ibid.*, I. 130n). Rodney did not reach Buenos Aires until mid-November, 1823, and served as minister only until the following June 11 when he died as the result of a stroke of apoplexy. (Forbes to Adams, June 14, 1824. MS. Department of State, Despatches from Argentina, II). On the following March 9 Forbes was commissioned *chargé d'affaires* at Buenos Aires. (Manning, *op. cit.*, I. 130n.)

²⁹ MS. Department of State, Despatches from Argentina, III.

³⁰ Forbes to the Secretary of State, March 25, 1829. *Ibid.*

tion of the vessel and the confiscation of its cargo,³¹ this incident may be considered the end of Forbes's activities at Buenos Aires insofar as they related to privateering. He had labored under some difficulties but had persevered and, on the whole, may be said to have been successful in his efforts.

Shortly after his arrival at Buenos Aires Forbes found it necessary to protest against impressment of American seamen. In March, 1821, the Platine government was making strenuous efforts to form a fleet to meet that of Ramírez which was expected from Spain. Numbers of foreigners were impressed into the naval service. When an American was taken and Forbes made an application for his release the application would be favorably acted upon but the offense would be repeated.³² Forbes finally addressed to the governor a formal note on the subject, requesting that the practice "so pernicious to the commerce of the two countries, and so repugnant to that friendship mutually professed by both" might cease.³³ The government's reply was to the effect that positive orders had been given against impressment of American seamen.³⁴

Notwithstanding these assurances, impressments continued though Forbes always succeeded in securing the release of his countrymen.³⁵ To prevent further annoyances from this cause, Forbes suggested that a general order be issued to permit all mariners who should be furnished with his certificate of their citizenship and actual engagement in the service of United States ships, to pass and repass freely about the legitimate affairs of their respective vessels. He proposed, provided his suggestion were accepted, to prepare suitable

³¹ Forbes to Minister of Foreign Relations, December 29, 1827. *Ibid.*

³² Forbes to Adams, April 1, 1821. MS. Department of State, Consular Letters, Buenos Ayres, I.

³³ March 22, 1821. *Ibid.*

³⁴ Luca to Forbes, March 23, 1821. *Ibid.*

³⁵ Forbes to Adams, April 17, 1821. *Ibid.*

certificates in the Spanish language which he would issue under his signature and seal to such individuals only as should be found on the strictest investigation to merit such certificate.³⁶ On April 24 a resolution of the governor and captain general was published which in its main features embodied Forbes's suggestion.³⁷

Forbes's protests and the new regulations seem to have effected a correction of the abuse for no further reference to impressment occurs in his correspondence.

Somewhat similar to the effort to impress seamen though more serious in its possibilities for trouble, the circumstances considered, was the attempt of a provisional government at Buenos Aires to force into the military service foreigners residing in the port. The matter gave Forbes many anxious moments.

A sequel to Argentina's war with Brazil was a revolution led by one Juan Lavalle, a dissatisfied general, against the governor of the province of Buenos Aires, Manuel Dorrego. In the course of this revolution, Lavalle captured Dorrego and, despite protests of Forbes and others, had him shot without trial.³⁸ Dorrego's execution provoked much feeling in the back-country provinces. A convention which met at Santa Fé characterised the act as high treason and summoned the interior provinces to join in war on the province of Buenos Aires. A military force was organized under the command of Estanislao López and Juan Manuel de Rosas and was led against Buenos Aires.

It was under these circumstances that the Lavalle govern-

³⁶ Forbes to the Secretary of Government, April 15, 1821. *Ibid.*

³⁷ In *ibid.*

³⁸ Forbes to Clay, December 23, 1828. MS. Department of State, Despatches from Argentina, III. It was in reference to his action here that Forbes wrote in the letter cited: "I am happy to say that those sincere, though unsuccessful efforts while disapproved by none, have excited a very friendly feeling toward me in the community."

ment at Buenos Aires revived an old law of the province³⁹ and issued a peremptory call to all foreigners to take arms for the conflict expected shortly to ensue.⁴⁰ At once Forbes remonstrated, claiming for his countrymen the enjoyment of the privileges in this respect which were secured to the British by their treaty of 1825.⁴¹ He based his claim on the correspondence which he had had with the government in 1825 when it had made the treaty with Great Britain. In this correspondence Forbes had demanded in the name of the United States that every right or privilege conceded to British subjects in the treaty just completed should likewise be enjoyed by the citizens of the United States.⁴² Believing resistance at the time more particularly necessary as the struggle was entirely a civil war in which foreigners should not be compromised, he advised his countrymen not to listen to the call of the government.⁴³

Reply to Forbes's remonstrance was delayed. The government issued new decrees threatening non-conformists with imprisonment and heavy fines and proclaiming April 6 as the last day of grace. Forbes still recommended to his fellow-citizens "a silent, prudent, but firm resistance".⁴⁴

The Lavalle government took the position that by the spirit and liberal meaning of the British treaty the English were not

³⁹ Passed April 10, 1821. It provided that every foreigner having a shop or exercising any art or profession must enlist in the local corps and be subject to the duties which citizens of his class customarily bore. Clerks as well as owners, and strangers in general, were included in the terms of the law. MS. Department of State, Consular Letters, Buenos Ayres, I.

⁴⁰ Forbes to the Secretary of State, March 25, 1829. MS. Department of State, Despatches from Argentina, III.

⁴¹ That treaty provided for exemption by each party of the nationals of the other from compulsory military service or forced loans or military exactions or requisitions. For text of the entire treaty see *British and Foreign State Papers*, XII. (1824-1825), 29-37.

⁴² Forbes to García, February 23, 1825. MS. Department of State, Despatches from Argentina, II.

⁴³ Forbes to the Secretary of State, March 25, 1829. *Ibid.*, III.

⁴⁴ Forbes to the Secretary of State, April 3, 1829. *Ibid.*

exempt from the service required of them.⁴⁵ Hence, the British *chargé*, Woodbine Parish, was concerned in the affair for his countrymen as were Forbes and the French consul general, Mende ville, for theirs. On March 31, these three gentlemen held a diplomatic conference. Forbes proposed that on receiving formal assurance that foreigners would be required to participate only in the maintenance of the police in the absence of conflicting parties and that they would not be compromised, all American, British, and French nationals should consent to be embodied under the characteristic name of "Urbane Guard", and under command of officers of their own selection. Mende ville readily agreed, but Parish would not consent that the British should take arms on those terms. He declared that in the last extremity he would call on the commanders of British ships on the coast to land marines for the protection of British life and property. Forbes would not consider participating in such a measure, believing it wholly incompatible with the constitution and policy of his government and far exceeding the authority of American naval commanders.⁴⁶ Hence, the effort to adopt and follow a common policy came to naught.

In its reply on April 7 to Forbes's note of protest of March 22, the government stated its interpretation of the British treaty in its relation to military service and expressed its determination to enforce the enrollment of foreigners without exception. Forbes then announced that if the rule were to extend to *all* nations, he would advise his countrymen to participate in a strictly "urbane service".⁴⁷

A new decree was issued. In only one case was there an attempt to apply its terms to an American. Forbes at once demanded to know from the person charged with the execution of the decree whether it was or was not within his instructions to apply its provisions to citizens of the United States.

⁴⁵ Forbes to the Secretary of State, April 10, 1829. *Ibid.*

⁴⁶ Forbes to the Secretary of State, April 3, 1829. *Ibid.*

⁴⁷ Forbes to the Secretary of State, April 10, 1829. *Ibid.*

The reply was in the negative and Forbes's countryman was immediately released from compulsory service.⁴⁸

Still another decree was prepared. It contained an absolute order for foreigners without exception to take arms.⁴⁹ Forbes saw the decree in manuscript, but its publication was withheld when the British *chargé* presented the alternative of its suppression or the granting to him of his passports to leave the country. He declared he would consider the measure as a breach of the existing treaty with his government and an act of war against Great Britain.⁵⁰ Parish was certainly justified in regarding the contemplated measure as a breach of treaty.

Forbes considered that the recall of the decree put to rest the whole question of compulsory military service for foreigners.⁵¹ The situation was further relieved when in late April the Lavalle government was overthrown.

The American *chargé* merits credit for the skill with which he navigated his diplomatic bark through the troubled waters that surrounded it. Though Parish's threat of a severance of diplomatic relations was decisive, there seems to be some justification for the pride which Forbes evinced in a statement regarding the incident which he made to Daniel Brent, chief clerk of the department of state:

I brought our Countrymen triumphantly out of their difficulties without the semblance of a treaty to stand upon; while the British Charge d'Affaires, Mr. Parish, with his treaty in hand, only rescued his Countrymen from the despotism of the day, by offering to the feeble Government the alternative of an open rupture; and Mr. Mende-ville, with vacillating opinions and conduct, brought his fellow subjects into imminent danger, and placed himself in the necessity of

⁴⁸ Forbes to the Secretary of State, April 13, 1829. *Ibid.*

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

⁵⁰ Forbes to the Secretary of State, April 14, 1829. *Ibid.*

⁵¹ *Ibid.* Between the Buenos Airean government and the French consul-general the friction became so great that Mende-ville demanded and was granted his passports. The French who could not quit the country were placed under the protection of Forbes. Forbes to the Secretary of State, May 1, 1829. *Ibid.*

separating himself from the Government and Country in mutual disgust and anger.⁵²

During the troubled months of early 1829, the U. S. S. *Vandalia* and *Boston* were most of the time at or near Buenos Aires. Forbes's opinion with respect to the usefulness of naval vessels in such cases as this under discussion is interesting. He stated that in the last extremity they would furnish an asylum, but he believed that the only real influence to be derived from their presence was "a silent and moral impression on the minds of the common mass". From the nature of the waters of the Río de la Plata⁵³ the people of the government, he said, had always manifested contempt for everything like a menace of a naval force. What had tended more than any other circumstance, he thought, to irritate the men in power toward both the English and the French representatives in the discussions concerning military service, had been the ostentatious boasting of both in respect to their naval forces on the coast. Similar menaces on his part would have had the additional ridicule of being in direct opposition to the known restrictions of the United States constitution and the naval service.⁵⁴

In the late months of 1830 there was some further discussion at Buenos Aires of the question of requiring military service from foreigners.⁵⁵ The government requested from Forbes information as to the practice in the United States on

⁵² January 23, 1830. MS. Department of State, Despatches from Argentina, IV.

⁵³ Between Cape St. Maria on the north and Cape St. Antonia on the south the Plata is nearly 150 miles wide. "But this noble expanse of fresh water . . . is deformed by rocks and sand banks, that render the navigation both difficult and dangerous; and it is exposed to impetuous torrents of wind, called *Pamperos*, which sweep, with dreadful fury over the vast plains of the Pampas." Wm. Bingley, *Travels in South America from Modern Writers, etc.* (London, 1820), p. 278.

⁵⁴ Forbes to the Secretary of State, May 4, 1829. MS. Department of State, Despatches from Argentina, III.

⁵⁵ Forbes to Van Buren, November 29, 1830. *Ibid.*, IV.

the point⁵⁶ and Forbes willingly supplied it.⁵⁷ No step involving American citizens was taken in the matter.

For more than ten years Forbes resided at Buenos Aires, a most faithful servant of his government, alert to defend its rights and those of its citizens. In 1827, he had requested leave to return to the United States, the condition of his health being the reason advanced. His request was refused because of the distance and the public inconvenience involved.⁵⁸ The Brazilian war and the succeeding civil war presented no convenient opportunity for his absence, while they increased the burdens of his position. His health continued to decline. Finally, early in 1831, he wrote to Van Buren saying he was at "the very doors of death", that his physicians told him that the only hope for improvement was in returning to the United States, and that he was put to the necessity of yielding up his existence or throwing himself on the indulgence of the government by taking leave without waiting for permission.⁵⁹ He was unable to put into effect at once his resolution to leave Buenos Aires because of the impossibility of disposing of his property.⁶⁰ Delay proved fatal, for on June 14, 1831, after "a painful and lingering illness", he died.⁶¹

Since the entire burden of maintaining sympathetic contact between the United States and Argentina from 1824 to the time of his death was borne by Forbes alone—Argentina having, during practically the whole period, no resident minister or other representative at Washington—it is a matter of much importance that he should have been so well qualified for the task. During his decade of service at Buenos Aires, Forbes was obliged to handle some difficult problems, but it is not evi-

⁵⁶ Guido to Forbes, November 18, 1830. *Ibid.*

⁵⁷ Forbes to Guido, November 19, 1830. *Ibid.*

⁵⁸ Clay to Forbes, April 27, 1827. MS. Department of State, Instructions to United States Ministers, XI. 309, 310.

⁵⁹ February 14. MS. Department of State, Despatches from Argentina, IV.

⁶⁰ Forbes to Van Buren, April 13, 1831. *Ibid.*

⁶¹ Slacum to Van Buren, June 14, 1831. *Ibid.* George W. Slacum was American consul at Buenos Aires.

dent that he made a single mistake in any matter of importance. His course was uniformly consistent and firm. He became thoroughly familiar with political and social conditions in South America and there is much evidence that he enjoyed the confidence of the government to which he was accredited as well as of the people at Buenos Aires. Likewise, evidence is not wanting that he gave satisfaction to his own government through several administrations.⁶² Though distressed that he should die in a foreign land, far from home, friends, and family, he could have the satisfaction in his ultimate hour of knowing that he had in his decade at Buenos Aires served his government and his countrymen well and that his efforts at counteracting British influence and commercial advantages had been rewarded with some degree of success.

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* Of Forbes's dispatches Clay once wrote to him: "While they exhibit proof of great zeal on your part, in collecting interesting information, in reference to the Political conditions of Buenos Ayres, the diligence and manner employed in presenting it to this Department give great satisfaction." MS. Department of State, Instructions to United States Ministers, XL 1.

BOOK REVIEWS

O Rei Cavalleiro. By PEDRO CALMON. (São Paulo, Brasil: Companhia Editora Nacional, 1933. Pp. 312.)

Os Marechaes de D. Maria II. By EDUARDO DE NORONHA. (Lisboa: João Romano Torres e Companhia, n.d. Pp. 297.)

No documentation beclouds the vividness of Calmon's "narrative of the short and bizarre life" of the first emperor of Brazil. Disregarding the serenity of the scholarly historian, the author frankly proposes to recreate the emotions inherent in the drama of this "most calumniated" and "most glorified" of sovereigns. More a novelist than an historian, despite the half-dozen titles listed as History among the publications by the author, the distinguished secretary of the Museu Historico do Rio de Janeiro projects himself into the intellectual and emotional life of the epic of independence largely by the aid of imaginative powers of no mean sort. Subjective, sometimes intensely so, impressionistic, this biography contains one footnote and one brief page of condensed bibliography listing less than half a hundred titles, over two-thirds of which are secondary works.

In a volume painted with the sweeping brush of subjective emotionalism one cannot expect too great accuracy of detail; nor is this biography an exception. The picture (pp. 26, 30, 73) in which Strangford the English minister to the Portuguese court, delivers the famous copy of the *Moniteur* containing Napoleon's announcement of the dethronement of the Braganças is dramatic, but Strangford, according to his own statement to his Foreign Office, was on board the English blockading fleet when the paper reached Lisbon. Pedro's participation in the formulation of the constitution of Brazil is compared with the part played by Napoleon in the formulation of the Code (p. 147); yet of the Committee of Ten which drew up the constitution after the Constituent Assembly had been forcibly dissolved by D. Pedro, five had sat in that body and the final form differed little from the document prepared by the Assembly. One line (p. 155) is devoted to the recognition of independence by foreign powers; more than one page (pp. 196-201 *passim*) to the loveliness of D. Amelia de

Leuchtenberg, D. Pedro's second wife; less than four pages (pp. 179-182) are devoted to the emperor's policy in La Plata, and scores of pages to his illicit love affairs. The emotional, the dramatic, receive the emphasis; the analytical, the dispassionate, are slighted.

From the three hundred pages there emerges a vivid and real personality, a figure which gibes in the main with the historical facts. The reviewer cannot agree that the youthful Pedro envisaged an independent Brazilian empire completely separated from Portugal as early as April, 1821 (pp. 68 ff.), nor can he overlook the summary dismissal of such unpleasant topics as the massacre of the deputies on the night of April 21, 1821, D. Pedro's first hesitating reply before the decisive "fico", or the supposed physical violence inflicted by D. Pedro on his first wife, D. Leopoldina, just before her death. And yet fundamentally the author's interpretation of this "most incomprehensible" of sovereigns is true. Keen insight, descriptive powers derived from an extraordinary command of the Portuguese language, realistic reproduction of the life of Rio and Lisbon of a century ago, and narrative ability which ranks the author among leading Brazilian novelists make this book fascinating reading.

Eduardo de Noronha's volume is built around the lives of Saldanha, Terceira, and Ponte da Santa Maria, the three marshals of D. Maria II., who emerged during the quarter-century of civil war following the death of D. João VI. The first half (to p. 178) parallels the latter part of Calmon's volume for it sketches Portuguese history from the return of D. João VI. from Brazil to the death of D. Pedro late in 1834. The intrigues of D. Carlota Joaquina, the death of D. João VI. (1826), the usurpation of the throne by D. Miguel, the civil war between Constitutionalists and Absolutists, D. Pedro's activity in Portugal after 1831, and the assumption of the throne by the fifteen year old D. Maria II. are told with a Portuguese bias which serves as a salutary antidote to Calmon's interpretation. Thereafter, the narrative falls into the hopeless welter of civil strife which ravaged the country to 1851.

The book is half history, half anecdote, hung on the tenuous thread of the biographies of the three principal characters: João Carlos Gregorio Domingos Vicente Francisco de Saldanha Daun e Oliveira, Duque de Saldanha (1790-1876); Antonio José de Sousa Manuel de Menezes Severim de Noronha, Conde de Vila Flor and Duque de Terceira (1782-1860); and Antonio Vicente de Queirós, Duque da

Ponte da Santa Maria (1794-1868). It is a gossip sort of book, sprinkled with incidents, some curious, some amusing, illustrative of the social life of the time, rich with illuminating side-lights on English adventurers in the service of Portugal, such as Admiral Napier and Major Shaw, and valuable chiefly for the insight which it gives into the turbulent and confused history of Portugal during the second quarter of the nineteenth century.

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Diccionario Biográfico del Perú. Compiled and edited by MANUEL DE MENDIBURU. 2d ed., with additions and bibliographical Notes by EVARISTO SAN CRISTÓVAL and a Biographical study of General Mendiburu by JOSÉ DE LA RIVA-AGÜERO Y OSMA. Vols. I-VI. (Lima: Imprenta "Enrique Palacios", 1931-1933.)

All students of Peruvian history are familiar with the famous Biographical Dictionary of Manuel de Mendiburu, a work which in completeness and accuracy has long been regarded as canonical in all matters relating to the colonial period and early years of independence of Peru. Unfortunately this work, originally published in 1874-1890, has long been out of print; in fact it has become so rare that it was with difficulty that the Library of Congress was able to complete its set. It was therefore a happy initiative on the part of a young Peruvian scholar, Sr. Evaristo San Cristóval, chief of the *Archivo de Límites* of the Lima foreign office, to prepare for the press an entirely new edition, the first volume of which appeared in 1931, while volume VI, bringing the biographies half way through the letter "L" has just been issued from the press.

The editing has been done with unusual competence. Nothing has been neglected which might enhance the value of the book for purposes of reference. For instance, each separate volume is equipped with an elaborate index of important persons and episodes mentioned in the various biographies. Thus (in volume I) under the letter "V" will be found the entry, "Vacuna, tratada a Lima, su propagación," with a reference to the appropriate portions of the life of Abascal, the enlightened viceroy who introduced vaccination into Peru.

The new edition is superior to the old in a number of other important particulars. In the original edition General Mendiburu was

accustomed to mention important documents (*e.g.* proclamations of viceroys) without stating where they are to be found. With a patience and perseverance worthy of the highest praise Sr. San Cristóval has added the exact references to the collections or volumes or sections of the archives where the documents in question may be located. The services which he has thus rendered to investigators of Peruvian history need no stressing. It is obvious that in all that pertains to Peruvian historiography much water has flowed under the bridges during the past half century. The editor has not recoiled, however, before the Herculean task of bringing the bibliographies, which accompany the individual articles, up to date. Finally, the distinguished historian, Sr. José de Riva-Agüero, has authorized Sr. San Cristóval to publish at the beginning of Volume I the brilliant essay on General Mendiburu which originally appeared in 1910 as a chapter in Sr. Riva-Agüero's *La Historia en el Perú*. Here is to be found a delightful and scholarly account of the important rôle which this writer and public man played in the affairs of Peru almost up to the time of his death in 1885.

It is of course impossible in this brief review to make any detailed reference to individual articles. It may merely be pointed out that a goodly number of the biographies, such as those of Abascal (84 pages), Amat (62 pages, including 22 pages of bibliography), Atahualpa (60 pages), Cantarac (42 pages) are veritable monographs in themselves.

In fine, this new edition of Mendiburu not only reflects great credit on the scholarship and enterprise of the editor but also is a signal example of the zeal with which historical studies are being prosecuted in Peru.

PERCY ALVIN MARTIN.

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Las Tablas de la Conquista de Mexico en las Colecciones de Madrid [de Miguel González]. With a Prologue by GENARO ESTRADA. (Madrid: 1933).

The exploits of Cortés have engaged the attention not only of historians and chroniclers but also of artists. Among these was a certain Miguel González who painted several collections of *tablas* of the class known as *maquedas*, in which the prevailing sepia tints are skilfully relieved with incrustations of mother-of-pearl. Unhappily, nothing is known of this artist save that he labored at the end of the seventeenth

or beginning of the eighteenth century. It is not even certain that he was ever in Mexico. One of the collections of his works is to be found in Buenos Aires, while the remaining two are in Madrid in the Museo Arqueológico Nacional and the house of the former Dukes of Montezuma de Tulentengo respectively. Both of the Madrid collections, each containing twenty-four *tablas*, have been reproduced through the efforts of the erudite Ambassador of Mexico to Spain, Sr. Genaro Estrada whose labors in connection with the *Archivo Histórico Diplomático Mexicano* are well known to all students of Mexican history. A brief but adequate foreword by Sr. Estrada places the reproductions in their proper historical setting.

It will freely be conceded that the *tablas* are better calculated to appeal to the artist than to the historian. As might be expected in view of the relatively late date at which the pictures were reproduced, the treatment is conventionalized and anacronisms—many of them delightfully naïve—abound. None the less the reproductions evoke with amazing vividness the various episodes of the stirring days of the conquest and as such possess a real historical interest. The quaint descriptive titles which González gave to the pictures heightens this interest, e.g., “Visita el Cap. General Cortes al gran Moctesuma en su Real palacio i le hablo tocante a la Sta. Fee y mando que se rrepartiesen collares de oro a los Soldados y dos Cargas de mantas a cada uno,” “Comen los Indios carne de Españoles y tienen Asco.”

The appearance and make-up of this book are all that the most exigent could demand. The cover depicts in colors episodes of the conquest in the style of the codices of the period. The *tablas* themselves are reproduced on an excellent quality of paper with both fidelity and charm.

PERCY ALVIN MARTIN.

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British Preëminence in Brazil: Its Rise and Decline. A Study in European Expansion. By ALAN K. MANCHESTER. (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1933. Pp. 354. Bibliography.)

Dr. Manchester presents in this volume a very penetrating analysis of the entire question of relations between Great Britain and Brazil, in view of the traditional friendship and mutual esteem which has

been maintained for so many years by historians of the two countries, and with particular reference to the domination by Great Britain of Brazilian policy and development.

As is necessary in a work of this nature, considerable attention has been paid to the historical background. The rise of the great friendship between England and Portugal, the Carolean infelicities, and the Napoleonic Braganza-hunt have been well expressed in three chapters of excellent narration and commentary. The transfer of the Portuguese court to Brazil and its inevitable effects upon the direction of British policy has been given detailed treatment in view of its position at the starting point of Brazilian national (as opposed to Brazilian colonial) political history.

There are several excellent short studies in the volume. The account of the life and curious and surprising adventures of Viscount Strangford—first in Portugal at the court of poor, undecided Prince John (later John VI.), and later under circumstances equally disadvantageous in the kingdom of Brazil with John and his fantastic queen—is neatly done and is almost definitive in several aspects. The viscount, though no effort is made to develop him as a personality, emerges in fine relief from among pages of treaties and reports, though, to be sure, the portrait is not entirely sympathetic. So well done is the Strangford case that it is a matter of regret that the Brant Pontes mission and the subsequent Stuart mission are not given in greater detail.

Dr. Manchester has gone through an enormous amount of manuscript and documentary material and has been very moderate in drawing his conclusions. For want of satisfactory Brazilian material he has drawn much of the detail of Brazilian history of the Strangford period from British diplomatic reports in the Foreign Office in London; nevertheless, or perhaps because of this, there appears at times a certain bias, shown mainly in the choice of adjectives, against the activities of the British. His point of view, more pro-Brazilian than anti-British, enables him to distinguish clearly the rise under the second Pedro of a Brazilian spirit opposed to further exploitation by the coin-jingling British.

The study is not entirely political, nor diplomatic, nor economic. Through the early days of the kingdom and the subsequent empire, the political influence of Great Britain is traced clearly and with ease as a species of Portuguese hangover; but after 1860 the emphasis is

laid more and more upon the commercial aspects. The factors which aided the decline of British preëminence tend to show rather a relaxation of the British grasp because of the expansion of British interests in other parts of the world, together with an increasing, but gentle, pressure by Brazil, than a wild, knock-down-and-drag-out battle by both countries. The three points of Anglo-Brazilian friction in the nineteenth century are well developed, with the slavetrade the most important of the three.

Not the least of the virtues of this study is the style in which it is presented, for it is evident that scholarship may be expressed by more than a wealth of documentation and an index so complete as to be at once an example and a reproach to writers of technical works on history. The handling and interpretation of the masses of statistical data are a high point; a readable and illuminating presentation of facts and trends, and not a mere arid table-land. Dr. Manchester achieves the serious in his style, but escapes the dessicated, and in his admiration of the exact phrase avoids the affected.

ALEXANDER MARCHANT.

Washington, D. C.

Bolívar: A Contribution to the Study of his political Ideas. By C. PARRA-PÉREZ. Translated by N. ANDREW N. CLEVEN, Ph.D., Professor of History, University of Pittsburgh. (Pittsburgh: Press of Pittsburgh Printing Co., [c 1930]. Pp. 198).

When, in 1928, Dr. Caracciolo Parra-Pérez published in Paris his *Bolívar: Contribución al estudio de sus ideas políticas*, a volume in which were included certain chapters previously printed as separate articles, his work was promptly welcomed as an important contribution to the study of Bolivarian political and sociological thought. To make this book of keen analysis and brilliant interpretation available to those who do not read Spanish was the laudable and serviceable object of the translator. The translation, furthermore, was one of the many recent acts of homage by scholars in commemoration of the life and career of the illustrious Liberator. Those occupied with the study of Hispanic America will be interested in the announcement, made in the introductory note, that Professor Cleven may some day undertake the preparation of a book of his own on the political philosophy of Bolívar.

The present work is not a commentary, but the translation of a commentary. Although the author states that the translation clothes the Parra-Pérez content in English "as faithfully as possible", he asks the reader's indulgence since "the task was performed under great pressure and in a rather hurried fashion". This explanation should be kept in mind, since it no doubt accounts for the shortcomings in proof reading, for the lack of uniformity in the use or non-use of accents, and for the variations in the printing of many names. Professor Cleven has exercised freedom in craftsmanship as translator. No doubt it was of advantage to clarity in the English version to break up long sentences of the Spanish text. But many changes of meaning, departing from the original—at least the reviewer judges them as changes—have been permitted. This outcome was not fortunate, since Dr. Parra-Pérez—again in the opinion of the reviewer—wrote with uncommon precision and severe logic.

With all respect for the latitude properly due the translator, but with regard for the book being translated, it is felt that a more strictly literal and accurate rendering would be preferred as the more serviceable to students. Often the translation or omission of a single word causes the deviation or change. For example, the rendering of "servidumbre" by the word "mob" (p. 19) changed Bolívar's thought; that of "realistas" by "realists" (p. 24) is scarcely adequate; and that of "letrados granadinos" by "cultured Granadians" (p. 75) is definitely inaccurate. The text has the following: "Cree el Libertador, como Rousseau, que la república federal es el tipo del gobierno libre, . . ." The translation omits the word "federal" (p. 17). Many entire passages, to the reviewer, are obscure as to meaning. For example, what does the following mean? "And as this book is primarily based upon the ideas of two or three masters of Venezuelan and American history, these coincidences deserve to be dealt with since they tend to prove that the test of any work lies in the same field, and tends to be purged of impure elements in the complicated process of definite evaluation" (p. 14). The Spanish text is:

Y como este libro se inspira substancialmente en dos o tres maestros de la historia venezolana y americana, la coincidencia merece notarse por canto contribuye a probar que el criterio sobre dicha obra tiende a la uniformidad y se despoja de elementos impuros, en el complicado proceso de la valuación definitiva.

Some typographical errors or variations in forms are the following: Muncini for Mancini (p. 15); Lauteano Valle-Nilla-Lanz for Laure-

ano Vallenilla Lanz (p. 16); Médira for Mérida (p. 22); Bibas for Ribas (p. 29); Preteus for Proteus (p. 42); Antonio Leocraddio Guzman for Antonio Leocadio Guzmán (p. 97; elsewhere this name is correctly presented); Brisceño Médnez for Briceño Méndez (p. 172); Olmeda for Olmedo (p. 172) Alarmo for Alamo (p. 174); Arboledo for Arboleda (p. 175).

W. W. PIERSON, JR.

University of North Carolina.

Las Ideas pedagógicas de Hostos. [Edición de la *Revista de Educación.*] By CAMILA HENRÍQUEZ UREÑA. (Santo Domingo: Talleres Tipográficos "La Nación," 1932. Pp. 132.)

This little book, written by a member of a distinguished Dominican family, is more than an educational treatise. Nearly half of it is devoted to the general career of the Puerto Rican educator and publicist. The reader unfamiliar with the life of Eugenio María de Hostos must be impressed with the number and variety of activities crammed into his sixty-four years—his efforts to liberalize Spain with a view to forming a world Iberian family; his subsequent work in the 1860's to free Cuba and Puerto Rico; his campaign in Peru against the oppression of Chinese coolies and against the projects of Henry Meiggs; his propaganda in Chile for the education of women; in Argentina his ardent advocacy of a transandine railroad; his final vain efforts, after the Spanish-American War began, to secure independence for his native island; his notable services to education, especially in Santo Domingo; his production of many books. His non-pedagogical writings, Señorita Henríquez Ureña considers briefly, but she discusses in considerable detail his educational works. Her book is a welcome supplement to the writings on Hostos by Antonio Caso, Rufino Blanco Fombona, and Pedro Henríquez Ureña, and helps round out our knowledge of a man who is properly classed with Domingo Sarmiento and Andrés Bello in the field of education. Unfortunately, the volume lacks a general bibliography and an index.

MARY WILHELMINE WILLIAMS.

Goucher College.

Tres Siglos de Arquitectura Colonial. Publicaciones de la Secretaría de Educación Pública, Departamento de Monumentos. (Mexico City: 1933. Pp. 158.)

To understand something of the spirit of an historical period or to experience in some measure that indefinable thing called "atmosphere", the student or investigator needs more than the contemporary yellowed manuscripts or musty tomes, indispensable as they are. No synthesis of an age or an epoch is possible without some consideration or study of the artistic manifestations of the civilization that then flourished. Of these the architectural remains are often the most durable and are doubly valuable, for they not only preserve the physical and, therefore, indisputable evidence of the reality of the epoch which the student seeks to understand, but they also reveal the esthetic feeling of a possibly vanished race. Consequently, the work under review, which is a beautiful piece of bookmaking, is a most valuable aid to the serious student of the history of Mexico in the time of the viceroys or, for that matter, the colonial history of Hispanic America taken as a whole. Preceded by a brief foreword in both English and Spanish are one hundred and fifty full-page, soft tone reproductions of photographs from the archives of the *Dirección de monumentos coloniales*, and under each is a brief description printed in the two languages. The subjects are admirably chosen, and the three centuries of Spanish domination are almost equally represented in this series of beautiful pictures showing only a little of the architectural wealth created in that colorful period. If one thinks that such treasures are found only in the twelve thousand or more churches, cathedrals, and other ecclesiastical structures scattered about Old Mexico, he will find that he is greatly mistaken; at least one half of the subjects portrayed are often no less impressive expressions of beauty existing in private, civil, or secular buildings. One may readily trace the course of history in these pictures as recorded in the architecture of the colonial period, beginning with the relatively simple, classic style of the conquest, the evolution into the complicated baroque and, later, the churrigueresque which reflected the ornateness of the Spanish-creole civilization at its height and decline, and terminating, finally, in the complete decadence of the eighteenth century when, under French influence, the neo-classic or academic style began to prevail. All of these are well typified in the collection of photographs here assembled. In

turning the pages of this book one witnesses the budding, blossoming, and withering of the Spanish-Creole-Aztec architectural art, and the first great phase of Mexican history. This volume is warmly recommended to the attention of students of architecture and history alike; both will find much understanding and inspiration in this extraordinary collection of pictures. It should be noted that the agent for the United States, Canada, and England for the sale of this volume is the D. Appleton-Century Company, Incorporated, of New York and London, whose imprint is on the title page of the volumes intended for such distribution.

IRVING A. LEONARD.

University of California,
Berkeley.

Romances of Chivalry in the Spanish Indies. With some Registros of Shipments of Books to the Spanish Colonies. By IRVING A. LEONARD. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1933. Pp. 155).

This work appears as a University of California publication in *Modern Philology*, Vol. 16, No. 3, pp. 217-373. It is probably the only study which traces the course of books from Spain to their final destination in the Indies and the routine through which they passed.

The term "romances of chivalry" includes the more sentimental tales of varying length which partake of the characteristics of the true novel of chivalry. It has been the idea of most historians and writers who describe the Spanish colonies that imaginative literature was rigidly excluded from the Indies by the mother country during the entire colonial period. This idea has been obtained from the laws of the Indies on the subject of books, but one must not forget that many of those laws were disregarded soon after they were promulgated.

The author shows that the romances of chivalry and all works of popular fiction in Spain passed to the American colonies and circulated there with practically the same freedom as in the Peninsula. Those books were transported to the Indies in such large numbers that the dependencies became a profitable market for them. The works were shipped from Spain with as few restrictions as those imposed upon approved theological writings and when they reached America

the attitude of church officials toward fiction and poetry was usually indulgent because most fiction was harmless and its popularity was too great to risk the opposition of an effective ban. The illicit shipment of books was also general in spite of the laws against it and even members of the religious orders were guilty of this practice.

Most of the romances and works of fiction had paper covers and consequently wore out on account of being passed from hand to hand and from hard usage as in Spain. The non-survival of the romances of chivalry today in Spanish America has led historians to believe that the laws excluding them were strictly enforced.

This interesting study explodes the myths of Spanish exclusion of secular literature and European ideas from the Spanish dependencies, which is still recited in history books. It likewise proves that the shadows of ignorance in which the Spaniards were reputed to have enveloped their American possessions were not so dense after all.

Some of the bills-of-lading are published for the first time; they are valuable for the intellectual history of Hispanic America. One is of especial interest since it includes copies of the first edition of *Don Quixote*, probably all of which were shipped to the Indies. An appended checklist facilitates the identification of many books on the bills-of-lading, since the titles are greatly abbreviated and only a person familiar with Spanish literature could decipher them. There is also a useful index in the work.

It is a pleasure to commend this little book by Dr. Leonard and no doubt it will be very helpful to students of Spanish American culture.

LILLIAN ESTELLE FISHER.

Oklahoma College for Women.

The National System of Education in Mexico. By CAMERON DUNCAN EBAUGH. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1931. Pp. 149. \$2.00.)

This work was written as a dissertation to fulfill the requirements for a Ph.D. degree. It is based primarily upon the official bulletins and publications of the Mexican Federal Department of Public Education. Included in the four pages of bibliography there is a number of secondary works.

The book begins with a very brief résumé of the social, economic, and political conditions in Mexico prior to the educational reform of

1921, based largely on secondary material. The other subjects considered are rural, primary, secondary, and normal schools; the national University of Mexico; the departments of Fine Arts, Psychopedagogy and Hygiene, and school libraries; and other activities of the Federal Department of Education.

The remarkable transformation, which has taken place in Mexico in every phase of life and is still going on, is emphasized. Great progress has been made in education since the reform of 1921 when President Obregón became the champion of public education, and every succeeding executive has continued his educational policies. Through democratic education, Mexico hopes to unite its heterogeneous population of Indians and whites socially, politically, and economically. The goal to be obtained includes a common language, improved economic conditions for all, a vocation for everybody, and a great democracy which will equal the leading powers of the world. In a country like Mexico the educational system must start at the bottom and work upward; this is the present program of the government, which is developing rural schools as never before. The education extended by the Mexican federal government aims to improve the whole community, to enlighten adults as well as the child, to reorganize the customs of the people, and create a new nationality. Every possible effort is being made to eliminate class prejudices, there is an attempt to revive folklore and arts, sports and entertainments in open-air theaters are being used to combat alcoholism, and coöperative organizations are formed for social and economic purposes. Mexican statesmen today believe in democracy through education and the revolutionary leaders, who are at the same time the political and educational leaders, are causing the central government to spread democratic principles and practices throughout the republic. The whole educational plan is very idealistic, but it has sound principles and if it can be systematically applied, no doubt, will transform Mexico.

It is to be regretted that the author did not personally observe the plan in operation in our neighboring republic. Perhaps the story, as obtained from the bulletins and publications of the Department of Federal Education, is painted in colors too glowing. The sordid poverty, ignorance, and misery of the people in Mexico bear witness to the fact that there are still tremendous educational problems to be met. Some inconsistencies have been noted in the work, as for in-

stance, sometimes the numbers of citations are placed at the beginning of quotations and sometimes at the end; the latter is the correct usage. It is not good style to start the footnotes on the left hand page with *Ibid.*

The work seems to be carefully written, it should cause a better understanding of Mexican education, and will be very helpful.

LILLIAN ESTELLE FISHER.

Oklahoma College for Women.

Public and Private Operation of Railways in Brazil. By JULIAN SMITH DUNCAN. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1932. Pp. 243. \$3.75).

The history of railroad construction, ownership, and operation in Brazil furnishes a particularly happy field for a study designed to discover and evaluate the relative advantages and disadvantages to the general public of the three types of operation, federal, state, and private. From the beginning of railway construction in the eighteenth fifties, topography, heavy rains, disease, light population density, and absence of any important single commodity which would serve as a basis of railroad prosperity forced the Brazilian government to subsidize private capital. The subsidy usually took the form of a guarantee of interest on capital invested, payable ordinarily in gold. The fall of the milreis after the overthrow of the empire with the proportionate increase in the number of milreis set aside in the budget for gold payments moved the government to purchase outright some of the roads on which guarantees of interest were payable in gold, consolidate them into five larger systems, and rent them to private companies. The bankruptcy of certain private companies also forced the federal government to take over and complete construction already begun. Some of these roads were likewise leased to private companies, but others, including the largest and most important system, the "Central do Brasil", were operated by the government. Thus, in general, prosperous roads remained in private hands, the remainder fell into government ownership, and, occasionally, government operation.

The war greatly intensified railroad operation costs and some of the most important of the government-owned but privately-operated lines again reverted to the federal government. Instead of operating them itself, the federal government leased these lines to the states

within whose borders they ran. In this manner, states became operators of lines owned by the federal government as well as of lines built and operated by themselves.

Thus there are three types of operators in Brazil: federal government, state governments, and private companies. Several of the larger Class I systems have changed from private to public ownership and operation, others from public to private operation; and private, state, and federal operated roads exist side by side. The advantages offered to a comparative study of public and private operation are obvious.

The method of approach selected by the author is comprehensive and pertinent. After tracing the history of imperial and federal government railway policy with special attention to the last two decades, he investigates certain specific roads which have changed their type of operation from private to public or vice versa, compares certain specific privately owned and operated roads with similar railways owned and operated by state and by federal governments, and concludes with a comparison of all public owned and operated roads with lines operated by private companies.

The reader will not find a decisive answer to his query as to which type of operation, public or private, is most advantageous to the general public. Qualifying conditions pertinent to individual roads prevent a positive conclusion. In general one receives the impression that federal ownership results in an improvement of the material equipment of the roads taken over, state operation is as efficient as private operation, and, where economic conditions such as sufficient freight commodities and population density guarantee profitable returns, both state and private operation are superior to federal operation. The author bases his guarded conclusions on a detailed analysis of railroad operation in Brazil; the volume bristles with statistics; and the footnotes constitute a rich bibliographical guide to Brazilian railway literature. It is disappointing, however, to find that he has failed to investigate the owners of the privately operated roads. One would like to know more concerning the owners of the Brazil Railway Company, for instance, or about the origin of the capital invested in private companies, or about the proportion of natives and foreigners in managing and directing positions. An analysis of the capital invested in railroads, federal, state, or privately owned, would add greatly to the value of the study.

The volume is marred by the worst exhibition of editorial revision this reviewer has chanced upon. Typographical errors are so common that one wonders if the proof were read at all; a subtitle of one chapter is missing (p. 73); a plural verb is used where grammar requires the singular form (p. 87); long Portuguese quotations are given either without the necessary accents (p. 20, n. 8; p. 59, n. 53; p. 136, n. 21) or in such garbled form as to be unintelligible (p. 34, n. 14); the lack of uniformity and precision in footnoting annoy the reader; *op. cit.* is used as a kind of scholarly talisman to mean "work cited," "volume cited," "date and place of publication as cited," or to mean nothing at all (see p. 22, n. 18, for instance). It is regrettable that a study which successfully aspires to scholarly precision and accuracy should appear in such slovenly attire.

ALAN K. MANCHESTER.

Duke University.

La Conquista de las Rutas Oceánicas. By CARLOS PEREYRA. (Madrid: M. Aguilar, 1929. Pp. 283.)

Las Huellas de los Conquistadores. By CARLOS PEREYRA. (Madrid: M. Aguilar, 1929. Pp. 404.)

Hernán Cortés. By CARLOS PEREYRA. (Madrid: M. Aguilar, 1931. Pp. 437.)

"The Revival of Learning was when the people found out that there were no evils in the ocean, that the world was round, and that if you went out of sight you could get back."

This delightful gem from some classroom I have read somewhere, and quote it not only for its charming final clause but also for revealing, however dimly, a true perspective of history, which, we shall suppose, was clearer to the teacher than the taught. The perspective should of course become clear to both; and the teacher, though the first to note the poetry in an examination paper, should be the last to laugh at any honest effort at prose, which can often be traced back to herself. And on the whole she is the last; teachers of history feel their responsibility now more than ever; and they must have read with lively approval the article in the *Forum* last August in which James Truslow Adams asked whether history has value, and answered, yes, especially at this moment "when the lessons of the past appear to be of least value". Mankind, he explained, has always been oscillating between a

fixed and a mobile form of society. "The mass of the past combines with the momentum of the present to determine the direction of society", and so continues until "at length the weight of the mass becomes more effective than the momentum, inertia brings about the break-down of social forms, and a new period sets in". We are now at just such a turn of the tide, but the past "appears to have nothing to say to men who pride themselves on belonging to the new era". Yet the prominent facts of a social scene "are usually the superficial facts; there are also the far greater number of old facts, the mass of which qualify our experience". It is in just such periods "that the teaching and study of history becomes supremely important".

For instance, how do we of the Americas happen to be here, and under such divers conditions? Long ages of accumulating knowledge, improvements in ship-building, accidents of fortune, the genius of Prince Henry the Navigator, all contributed to the year 1492. Additional old forces entered with the conquests, encountered new conditions differing with locality, and social forms broke down with various results throughout the two continents. Though the processes are not yet fully agreed upon, there is enough held in common to explain colonial Spanish America to the average reader.

To him Don Carlos Pereyra addresses three small books that review the first three phases of the westward movement of Europe. The first volumes noted above, begins with Plato and ends with Sebastián de Elcano, who, leaving Magellan dead in the Philippines, sailed the *Victoria* back, or, rather, forward to Sanlúcar de Barrameda and completed the first circumnavigation of the globe. "It has not been easy," begins Señor Pereyra, "to bring into this little book and set forth attractively the essential facts of that great geographical revolution begun in the thirteenth century and realized in the sixteenth." To gather and condense the facts was simple, but to set them forth attractively, when the materials are so rich and complex, has required an art without which facts do not always tell the truth, and at the same time the art to tell a fascinating story, the story of how the world suddenly began to grow, and of how the plans of men expanded to match the new geography.

Those gigantic plans, their successes and failures, fill the next volume, *Las Huellas de los Conquistadores*, in which the plot rapidly thickens and the telling becomes more and more difficult, because:

To know the conquistador one must review the whole procession of conquistadores; only so can we be sure not to invent an imaginary type; for there was a very wide variety of men and enterprises. Some set out from Seville, some organized expeditions in American lands, and how different they were from each other will be shown in this volume. Besides, each expedition had its own peculiarities, and few are the features common to Mexican, Peruvian, Isthmian, and Antillean enterprises. Even those most alike show notable contrasts, and in a single theater of action curious discrepancies occur. The pacificator of Porto Rico, for example, wrestles with problems unknown to the first settlers of Cuba; and the case of Paraguay is unique.

Again, a failure may be as significant as a success; and here Señor Pereyra lays stress on such abortive attempts as those in Florida, New Mexico, the Californias, the Chaco, Patagonia, and others where the conquistador flattened out into a simple explorer. And if the various bodies of adventurers differ, within each the diversity of its components is no less striking—captain, soldier, priest, lawyer, and so on, each with his particular antecedents of family, birthplace, education, capacity, and limitations to contribute to his vices and virtues. Also, after a pacification the conquistador might be transformed into a settler, or go to try fresh fields; and here Señor Pereyra dwells longest, for this is where the discussions have been most at a loss for lack of information. "Of all Spanish adventurers," wrote J. W. Robertson,

Cortés is the most notable, because of his conquest of Mexico. . . . Because of such achievements he is known as the Conqueror; little has been written regarding his career as the Discoverer, and as the Explorer to whom we are most indebted for our first knowledge of the Pacific coast of North America.

All these complexities are constantly before Señor Pereyra's mind, but the reader enjoys only the net result without laboring through the analysis. The method is not the same as that of *La Conquista de las Rutas oceánicas*, for *Las Huellas de los Conquistadores* does not narrate deeds but reviews aspects. The effect on the reader is nevertheless that of a series of dramas, in which the most interesting features result from the indirect action of Spain, which by itself makes none of the great conquests nor could have made them at such vast distances until each conquest had secured an American base. "The conquistador is a man from Spain formed in America." The expeditions matriculate in Seville and graduate in the new world. The process described by Mr. Adams was well illustrated by those sea changes, and

Señor Pereyra in his third volume enlarges the scale of one of them in narrating the career of *Hernán Cortés*. But, here again, to know the truth "one must review the whole procession of conquistadores"; and Señor Pereyra begins by saying that the figure of Cortés cannot be isolated from the rest of the movement, studied in *Las Huellas de los Conquistadores*, which in turn is dependent on *La Conquista de las Rutas oceánicas*. But though not isolated, that figure is a splendid culmination of Spain's work in the new world, so splendid that the historian has to be very careful not only to keep his own feet on the ground but also those of Cortés. Aware of this, Señor Pereyra says that "while studying him I saw that censure of his conduct did not lessen admiration; the greatness of Cortés survives the most carefully controlled analysis of his deeds."

The reader will see in these three books how, as Mr. Adams said, "the mass of the past combines with the momentum of the present to determine the direction of society". The third volume ends with observations regarding the direction society took in Spanish America; the same, we may add, would, with terms changed, apply to English America:

Discoverers, traders, farmers, cattle men were in America what they could not have been in Spain nor had any hope of being, for lack of space and opportunity. America was their country, their *patria*, all the more truly because they did not sever the ties that bound the two worlds together. But they formed another current of affairs, of a power and amplitude too great to be lost in the European current. Thus Independence was born in the times of the Conquest.

S. L. MILLARD ROSENBERG.

University of California,
at Los Angeles.

Spain, A Land Blighted by Religion. By JOSEPH LEWIS. (New York: Freethought Press, 1933. Pp. 96. Illus. \$1.00).

This book is a travel account (1932) written by the President of the Freethinkers Society who with his wife went to Spain to collect relics of the Inquisition and who seemed to have had the intention of painting a picture of the country in the blackest hues possible. He describes beggary, disease, religious fanaticism, and "a priest contaminated people" whom he calls "poor deluded fools" because of their Catholic superstitions. Everywhere the author sees decay and

"lost glory", and signs of an "ignorant and brutal Catholicism" which has been superimposed upon a onetime brilliant Moorish and Jewish civilization. Since the expulsion of the Moslem and the Jews Spain has become a land blighted by religion. Mr. Lewis wishes to believe that there is no good in the country and that beauty is confined to the scenery and architecture. If he had known more of history he would have made a better observer. As it is his book is filled with glaring inaccuracies and astonishing prejudices. The only parallel to this rabid volume is that by G. L. Morrill entitled *The Rotten Republics of Central America* (1916).

A. CURTIS WILGUS.

The George Washington University.

Spanish Voyages to the Northwest Coast of America in the Sixteenth Century. By HENRY R. WAGNER. (San Francisco: California Historical Society, 1929. Pp. viii, 571. Facsimiles, Maps, Indexes. \$15.00; extra illustrated—25 copies—\$30.00.)

Spanish Explorations in the Strait of Juan de Fuca. By HENRY R. WAGNER. (Santa Ana, California: Fine Arts Press, 1933. Pp. v, 324. Maps, Index.)

Mr. Wagner has made his own the accounts of Spanish voyages along the western coast of North America, and with infinitely better sources at his command than any of his predecessors. In the two volumes above noted, he has reproduced in English translation, with a wealth of detail in annotation, bibliographical, and cartographical notes, and above all, reproductions of early printed and manuscript maps (some of the latter for the first time), accounts of voyages during the two distinct periods of Spanish exploring activity along the western coast of the North American continent. In the first volume, he has presented facsimile accounts of four voyages, and in both volumes, his own comments in narrative form (including prefaces) add much.

The first volume is concerned with the voyages of Ulloa (1539-1540), Bolaños (1541), Cabrillo (1542-1543), Mendaña (1567-1569), Unamuno (1587), Cermeño (1595), and Vizcaino (1602). Other chapters are devoted to the rather unnatural alliance between Mendoza and Alvarado, the occupation of the Philippines and the efforts to establish the best return route thence to the American coast, the antecedents of Vizcaino's expedition, and the project to settle Mon-

terey. The eleven appendices (both from manuscript and printed materials) furnish much additional and essential information concerning the various voyages; and the reproduction in facsimile of the original account of the Cabrillo expedition, the log of Espinosa, Unomuno's account, and Cermeño's *Declaracion* are welcome additions to students who prefer to work with originals. It is unfortunate that the original account of Ulloa's voyage, notwithstanding its dilapidated condition, was not reproduced in facsimile, for undoubtedly the original will continue to deteriorate.

Most of the chapters of this first volume were published in various issues of the *Quarterly* of the California Historical Society (see this REVIEW for November, 1930, pp. 546-547); but as published in Mr. Wagner's volume they have been thoroughly revised and rewritten. The reader will be struck by the generous space given to expeditions between the Philippines and the American coast, but this is perfectly logical in view of the fact that communication (because of Portuguese colonial efforts) between Spain and the Far East had necessarily to be carried on in this way unless the long and dangerous course around Cape Horn was to be undertaken. The Philippines on this account early became a factor in American exploration and trade. The documents of this volume supplement to some degree those of the Blair and Robertson series. Among other documents, Mr. Wagner publishes the essential portion of a royal decree of August 19, 1606, addressed to the viceroy of Mexico and relating to Vizcaino. In Blair and Robertson (XIV. 182-188) appears a similar document addressed to the governor of the Philippines.

The value to the student would have been enhanced had Mr. Wagner stated where English translations of documents cited or used by him are to be found; and the same is true of certain printed books or portions of books (*e.g.*, his bibliographical list on pp. 533-538). This reviewer would also prefer to have the annotations printed as footnotes instead of being placed in the back of the volume. As footnotes they would certainly have a much wider use. The translations are generally correct. On p. 183, the word "*difinidor*" appears twice as "*difinador*".

Whereas the voyages discussed in the above volume were those of a Spain which had but shortly before entered upon its brilliant career of colonization and was approaching its zenith, the voyages of the

second volume are those of a Spain which had largely spent itself, but which had entered upon a brief period of really wonderful activity. These were about the last great voyages of exploration carried on by Spain before its vast colonial empire crumbled away to almost nothing. The expeditions of Quimper (1790), Eliza (1791) and Galiano-Valdés (1792) are not less important than those of Cook and Vancouver, but the latter, as Mr. Wagner points out received greater publicity. This series of voyages and the Spanish settlement at Neah Bay was Spain's last serious attempt to assert its claims to territory in the northern continent north of California. They came too late. England, Russia, and the United States (through its traders) had already become interested in this region, being led on by hope of trade. Though the Nootka Sound controversy was not to be settled until 1795, these voyages through the Strait of Juan de Fuca were in reality a part of that controversy.

The documents of the second volume are, on the whole, of more immediate interest than those of the first because they are concerned more nearly with our own history as a nation. The appendices of this volume also have considerable interest and most of them are new to students. Of greatest interest perhaps are the diary and letters of Quimper, an extract from Eliza's diary and the secret instructions given him, an extract from the diary of Galiano and Valdés and an extract from the voyage of the *Sutil* and *Mexicana*—the last named being a translation by Mr. Barwick of the British Museum. The other documents were translated by Mr. Wagner. This volume, on the whole, shows the same care as the former volume and the same meticulous map study. A few awkward words and expressions occur, *e.g.*, "freshish", which is used repeatedly, and expressions like "very satisfied" (p. 235). On the other hand, Mr. Wagner is usually happy in his nautical terms for describing the weather, *e.g.*, "ugly", "dirty", etc. On p. 22, in noting a "Rio de Cuesta" on a map of Lope de Haro, Mr. Wagner remarks that the word "Cuesta" is often used to denote "a pass in the mountains of steep ascent", apparently forgetting that the name "Cuesta" is common in Spain, and the river might have been named after some man just as was "Canel" River. The small vocabulary of native words and the account of Quimper's voyage from Monterey to San Blas (p. 132) might well have been retained. On p. 159, it would have been easy to quote the ambiguous

phrase (see note 30); and on p. 167, the "unknown abbreviation" should have been reproduced. Perhaps the word "raw" would be better than "crude" in describing the climate on p. 209.

The book is excellently printed and is well designed from a book-making point of view. The types are clear, the presswork is unusually good, the maps are well printed, the paper is well chosen, and the binding is above the average. The volume, however, is marred by poor proofreading, the most serious blemish being that on p. 206 where a doublet of four lines occurs. Also it is certainly not good printing to allow paragraphs to end with a short line at the top of a page, especially as in this volume where the measure is wide enough to allow for run overs.

Both volumes represent the mature work of their author who has given the closest study over a long period to old voyages and old maps. He is a worthy successor of Hakluyt and of Fernández de Navarrette.

JAMES ALEXANDER ROBERTSON.

The People of the Serpent. By EDWARD HERBERT THOMPSON. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1932. Pp. xv, 301. Illus. \$3.50).

The Lost Empire of the Itzaes and Mayas. By THEODORE A. WILLARD. (Glendale, California: The Arthur H. Clark Company, 1933. Pp. 449. Illus. Index. \$6.00.)

Mr. Thompson, the author of the first book noted above, is, as no other man, the father of modern archaeological work in Yucatan. Those who have had the good fortune to meet him and hear him talk have been struck (as has the reviewer) by his geniality, earnestness, and great modesty. It was his persistent faith in the record of Bishop Diego de Landa regarding the sacred well that led finally to his dredging the sacred waters and finding treasure throve beyond the expectations of himself and every one else. He was "caught" young in the net of archaeology and was able to accomplish more during his working life than most men have even dreamed of accomplishing. This work has been written from his voluminous notes (kept for a period of about fifty years) with the aid of Mr. W. E. Playfair, to whom Mr. Thompson acknowledges his debt gracefully and wholeheartedly. The volume is divided into three parts—"Mayas, Ancient and Modern", "Yucatan Days and Nights", and "The City of the Sacred Well". Mr. Thompson approached his work largely through the modern Maya, learning his

language and studying his mode of life, even being elected a member of a Maya secret society, at the same time reading all he could find on the ancient Maya. In his first chapter, he enumerates his three most important contributions to archaeology, namely, "the finding at Old Chichen of the tablet of the Initial Series, or date stone . . . ; second, the proving that ancient traditions concerning the Well of Sacrifice at Chichen Itzá were true; and third, the discovery of the Tomb of the High Priest in a hollow pyramid at Chichen, the only one of its kind yet brought to light". But these three discoveries are only three of the many that Mr. Thompson made. Perhaps his greatest service has been in the inspiration he has given for the continuance of the work he so ably started. His volume, with its descriptions and its narrative, rambling at times, and with its mixture of old and new Yucatan, is a delightful book and it should inspire more than one young and active man to dedicate himself to the field of archaeology in Yucatan. It is a far cry from the author's modest beginnings to the organized work now being accomplished by the Mexican Government and the Carnegie Institution of Washington, but it is safe to say that the present work would not have advanced to its present stage without his pioneering. It is unfortunate that the volume has no index.

The volume by Mr. Willard is another and very creditable attempt to tell the layman something of the old Maya civilization. Mr. Willard, an engineer, inventor, and manufacturer, has spent much of the last twenty-five years in the "diggings" of Yucatan and adjacent fields. He will be remembered as the author of *The City of the Sacred Well*, in which he tells the story of Mr. Thompson's marvelous work in Chichen Itzá. In the present volume, the subtitle of which is "An American civilization, contemporary with Christ, which rivaled the culture of Egypt", he gives a resumé of the early inhabitants of Yucatan—the ancestors of the present-day Mayas. He quotes the accounts of Bishop Landa, the answers to the questionnaire sent out by Charles V., and the books of Chilán Balam, which last he calls "the last attempt of the Mayas to perpetuate their history". To bring the culture of these early builders the more vividly before his readers, he portrays a fanciful account of what might have happened on the occasion of a celebration, and gives also some Maya folklore, the authenticity of which is not clear. He adopts the theory of the great age of the Maya civilization, but this is still a moot question, as is the method of dating

the monuments. He falls into a curious non-sequitur in his note on p. 27, when he states that since there are only two opinions regarding "the method of arriving at the exact correlation between the Maya dates and ours", "one or the other is correct". His chapter on "the two greatest men of Maya history"—Itzamna and Kukulcan, the one a Maya and the other possibly a Toltec—is of interest; and his contrasts between ancient and modern Yucatan are striking. In his account of the conquest by Montejo he follows the old chronicles. His short exposition of the Maya calendar is not happy and might have been omitted with references to fuller accounts. On p. 33 he speaks of "this data"; and on p. 152 he forgets his history to suggest that the grains of corn used by the Mayas in gambling may have been the forerunners of the modern dice. He argues valiantly for the use of hardened copper by the Maya builders and shows interesting illustrations of various tools used by them. While on the whole, he probably claims too much for the ancient culture of the Mayas, his volume contains much that is of value. A comparison might be made between the Mayas and the early Filipinos and the present non-Christians of the Philippine Islands with respect to some of their customs. His volume should be read with that of Mr. Thompson and the little book on *The History of the Mayas* by Thomas Gann and Eric Thompson. Like all the Clark books, the volume is pleasing and distinctive in appearance, and is well illustrated. The index is good.

JAMES ALEXANDER ROBERTSON

NOTES AND COMMENT

EL CENTRO DE ESTUDIOS DE HISTORIA DE AMÉRICA EN LA UNIVERSIDAD DE SEVILLA

With the advent of the Spanish Republic came a marked increase of enthusiasm for all things Spanish American. This interest naturally took the form of renewed efforts to draw closer the bonds between the former mother country and her errant children. In the first flush of the republic it was even suggested that the Spanish American Republics be invited to send delegates to the Constituent Cortes. While nothing came of this fantastic proposal a very real step forward in the strengthening of cultural relations was taken by the new régime through the promulgation of the Law of November 21, 1931, creating a "Centro de Estudios de Historia de América en la Universidad de Sevilla."

Such a move was long overdue. The author of this brief article will never forget his astonishment on discovering while spending the winter of 1929-1930 in Seville that no provision was made by the University for instruction or guidance in the study of Hispanic American history and institutions, despite the fact the Archives of the Indies, with treasures beyond compare, lay at its very doors.

A short summary of the salient provisions of the Law of 1931 will make clear its importance. The activities of the Centro fall under four general classifications. 1. General courses on (a) History of America; (b) Hispanic American archaeology and colonial art; (c) American geography; (d) Economic, juridical, and social institutions of the Hispanic American colonial period; (e) Hispanic American bibliography and palaeography. 2. Monographic courses on each of the four topics just mentioned. 3. Seminar courses corresponding to each of the monographic courses. 4. Brief courses on concrete points connected with any of the disciplines followed in the Centro.

The Centro de Estudios is under the charge of (a) a technical director (*director técnico*) who is likewise a professor of the University of Seville appointed by the government and (b) an autonomous *Junta de Patronato*, consisting of the director, the rector of the university,

the dean of the faculty of philosophy and letters, and representatives of the Archives of the Indies and the Instituto Hispano-Cubano de Historia respectively. The Junta de Patronato elects the professors, the directors of the seminars, and the Spanish and American investigators. It may also award scholarships and grants-in-aid to properly qualified students who wish to prosecute their work either in Spain or abroad.

The Centro de Estudios receives an annual grant of 135,000 pesetas, distributed as follows: 6,000 pesetas for the honorarium of the director; 26,000 pesetas for honoraria for the professors entrusted with the monographic and seminar courses; 15,000 as stipends for the assistants (*ayudantes*) and those entrusted with special brief courses; 25,000 pesetas for scientific material; and 25,000 pesetas for pensions, grants, and traveling fellowships. The Centro will have practically no other expenses as the sessions are to be held in the University, the Archives of the Indies and the Instituto Hispano-Cubano de Historia.

Recently, the Centro completed its first period of activities, corresponding in a general way to the academic year 1932-1933. The post of director was held by Sr. José María Ots Capdequí, professor of the History of Spanish Law of the University of Valencia. The general courses were assigned to specialists recruited from the University of Seville, the Instituto Hispano-Cubano, the Instituto de Sevilla, and the Archives of the Indies. The representative of this last body was the director himself, Sr. Juan Tamayo.

Initiating a custom, which apparently is to be permanent, the Junta de Patronato selected two foreigners among those assigned to the monographic courses. Senhor Jaime Cortesão, a distinguished Portuguese historian, and former director of the Biblioteca Nacional of Lisbon gave twelve lectures on the general topic of "The Portuguese in the discovery of America." On this occasion he expounded one of his favorite theories, namely that an Andalusian mariner in the service of Portugal had reached America prior to the first voyage of Columbus.¹ Sr. Jorge Basadre, professor of history in the University

¹ The views of Professor Cortesao are set forth at length in the chapter entitled "A expedição de Cabral" in the monumental work, *Colonização Portuguesa do Brasil* (3 vols., Porto, 1923), II. 1-39 and in his article, "Do sigillo nacional sobre os descubrimentos," in *Lusitania, Revista de Estudos Portugueses*, no. 1 (January, 1924).

of San Marcos, and the author of a number of excellent works² on the history of Peru during the nineteenth century offered a course of twelve lectures on the "Hispanic American social institutions during the colonial period". The remaining monographic courses, which dealt with architecture, art, and geography, were in charge of scholars from Madrid.

The program for the year 1933-1934 is also of interest. As director of the Centro, Sr. José María de la Peña, a member of the staff of the Archives of the Indies, takes the place of Sr. Capdequí, who offers two courses, one of a general, the other of a monographic character. The two foreigners who are scheduled for monographic courses are Professor Clarence H. Haring of Harvard University and Professor Rómulo D. Carbia of the University of Buenos Aires. Professor Carbia is a most prolific writer, probably his best known work being his *Historia de la historiografía Argentina* (Buenos Aires, 1925). He has specialized in the critical questions connected with the history of the discovery of America. His thesis is that this period has been obscured by a cloud of fraudulent documents, largely the results of the misplaced zeal of Las Casas. The conventional figure of Columbus is in need of drastic revision.³ Dr. Carbia has informed the writer of this article that these views will be elaborated in his course at Seville.

Of special interest to students from the United States is the regulation in regard to the granting of advanced degrees. By the provisions of the law of 1931, the Centro is authorized to grant the title of "Doctor en Historia Americana" to "Licenciados en Ciencias Históricas" of any Spanish university or to those possessing equivalent degrees from American universities, provided the candidates meet requirements similar to those in force at the University of Madrid. The most important of these requirements is the preparation of a piece of historical investigation, carried on in one or more of the seminars, and which will be passed upon by a committee appointed by the director. The Centro does not fix any minimum time of residence.

Not the least important of the activities of the Centro will be its series of publications. In the very near future will be launched the

² *La Iniciación de la República, Contribución al Estudio de la Evolución política y social del Perú* (2 vols., Lima, 1929-1930) and *Perú: Problema y Posibilidad* (Lima, 1931).

³ Dr. Carbia's views are set forth with much erudition in his work, *La Superchería en la Historia del Descubrimiento de América* (Buenos Aires, 1929).

Anales in which will appear the work of both the students and the instructing staff. The first work scheduled for publication is a critical edition of the *Recopilación de Leyes de Indias de 1680* on the basis of the labors of an erudite Panamanian of the eighteenth century by the name of Miguel José de Ayala. The manuscripts left by Ayala are to be found in the National Archives at Madrid, the library of the National Palace in Madrid (now thrown open to the public), and the library of the Sociedad Económica del País of Seville.

From this brief survey it is evident that the Centro de Estudios de Historia de América has been launched under favorable auspices. It enjoys the coöperation of many of the outstanding learned institutions of Spain. It has enlisted the support of some of the most competent scholars of both Spain and the two Americas. Its program of activities, though ambitious, is well within the bounds of realization. As the years go on it should serve as a powerful incentive not only to the study and investigation of Hispanic American history but also to a wider use of the treasures of the Archives of the Indies at Seville.

PERCY ALVIN MARTIN.

Stanford University.

EXHIBIT AT SAN MARINO

The Henry E. Huntington Library and Art Gallery at San Marino, California, is nationally famous for its rare books and manuscripts in the domain of English literature, especially of the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries. Less well known is its wealth of materials on certain phases of Hispanic American history and the history of California. Yielding to the desires of many visitors to see more items that relate to the history of the state than the few books and manuscripts in the main library exhibit the library authorities organized in December, 1933, an interesting historical exhibition entitled "California from Legendary Island to Statehood". The exhibits, arranged in eighteen cases, were grouped as follows: Legends and Early Records (three cases); Lower California; Colonization of Upper California; the Missions; the Mexican Period; Early American Visitors; Early Immigration; the Bear Flag Revolt; American Occupation; the New State; Discovery of Gold; the News Spreads; the Great Migration; Life at the Mines; San Francisco; Los Angeles.

In this brief notice only a few of the more important items dealing with the history of California prior to the coming of the Americans will be noted. The exhibit opened with a fine portolano made by the Portuguese cartographer Fernão Vaz Dourado about 1580, showing California as a peninsula. Then came a copy of the original edition of Gómera's *Historia General de las Indias* (Caragoça, 1553), as well as the first English translation of this work, *The Pleasant Historie of the Conquest of the Weast India* (London, 1578). Gómera was the first historian, it will be recalled, to mention the voyages of Francisco de Ulloa and Juan Rodríguez Cabrillo, as well as the expeditions of Fray Marcos de Niza and Coronado. It is generally believed that the name California came from the romance *Las Sergas de Esplandian* by Ordóñez de Montalvo; quite appropriately therefore appeared in the exhibit an English version of this work entitled *The Fifth Book of Amadis de Gaule, Containing the . . . Acts of Esplandian* (London, 1664). Next in chronological order came *The Famous Voyage of Sir Francis Drake . . . Begun in the Yeere . . . 1557*. This consisted of six unnumbered folio leaves, which are usually found, as in this instance, inserted between pages 643 and 644 of Hakluyt's 1589 edition of *The Principall Navigations, Voiages and Discoveries of the English Nation*. In the section devoted to Lower California were Father Picolo's *Informe del Estado de la Nueva Christiandad de California* (Mexico, 1702) and Venegas's three volume *Noticias de California* (Madrid, 1757). The case containing items on the colonization of Upper California included a manuscript report of the conference held May 16, 1768, at San Blas, Mexico, in which it was decided to send expeditions to Upper California to found a settlement at Monterey. It is signed by *Visitador General* Gálvez, Vicente Vila, captain of the *San Carlos*, the second ship to reach San Diego; Miguel Costansó, engineer; and others. Other items in the same section were Costansó's historical journal of the expedition to Upper California, printed in October, 1770, and entitled *Diario Histórico de Los Viages de Mar, y Terra Hechos al Norte de la California*; and the *Reglamento para el Gobierno de la Provincia de California* (Mexico, 1784) prepared in 1779 by Governor Felipe de Neve. This governor, it will be remembered, was the founder of Los Angeles and San José. The period of the missions was represented by the classic biography of Father Serra, written by his intimate friend, Father Francisco Palou,

Relación Histórica de la Vida . . . del Venerable Padre Fray Junipero Serra (Mexico, 1787); Vancouver's *A Voyage of Discovery . . . round the World* (London, 1798), in which an account of the mission system is given; and Alfred Robinson's *Life in California* (New York, 1846) to which is appended Father Gerónimo Boscana's *Chinigchinich; a Historical Account of the . . . Indians . . . of St. Juan Capistrano*. The doom of the mission is foreshadowed in a broadside (Mexico, 1833) beginning *El Gobierno procederá a secularizar las Misiones de la Alta y Baja California*.

The Mexican period, apart from the missions, was represented by three items of interest. *Tablas para los Niños que Empiezan a Contar* (Monterey, 1836) is one of the very few works printed in California prior to the American occupation, and is probably the first children's book printed in California. No other copy apparently exists. A fine plate, depicting two Californians is from one of the four atlases which accompany Dupetit-Thouars's *Voyage autour du Monde . . . pendant les Années 1836-1839*. Finally a manuscript agreement (September 8, 1844) acquires a special significance through the signatures of several prominent residents of Monterey, including Governor Pío Pico and the American consul, Thomas O. Larkin.

The remaining items of the exhibit, though of compelling interest to the students of the later history of California, do not lie within the Hispanic American field and are therefore omitted. The value of the entire exhibit is greatly enhanced through a carefully prepared illustrated handlist with a brief but comprehensive introduction entitled "California Through Four Centuries" by Professor John C. Parrish of the University of California at Los Angeles.

PERCY A. MARTIN.

Stanford University.

On September 30, 1933 Mr. F. A. Kirkpatrick of Trinity College, Cambridge, resigned the post of reader in Spanish which he had held since 1919. It is no exaggeration to say that the high place which Hispanic and Hispanic American studies now hold in Cambridge University is due in no small degree to the untiring efforts of this modest and devoted scholar. After an excellent training in the classics Mr. Kirkpatrick spent many years of research into special points of European and Colonial History, receiving the much coveted Gold Medal of the Colonial Institute. His real interests, however,

gravitated toward South America and Spain. The appointment of reader in Spanish in 1919 afforded him the opportunity of introducing for the first time the systematic study of Spanish and Hispanic American history at Cambridge. For fourteen years he labored in this field and founded a small but enthusiastic group of disciples who may be counted upon to carry on his work.

The writings of Mr. Kirkpatrick have not been numerous but all bear the hallmark of ripe scholarship. His two chapters in volume X of the Cambridge Modern History entitled "The Spanish Dominions in America" and "The Establishment of Independence in South America" are well known to all students of these subjects. His *South America and the War* (London, 1918), though necessarily somewhat ephemeral in character, possessed a real importance at the time. Mr. Kirkpatrick has always been particularly interested in Argentina and partly at the instance of his friends Professor Harold Temperley and Dr. Ricardo Rojas, the Rector of the University of Buenos Aires, he brought out in 1931 his admirable History of the Argentine Republic, distinctly the best work in English on the subject.

The many friends of Mr. Kirkpatrick trust his increased leisure will enable him to publish a number of his manuscripts dealing with Spanish American topics. It is understood that a work entitled *Conquistadores* will appear in 1934 in the series known as "The Pioneers Histories." It is also an open secret that Mr. Kirkpatrick has much material on Venezuela that should see the light of day within the next few years.—P. A. M.

Ever since the publication of Professor Bolton's well-known *Guide* the variety and wealth of the historical material in the National Archives of Mexico (*Archivo General de la Nación*) have been brought to the knowledge of students of Hispanic American history. What is less well known is the fact that in recent years the director of the Archives and his staff have been making laudable efforts to render available through publication some of the more notable treasures of this great collection. Already thirty-one volumes of documents, accompanied by critical and scholarly introductions, have been issued. Unfortunately the majority of these are already out of print. But those available contain material of great value. They are as follows:

XIV-XV. *Estado General de las Fundaciones hechas por don J. Escandón*. Tomos I y II.

XVI. *Correspondencia y Diario Militar de don Agustín de Iturbide—1815-1821*. Tomo III.

XVII-XIX. *Crónica de Michoacán.—Beaumont*.

XX. *Los judíos en la Nueva España, durante el Siglo XVI*.

XXI. *Los Precursores Ideológicos de la Guerra de Independencia.—Tomo II. Proceso del Cura don Mariano Matamoros. La Iglesia y el Estado en Mexico*.

The following volumes are in preparation:

La Via Colonial.—Segunda serie.

El Segundo Conde de Revilla Gigedo.

In addition to these publications the Archives issue (generally bi-monthly) the *Boletín del Archivo General de la Nación*, now in its fourth year. The general character of this magazine may be indicated by the table of contents of the latest number (Tomo IV, Num. 4. Julio-Agosto, 1933):

Don Valentín Gómez Farías. (A biographical study accompanied by documents of the famous liberal, the 75th anniversary of whose death falls this year).

Proceso de Martín Salazar y Villavicencio (Garatuza) (Inquisición, siglo XVII.).

El Trabajo y Salario de los Indios.

Índice del Ramo de Tierras. Volumen 510 al 534. (Continúa.)

The director of the archives is Sr. Rafael López and the *historiador jefe* is the venerable and erudite scholar, Sr. Luis González Obregón, the author *inter alia* of *Mexico Viejo* (1891-1895), *Los Precursores de la Independencia Mexicana en el Siglo XVI* (1906), *La Vida en Mexico* (1911), *Vetusteces* (1917), *Las Calles de Mexico* (2 vols., 1923-1927). Sr. González Obregón possesses one of the two or three finest private libraries in Mexico City. The street on which he resides, by a decree without precedent in the history of Mexico, has been named by the municipality after himself.—P. A. M.

At the present time there are three chairs of Brazilian studies in Europe. The oldest and in many respects the most important is to be found in the University of Paris. It has been occupied since its origin by Professor Georges Le Gentil, not inaptly characterized by Brazilian critics as a "contemporary Ferdinand Denis." The second is attached to the University of Lisbon and has as its present incumbent the eminent Brazilian *litterateur*, Professor Souza Pinta. The authorities of the University of Berlin have just informed the Brazilian ministry of foreign affairs of the creation of a similar chair in the German capital.

The definite occupant has not yet been announced but the courses during the first semester of the present academic year will be entrusted to Sr. Silvio Romero, the son of the famous historian of Brazilian literature.—P. A. M.

Important as a collection of studies of Hispanic American cultures, and referring especially to the Pacific rim of the Southwestern United States and Northwestern Mexico, is the publication *Ibero-Americana*, from the Press of the University of California, under the general editorship of H. E. Bolton, C. O. Sauer, and A. L. Kroeber. It is planned to carry the series into study of all stages of the culture of the area; although the numbers so far issued relate to Mexico it is not the intention to so limit the series. Thus far, the following have been published: No. 1, by C. O. Sauer and Donald Brand, *Aztatlan* (1932), presented the discovery of an advanced culture with Toltec Mayan affinities on the Culiacan River. Comparison of the ruins with the reports of his conquest by Nuño de Guzmán indicates that this culture persisted until the advent of the Spanish colonizers. No. 2, by Ralph L. Beals, *The Comparative Ethnology of Northern Mexico before 1750* (1932), gives the substance of the colonial literature on the subject down to the time of the Jesuit Expulsion, 1767. Numerous charts display the distribution of individual traits and products, serving as a basis for recognition of numerous intrusion alongside autochthonous developments. Several South American and Pueblo traits are thus here first recognized. No. 3, by Carl O. Sauer, *The Road to Cibola* (1933), reconstructs the routes of exploration of northwestern New Spain. The conclusion reached is that the one route followed into the northwest became the main colonial highway. Sauer disagrees with conventional historical views on the route of Cabeza de Vaca and Fray Marcos, as he has traced the routes in the field and the characteristics of the aboriginal settlements. Unpublished contemporary documents, referring especially to the expedition of Francisco de Ybarra, form an Appendix. No. 4, by Paul S. Taylor, *A Spanish-American Peasant Community, Arandas in Jalisco, Mexico* (1933), is a sociologico-economic type study of a rural area which preserves institutions and traits of colonial days. The parish records are used to study the contrasts between the population and occupations of the past and the present. No. 6, by Ralph L. Beals, *The Acaxee* (1933), is an historico-

ethnographic study relating to the notorious cannibal Indians of the mountains of Durango; it is based on several detailed accounts by early Jesuit missionaries which provide data adequate for the evaluation and classification of their culture. Nos. 5 and 7, announced for immediate publication are studies by Carl O. Sauer on "The Distribution of Aboriginal Tribes and Languages in Northwestern Mexico," and by Lesley Byrd Simpson on "The administration of the Indians of Mexico"; this latter will consist of two parts, one being a reproduction of the important Laws of Burgos, while the second discusses The Civil Congregations of Indians, chiefly as instituted in Hidalgo.—H. I. P.

The Commonwealth Fund Department of American history in the University of London was established in 1930; and the department is located at University College. It is hoped now to extend these studies to include the history of Hispanic America. This branch of history will be in charge of Mr. R. A. Humphries, assistant lecturer in American history.

The preliminary notices of the second inter-American educational conference to be held at the University of Chile in Santiago, September 9-16 of this year, have been sent out. The first conference was held in the United States several years ago. Not all the countries of the Americas have as yet adhered to the organization, but it is hoped that all will adhere at this second meeting. The primary objectives of the conference are in general the fomenting of solidarity among educators of all the American states; the interchange of information on educational matters; discussion of means for the moral and material betterment of the status of all teachers; and a general interchange of ideas. The honorary president of the second conference is the Chilean minister of education, Sr. Domingo Durán M. and the directing board is under the chairmanship of Sr. Agustin Edwards. All correspondence regarding the conference should be addressed to the secretary general, Professor Raúl Ramírez J., Correo, Casilla 2543, Santiago, Chile.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL SECTION

SOME RECENT PUBLICATIONS IN HISPANIC AMERICA

The well-known Mexican engineer and writer Félix F. Palavicini, whose career as newspaper owner and publicist is one of the most remarkable in recent Mexican history, has just launched a new venture in the shape of a popular illustrated weekly known as *Todo*. While most of the articles are popular and ephemeral in character almost every number of the magazine contains some valuable material on recent historical events. That of October 17, 1933, for instance, includes an article by General Alfredo Breceda entitled "El Nacimiento de la Candidatura de Bonillas", in which some interesting side lights are shed on one of the most inexplicable actions of President Carranza. Sr. Palavicini will be remembered as the director of *El Universal* during the critical years of the world war; his marked sympathy for the cause of the United States and the Allies led to his exile from Mexico.

Dr. Enrique de Gandía, one of the better known among the younger historians of Argentina, and secretary of the Junta de Historia y Numismática Americana de Buenos Aires has just published *La Historia de la Conquista del Río de la Plata y del Paraguay: los gobiernos de don Pedro de Mendoza, Alvar Núñez y Domingo de Iralá, 1535-1556* (Buenos Aires, 1932). Other volumes are expected to follow.

It may be something of a surprise to many readers of this REVIEW to learn that the monarchical cause in Brazil still has a number of very vigorous adherents. Its chief organ is a well-edited weekly newspaper entitled *O Império*, published at Fortaleza, the capital of the State of Ceará. The director is Dr. Rosendo Ribeiro. Each number of the paper contains articles of some historical value on different phases of the empire, naturally very eulogistic in tone. The more ardent of the monarchists are members of an organization known as the "Supremo Conselho Império Patrianovista"; their future emperor, as they call him, is Dom Pedro d'Orléans-Bragança, the eldest son of

the Conde d'Eu, who died in 1922. Most of the time of this pretender is spent in France at the Castle d'Eu whose rich archives have been placed under requisition by such well-known Brazilian writers as Alberto Rangel and Tobias Monteiro. The latest scholar to utilize this material is Professor Mary W. Williams of Goucher College who is engaged in the preparation of a biography of the Emperor Dom Pedro II.

Among the most able of the Brazilian monarchists is Dr. Luis da Camara Cascudo, whose latest book, *Conde d'Eu* (São Paulo, 1933) is a valuable contribution to the history of those members of the Braganza and Orleans dynasty identified with Brazilian history. He has in preparation a much needed biography of one of the great statesmen of the empire entitled *O Marquês de Olinda e seu Tempo*. Among his shorter works, published this year at Natal, may be mentioned *A Intencionalidade no Descobrimento do Brasil* and *O Homem Americano*.

On the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the federalization of Buenos Aires a number of works dealing with the changes wrought by the last half century in the life of the Capital have appeared. Especially to be noted is the book by Ernesto Muello, *Cincuentenario de la Federalización de Buenos Aires: comprende el Proceso de su Evolución histórica, política, económica y social* (Buenos Aires, 1932). The year 1932 also saw the completion of a magisterial work by Dr. Arturo de Carranza in five volumes, *La Cuestión Capital de la República* (Buenos Aires, 1926-1932). This voluminous work traces the history of the difficulties growing out of the anomalous status Buenos Aires as capital both of the Argentine Confederation and of the Province of Buenos Aires up to and including the final settlement of 1880. It contains a vast wealth of relevant documents.

Students of Hispanic American History are prone to accord too little importance to the history of Hispanic American architecture despite the recognized value of this subject. If neglect in the past may be excused on the ground of inadequate published material, such is no longer the case. Among those contemporary writers who have been especially active in this field should be mentioned the distinguished Argentine architect Martín S. Noel. His latest work, *Teoría*

histórica de la Arquitectura proto-virreinal (Buenos Aires, 1932) covers the earlier viceregal period, with special reference to the architectural developments in the regions bordering on the Caribbean. The work is well illustrated and contains a number of critical bibliographies. Sr. Noel is about to publish a work somewhat more comprehensive in character entitled *Arte Virreinal*. The value of this book to historical investigators is attested by the fact that it will appear under the auspices of the Instituto de Investigaciones Históricas de la Facultad de Filosofía y Letras de la Universidad de Buenos Aires. Among the works of Dr. Noel already published may be mentioned *Contribución a la Historia de la Arquitectura Hispano Americana* (1923), *Fundamentos para una Estética Nacional* (1926), and *España vista otra vez* (1929). As writer, university professor, and practicing architect, Sr. Noel has striven to create a type of national architecture which seeking its inspiration in colonial motifs presents certain distinctive national traits. His most notable achievements on this score have been the restoration of the historic Cabildo of Luján, the impressive Argentine pavilion at the exposition of Seville, the Argentine embassy in Lima, as well as a number of private houses. He has been entrusted with the designing of the building which eventually will house the Faculty of Philosophy and Letters of the University of Buenos Aires.

The growing literature on San Martín has been immeasurably enriched by the appearance of a work of four volumes by José Pacífico Otero, *Historia del Libertador Don José de San Martín* (Buenos Aires, 1932). The subtitles of the different volumes, each one of which contains over seven hundred pages, are as follows: "El Capitán de los Andes, 1777-1820", "El Libertador de Chile, 1817-1820", "El Libertador y el Protector del Perú, 1820-1822", "Ostracismo y apoteosis, 1822-1850". A review of this important work will later appear in THE HISPANIC AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW.

The stormy and tragic period of Mexican history with which the names of Díaz, Bernardo Reyes, Madero, and Huerta are inseparably linked has been evoked with almost poignant intensity by one of the actors in the drama, Sr. Rodolfo Reyes, the son of General Bernardo Reyes, in his two volume work *De mi Vida, Memorias Políticas* (Ma-

drid, Biblioteca Nueva, 1929-1930). Volume I deals with the period from 1899 to 1913 while volume II is devoted entirely to the two memorable years, 1913-1914. For some time, Sr. Reyes has been a practicing lawyer in Madrid and has taken an important part in the intellectual life of the Spanish capital. His addresses, many of them on historical topics delivered before the Ateneo, have just been published under the title of *Discursos Ateneistas* (Madrid, Imprenta Pueyro, 1933). The coming of the republic was responsible for another important work, *Ante el Momento Constituyente Español* (Madrid, Cia. Ibero-Americana de Publicaciones, 1931).

The wealth of material to be found in the archives of the Province of Buenos Aires is gradually being rendered available through an admirable series known as the *Publicaciones del Archivo Histórico de la Provincia de Buenos Aires, Contribuciones a la Historia de los Pueblos de la Provincia de Buenos Aires*. During the past year three volumes of documents numbered IV., V., and VIII., have been edited. Volume IV, in the series entitled *Los Orígenes y la Fundación de la Villa de San Antonio de Camino*, is a monograph from the pen of Sr. José Torre Revello, the prolific investigator of the Instituto de Investigaciones Históricas of Buenos Aires permanently stationed at Seville. Volume V., *Acuerdos de la Honorable Junta de Representantes de la Provincia de Buenos Aires (1820-1821), con una Introducción sobre 'La Anarquía de 1820 en Buenos Aires desde el punto de vista institucional,'* by Ricardo Levene. Dr. Levene, it will be recalled, is president of the University of La Plata and the author of over fifty works of which more than half embody the results of historical investigation. Among them may be mentioned *Los Orígenes de la Democracia Argentina* (1911); *Lecciones de Historia Argentina* (14th edition 1932); *Notas para el Estudio del Derecho Indiano* (1917); *Ensayo histórico sobre la Revolución de Mayo y Mariano Moreno. Contribución al Estudio de los Aspectos político, jurídico y económico de la Revolución de 1910* (2nd edition 1925); *Introducción a la Historia del Derecho Indiano* (1924); and *Investigaciones acerca de la Historia económica del Virreinato* (1927-1929).

The Mexican writer Artemio de Valle-Arizpe is the author of a series of fascinating volumes dealing with life in Mexico during

the colonial period: *Del Tiempo Pasado (Leyendas, Tradiciones y Sucesos del México virreinal)* (1931), *Amores y Picardías (Leyendas, Tradiciones y Sucesos del México virreinal)* (1932), *Virreyes y Virreinas de la Nueva España (Leyendas, Tradiciones y Sucesos del México virreinal)*. All three books appear in the Biblioteca Nueva of Madrid. In a number of respects the volumes of Sr. Valle-Arizpe recall the well known *Tradiciones Peruanas* of Ricardo Palma.

Sr. Enrique Fernández Ledesma, the erudite librarian of the Biblioteca Nacional of Mexico, has just published a series of charming sketches and essays on traveling in Mexico before the advent of railroads: *Viajes al Siglo XIX* (Mexico, 1933). The work is delightfully illustrated with block prints and half tones.

A new edition of the classic work long out of print of José Antonio Saco, *Historia de la Esclavitud de los Indios en el Nuevo Mundo, seguida de la Historia de los Repartimientos y Encomiendas*, has recently been published with a critical introduction by the indefatigable Cuban historian, Dr. Fernando Ortiz (Habana, 2 vols. 1932).

Sr. C. Parra-Pérez, the scholarly Venezuelan minister in Rome, is the author of *El Regimen Español en Venezuela, Estudio histórico* (Madrid, 1932). Sr. Parra-Pérez will be remembered as the author of a number of works on Miranda and Bolívar.

The young Chilean scholar, Domingo Amunátegui Solar, has written an interesting *Historia social de Chile* (Santiago, 1932), which unfortunately brings the story only as far as the beginning of the presidency of Manuel Montt. It is assumed that a second volume will cover the period of the last hundred years. The same writer has produced a useful two-volume text for secondary schools entitled *Historia de Chile* (Santiago, Editorial Nacimiento, 1933).

The Argentine novelist, José Gabriel, in a work called *Bandera Celeste* (Buenos Aires, 1932), has written a vivid though somewhat prejudiced account of the history of his country during the critical years 1930-1931.

Sr. Víctor H. Escala, Ecuadorean minister to Venezuela and one of the outstanding figures in contemporary Ecuadorean literature has published two works of considerable historical importance. *Paliques de Ayer* (Caracas, Editorial Elite, 1931) consists of a series of notes, articles, and sketches dealing chiefly with personages of Ecuador and Venezuela with whom the author has come in contact during the past two decades. *Mosaico* (2nd Edition, Caracas, 1932) contains, as the name indicates, a *mélange* of impressions, biographical sketches, historical episodes, and the like. In its pages appear and reappear some of the outstanding characters in the fields of Ecuadorean history, literature, and art.

The Brazilian Historical and Geographical Institute has rendered all students of Brazilian history a very real service by issuing in a Portuguese translation the classic *Geschichte von Brasilien* by Heinrich Handelmann (Berlin, 1860). The work of Handelmann has long been out of print and is difficult to obtain. The full title of the translation is *História do Brasil, Tradução Brasileira feita pelo Instituto Histórico Brasileiro, na Revista do Instituto Histórico e Geográfico Brasileiro* (Rio de Janeiro, 1931). The translation contains an introduction of 54 pages dealing with the career of Handelmann and 1006 pages of text. A portrait of the author is also included.

A notable work in the field of the social history of colonial Brazil has appeared from the pen of Luiz Edmundo, *O Rio de Janeiro no Tempo dos Vice-Reis, 1763-1808* (Rio de Janeiro, Imprensa Nacional, 1932). This work of 545 pages contains some 300 illustrations, the majority original works of Brazilian painters based on documentary material supplied by the writer. So important is this work regarded by Brazilian historians that a reprint has been published in the *Revista do Instituto Histórico e Geográfico Brasileiro* (1932). The book will shortly be reviewed in THE HISPANIC AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW.

On the occasion of the centenary of the birth of the Chilean historian, Benjamin Vicuña Mackenna, there appeared in the *Anales de la Universidad de Chile* (Santiago, 1931) a five hundred page volume entitled *Homenaje a Vicuña Mackenna*. Among the contributors are

to be found some of the outstanding contemporary historians and writers of Chile. Sr. Luis Galdames writes on "La Juventud de Vicuña Mackenna"; Sr. Carlos Vicuña Mackenna on "Bibliografía Parlamentaria de Vicuña Mackenna"; Sr. Guillermo Feliú Cruz on "Bibliógrafos y Bibliografías de Vicuña Mackenna"; and Sr. Gustavo Labutut G. on "Vicuña Mackenna y Sarmiento".

The Academia Panameña de la Historia in addition to its quarterly *Boletín* plans to issue from time to time *Publicaciones*. The first volume of this series is a monograph by the young Panamanian historian, Professor Ernesto Castillero R., and is entitled *La Causa inmediata de la Emancipación de Panamá* (Panamá, 1933). The scope of the work is sufficiently indicated by its subtitle "Historia de los Orígenes, la Formación y el Rechazo por el Senado Colombiano del Tratado Herrán-Hay."

After a forced interruption of three years the Faculty of Humanities and the Science of Education of the University of La Plata has resumed the publication of its review, *Humanidades*. Volume XXIII for 1933, which issued from the press in December of that year, fully maintains the high standard of its predecessors. The entire volume is devoted to historical subjects, some of them of the greatest interest. The series is opened with an article by the president of the University, Dr. Ricardo Levene, entitled "Los primeros documentos de nuestro federalismo político," and includes in an appendix some of the documents in question. Then follow: "Designación de una comisión de Buenos Aires para mediar en la lucha entre Paz y Quiroga (1929-1930)," by Emilio Ravignani; "Una misión de estudios al Paraguay," by Albert Jehan Vellard; "El Valle de Santa Ana y el repartimiento de tierras efectuado por Garay en 1580 (Contribución al estudio de la geografía histórica del Río de la Plata)," by Rómulo D. Carbía; "El teatro en la Colonia," with a documentary appendix, by José Torre Revello; "Los Ingleses y el Río de la Plata (1780-1806)," by Ricardo R. Caillet-Bois; "Extremidad mediterránea de Tandilia. Resumen de su composición geológica," by Juan José Nágera; "La forma del territorio de los Estados. Ensayo de geografía política," by Ramualdo Ardissoni; "La Polémica sobre el Acuerdo de San Nicolás. Documentos que la integran," by Carlos Heras; "Primeras Constituciones

de Chile," by Enrique M. Barba; "El Cuerpo de Blandengues de frontera de Buenos Aires (1752-1810)," with documentary appendix, by Roberto H. Marfany; "Expedición y recepción de correspondencia en la época del virreinato del Río de la Plata," by Walter B. L. Bose. The value of this important collection of articles, many of them written by the foremost historians of Argentina, is further enhanced by the large number of illustrations, facsimiles and the like which accompany a number of the essays.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY OF JOSÉ TORRE REVELLO

From time to time notices have appeared in this REVIEW¹ regarding the splendid work of the *Instituto de Investigaciones Históricas* of the Department of Philosophy and Letters at the University of Buenos Aires, Argentina, and all active students of Hispanic American history have found the quarterly *Boletín*, the monographs and other publications of the Institute indispensable in furthering their own investigations. Under the inspired leadership of Dr. D. Emilio Ravignani this organization has become one of the most important centers of research in the history of Spanish America now functioning anywhere. It has embarked upon a comprehensive plan of a systematic search of the archives of America and Europe known to contain material relating to Argentine and general South American history. Resident commissioners have been working steadily in the repositories of Spain, France, and Germany as well as Argentina and have amassed an impressive amount of documentary material. No little credit for the fine achievements of the Institute in this laborious task belongs to Sr. José Torre Revello, commissioner in charge of research in Europe, with headquarters at Seville, Spain. Numerous monographs, sponsored by the *Instituto* and prepared with a view to meet the requirements of the most exacting criticism, amply testify to his ability to utilize effectively the source materials that he has brought to light in his searches. Scarcely an issue of the valuable *Boletín* appears without one and sometimes two or more articles on interesting phases of colonial history from the pen of this indefatigable investigator. Without neglecting the more conventional political and economic aspects of history which preoccupy many scholars, he has not hesitated to explore the newer and relatively unfrequented by-ways of cultural and intellectual history with the result that he has opened new vistas to the social historian.

The data relating to the books, customs, diversions, habits, occupations, etc., of the former Spanish colonies made available by him are

¹ See especially James A. Robertson, "The Publications of the Instituto de Investigaciones Históricas de la Facultad de Filosofía y Letras," in the February, 1930, number (Vol. X, No. 1) pp. 101-113.

exceedingly useful in recreating the every-day life of the colonists and will, no doubt, contribute greatly to the revaluation already under way of the whole colonial period of Hispanic American history. Because of the special character of many of these contributions it has seemed to the present writer both helpful and fitting to give below a list of the publications of Sr. Torre Revello, which are not as well known in this country as they deserve, preceded by a few facts concerning the man himself.

In 1918, Dr. Luis M. Torres, then chairman of the Department of Philosophy and Letters of the University of Buenos Aires, appointed Sr. Torre Revello as commissioner in Spain to classify the Argentine materials in the archives of the motherland. Under Dr. Ravignani, who assumed the directorship in 1921, the scope of the work was broadened and a more comprehensive and systematic investigation of foreign archives was undertaken, with Sr. Torre Revello in charge of all the work in Europe. In addition to the classification of scattered documentary material, this Argentine investigator is engaged in cataloguing scientifically every document relating to the history of his native land existing in the Archives of the Indies at Seville, the fountain head of data on colonial Hispanic America, and some of the results of his intimate knowledge of the contents of that precious storehouse are already available in carefully prepared inventories (see bibliography, section I). His duties also include the directing of the work and the careful checking of a vast amount of copied material which is sent continuously to the Institute at Buenos Aires in accordance with the elaborately premeditated plan of Dr. Ravignani who seeks to bring together in the Argentine capital a complete collection of documents of fundamental importance for the history of the great South American commonwealth.

Despite limitations placed upon his time and energy by such onerous tasks, Sr. Torre Revello, as already suggested, manages to produce a steady stream of publications of varying length based upon his discoveries. In some of these writings one notes a lightness of touch, betokening a genuine literary talent, which in no way impairs the accuracy and reliability of his account; in others, the careful scholar triumphs over the artist in his nature and affords us a factual account closely following the original documents. But all reveal a delicate perception and a sympathetic understanding of the spirit and

atmosphere of an epoch that is past. No doubt his exceptional artistic instinct (he is as skilful with the brush and palette as with the pen) enables him to catch the gleam of the color and glamor of colonial life shining faintly through the countless bundles of musty and faded documents which he handles daily. One feels, while reading some of his articles evoking a picturesque past, that the author wished to let his vivid imagination guide his pen; perhaps it is this fear of being remiss to the integrity of Clio that moves him in part to document his studies with such care that often enough the text is almost crowded off the page by the full and meaty foot notes. As further evidence of his self-restraint and dedication to truth in writing his accounts, he invariably attaches a substantial appendix faithfully reproducing inedited documents of exceptional interest and value. These addenda serve to make his studies of primary importance even as source material, and the alert investigator will find rich veins in them to exploit profitably. It is to be hoped that Sr. Torre Revello will gather up a number of his highly important contributions published in periodicals not readily accessible outside of his own country and present them in book form for the benefit of the growing public of students of Hispanic American history everywhere.

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59. *Conversando con José Toribio Medina*. No. 23 (Junio, 1929), pp. 171-177.
60. *Los Bibliógrafos y la bibliografía relativa a la historia de la imprenta impresos de la América colonial*. No. 25 (Junio, 1929), pp. 47-53.
61. *Un Trotamundos español del siglo XVII*. No. 34 (Marzo, 1930), pp. 49-64.
62. *Los Juegos de azar y envite en la Colonia*. No. 38 (Julio, 1930), pp. 129-140.

VI. MISCELLANEOUS

63. *Las Veladas literarias del Virrey del Perú, marqués de Casteldosrius, 1709-1710*. Seville, 1920, 20 pp. Reprint of article published in the *Boletín del Centro de Estudios Americanistas* (Seville, 1920), VII. Nos. 34, 35.

64. *Una Carta del Virrey del Nuevo Reino de Granada, D. Pedro Mendinueta, al secretario de Estado D. Pedro Ceballos, comunicándole la llegada a Santa Fe de Bogotá de Alejandro Humboldt y Aime Bompland. Ibid., XII. (1925), nos. 91-93, pp. 129-133. (Under pseudonym "Rolando René Frágola".)*
65. *Los Archivos de la República Argentina, etc. Seville, 1925, 32 pp. (Reprint of article in Bol. Cen. Est. Amer., año XII (1925), nos. 94-96.*
66. Don Manuel del Socorro Rodríguez, *Boletín de Historia y Antigüedades*, Bogotá, 1925, No. 169, pp. 46-51, and No. 170, pp. 76-82. (Under pseudonym "Rolando René Frágola".)
67. *Los Orígenes de la imprenta en la América Española*, Madrid, 1927, pp. 44.
68. Notas sobre el gobierno de Alvar Núñez Cabeza de Vaca en el Río de la Plata, (with a documentary appendix), *Boletín del Real Centro de Estudios Históricos de Andalucía*, I. no. 1, pp. 14-31. (The only number published of this periodical.)
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70. Del Montevideo del siglo XVIII. Fiestas y costumbres, *Revista del Instituto Histórico y Geográfico del Uruguay*, VI. no. 2, pp. 611-700. (Reprinted in pamphlet form, Montevideo, 1929, pp. 92).
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72. Nuevos datos para el estudio de la Inquisición en el Río de la Plata *Humanidades* (La Plata, 1930), XX. 317-339. (Reprinted in a pamphlet of pp. 25.
73. *La fundación de Chascomús. Ensayo histórico*, Buenos Aires, 1930, 70 pp. with 3 maps.
74. Del tiempo del coloniaje. El uso de armas y los desafíos, *Azul* (Azul, Province of Buenos Aires), no. 6 (Septiembre-Octubre, 1930), pp. 45-56.
75. Cuatro cartas anónimas sobre la invasión inglesa de 1806, *Azul* (Azul, Province of Buenos Aires), no. 7 (Noviembre-Diciembre, 1930), pp. 31-42.
76. De Arquitectura colonial, *Azul*, (Azul, Province of Buenos Aires) no. 8 (Enero-Febrero, 1931), pp. 53-74.
77. El portugués José de Silva y Aguiar, fué el primer impresor que tuvo la ciudad de Buenos Aires, *Revista de Arqueología*, (Lisbon, 1932), I. 46-49.
78. *Publicaciones del Archivo Histórico de la Provincia de Buenos Aires*, No. IV. "Los orígenes y la fundación de la Villa de San Antonio del Camino," La Plata, 1932, pp. 100.
79. El Teatro en la Colonia, *Humanidades* (Buenos Aires), tomo XXIII. pp. 145-165 (1933).

NOTES

Dr. David Rubio, O.S.A., professor of Spanish Literature in the Catholic University of America and consultant in Spanish Literature in the Library of Congress has published at Madrid (1933) a timely volume entitled *La Universidad de San Marco de Lima durante la Colonización Española* (pp. 251). The volume is in good part a compilation, which the author calls "Datos para su historia". These he has introduced with a preliminary essay under the title "La Instrucción pública en las Colonias Españolas de América", in which he discourses on the debt of Hispanic America to the educational teaching of the missionaries, and the debt owed to such writers as Bernardino de Sahagun. Very fittingly, Dr. Rubio points out that the art of printing was introduced into Mexico by the missionaries as early as 1536, into Lima in 1582, into Guatemala in 1662, and later into Paraguay, Cuba, Nueva Granada, and Chile. He cites Altamira and Pereyra to the effect that "wherever the Spaniards settled, there they founded a school"; and he cites other works that prove the importance of the educational ideal. As early as 1538, an educational institution was founded in Santo Domingo; and by his cédula of September, 1551, Charles V provided for the foundation of universities in Lima and in Mexico, both of which were founded in due time. Dr. Rubio gives considerable useful and bibliographical data in this prologue, which give evidence of wide reading. Continuing, he reproduces five documents, an important one of which is the "Reseña histórica de la Universidad de San Marcos" by José Bequidano (1791). The other materials reproduced include the "Constituciones" of the University (pp. 43-216), "Lijera revista histórica sobre los estudios hechos en el Perú en las ciencias . . ." by A. Raimondi, reproduced from *Anales Universitarios del Perú* (Lima, 1862), and "Estado de la Instrucción en el Perú en 1796" taken from the *Guía* of José Hipólito Unanue. Although a Spaniard, Dr. Rubio is himself a graduate of San Marcos. He has performed well a necessary and a useful task. The volume needs an index, for it treats of a great multiplicity of matters.

Dr. Pedro F. Vicuña is one of the few Hispanic Americans who have written on the history of the United States. His little book, *Los Estados Unidos* (Paris, "Le Livre Libre", 1932, pp. xxxii, 357) is a very creditable attempt to give Hispanic Americans an introduction to the history of the United States. The work is described as a "bosquejo histórico" and as such might very well find use in secondary schools and even in colleges in Hispanic America. The volume is dedicated to the Chilean, Juan Egaña, who was one of the earliest Pan Americanists, and a "prólogo" has been written by another equally well-known Chilean Agustín Edwards, who calls attention to its worth as a pioneer work as follows: "Ante todo tiene el mérito de ser la primera obra castellana sobre los Estados Unidos de América. Mucho y excelente se ha escrito sobre ese país en inglés, francés, alemán, italiano y, en verdad, en todas las lenguas, pero en el idioma de Cervantes apenas han visto la luz esporádicamente folletos, artículos y apuntes no siempre para hacerle justicia y examinar desapasionadamente el desarrollo portentoso del que es hoy día el primer pueblo del mundo." In his own foreword, the author says that his sole purpose in writing the volume is to familiarize his fellow citizens with the United States, and he remarks "The ignorance of Chileans with respect to the history of the United States . . . is fantastic." On p. xxiv, he says: "Es difícil comprender la ironía o el rencor del europeo por todo lo que lleva nombre americano." In his fifteen chapters, Sr. Vicuña discusses: Los precursores; La colonia; La independencia; Los grandes Virginianos; Al margen de la doctrina de Monroe; John Quincy Adams; Andrés Jackson; Hacia el Pacífico; La guerra de Secesión; El romance de Crespo; América contemporánea; América imperialista; Un siglo después de Jefferson; Al margen del Pan-americanismo; La Americanización económica del Mundo. Footnotes reveal that Sr. Vicuña has consulted many French, Hispanic American, and North American authors, among the last being Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson. He has (and wisely) made no attempt to make original researches. Sr. Vicuña, who is a staunch Pan Americanist, will undertake, it is hoped, further studies of the northern republic. There is room in Hispanic America for a number of monographs covering critical periods in the history of the United States and various movements which have been a part of its development. There is room also for a history of the United States of from four to

six volumes. Why should not Sr. Vicuña be the Hispanic American scholar to write such a work?

In 1932, The Instituto Hispano-Cubano de Historia de América at Seville published its third volume of the *Catálogo del Archivo de Protocolos de Sevilla* (which is also Vol. VIII of "Colección de Documentos Inéditos para la Historia de Hispano-América." This volume of 539 pages was issued, as were its predecessors, by the Compañía Ibero-Americana de Publicaciones (S.A.), with offices at Madrid, Barcelona, and Buenos Aires. In a short preliminary note, Dr. José Maria Ots Capdequí, technical director of the Instituto and professor in the University of Seville, states that "all the documents which are listed here, have a direct interest for the study of America, either through their contents or by reason of the persons who signed them. As in the two preceding volumes, each document is provided with the necessary data for identification and a short calendar. In all, 1600 documents are listed in this way. On pp. 397-449 are reproduced twenty of the most important documents, each being reproduced literally, except that apparently abbreviations are written out. Not only page endings but line endings are shown. These twenty documents consist of notarial items, each of which has been properly attested. Among them are delegations of authority by Andrés Niño, Sebastian Caboto, Doña Isabel Colón, Pedro Ximénez de Encizo; a letter by Dr. Sanchez de Matienzo to Lope de Conchillos; copy of a royal decree granting a pension to Vespucci's widow; receipts of money by agents acting in the names of their principals—among these being three by Jácome Boti, acting for Hernando Pizarro; a receipt given by Alonso de Santo Cruz in his own name for his salary for the last third of 1545; several inheritance items. The last appendix is as follows: "Don Jorge de Colón y de Portugal otorga poder a D. Enrique de Zuñiga, . . . para que defienda sus derechos a la sucesión del mayorazgo instituido por D. Cristóbal Colón, por haber muerto sin descendientes legítimos D. Diego Colón, almirante de las Indias." Pp. 453-525 consist of an index of contents, one of persons, and one of places—all very useful to the student. The volume maintains the high level set by the first two volumes, and is a praiseworthy accomplishment.

The Compañía Mexicana de Luz y Fuerza Motriz, S.A., published in 1932 a "Mapa de la Ciudad de Mexico y alrededores, Hoy y Ayer".

This map, which is in colors, measures about 28 x 37 inches, and was planned and executed by Emily Edwards. It was printed in Mexico by the American Book and Printing Co., S.A. The borders are ornamented with various arms. The whole map is not only a work of art but has much historical significance. The president of the company above noted is the well known G. R. G. Conway, who has done so much work on the subject of the early Inquisition with respect to Mexico.

A useful little volume for those about to visit Mexico is Jack Star-Hunt's *American Guide to Mexico*, which was published in 1932 by the American Chamber of Commerce, S.C.L. (pp. VI, 178, paper, \$1.00, U. S. currency). The volume was prepared to answer the question "Why go to Mexico" and to give information on how to prepare for the trip, how to go, and what to see. Chapter VI is "A Tourist's Spanish Vocabulary". The book can easily be carried in the pocket and will be a good companion to the one who has a limited time in Mexico and who wishes to see the best things.

Under the auspices of the Harvard Council of Hispano-American studies, seven bibliographies have already been published by the Harvard University Press at Cambridge, Massachusetts. These are as follows:

- Coester, Alfred: *A Tentative Bibliography of the Belles-Lettres of Uruguay* (1931, pp. viii, 22).
 Ford, J. D. M., Whitten, Arthur F., and Rafael, Maxwell I.: *A Tentative Bibliography of Brazilian Belles-Lettres* (1931, pp. vi, 201).
 Rivera, Guillermo: *Id. of Porto Rico* (1931, pp. viii, 61).
 Waxman, Samuel Montefiore: *A Bibliography of the Belles-Lettres of Santo Domingo* (1931, pp. x, 31).
 Leavitt, Sturgis E.: *Hispano-American Literature in the United States—A Bibliography of Translation and Criticism* (1932, pp. x, 54).
 Ford, J. D. M., and Rafael Maxwell, I.: *A Bibliography of Cuban Belles-Lettres* (1933, pp. x, 204).
 Torres, Riosco, Arturo: *Bibliografía de la Novela Mejicana* (1933, pp. viii, 58).

Each volume is indexed. Although no critical comments accompany the titles, these small volumes are extremely useful to investigators. The Harvard Council on Hispano-American studies consists of Professors Ford (its director), Whitten, Rivera, Waxman, Coester, Doyle, Leavitt, and Torres-Riosco. Under the auspices of the council was